

**T.R.**  
**ÇANAKKALE ONSEKİZ MART UNIVERSITY**  
**INSTITUTE OF EDUCATIONAL SCIENCES**  
**DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONAL SCIENCES**  
**PROGRAM OF EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION AND SUPERVISION**

**ANALYSIS OF THE EDUCATION INCENTIVE POLICY  
FOR PRIVATE EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS IN TURKEY**

**DOCTORAL DISSERTATION**

**HALİME ÖZTÜRK ÇALIKOĞLU**

**ÇANAKKALE**  
**August, 2018**

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**Halime ÖZTÜRK ÇALIKOĞLU**  
**(Doctoral Dissertation)**

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## Statement of Undertaking

I, hereby, declare that, the doctoral dissertation titled “Analysis of Education Incentive Policy for Private Schools in Turkey” was written solely by me. I confirm that all the materials and scientific resources used in this dissertation are stated as reference or acknowledgement.

31/08/2018

Halime ÖZTÜRK ÇALIKOĞLU








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Approval

The doctoral research pursued by Halime OZTURK CALIKOGLU was found satisfactory by the committee as a result of the dissertation defense held on August 31<sup>th</sup>, 2018 and it was accepted as a doctoral dissertation.

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Halime Öztürk Çalıkođlu



## **Abstract**

### **Analysis of the Education Incentive Policy for Private Education Institutions in Turkey**

**Halime Öztürk Çalkođlu**

Privatization policies in education have been witnessed in several countries across the world through different rationales including effectively using of limited resources, improving quality and equity, and providing alternatives for school choice. Thus, privatization in education has, recently, become a prevalent topic on the agenda of policy makers and related stakeholders in Turkey. This research aims at analyzing the identifiers, processes and outcomes of the education incentive policy (EIP) in Turkey which has been put into practice at the 2014-2015 school year to increase the share of private education in total by focusing on the children from socioeconomically disadvantaged families.

Drawing on interpretive case study design, “EIP” was considered as the case of the study. This qualitative case study has characteristics of single case with embedded units. As for the data sources; (1) policy documents, (2) policy-related governmental actors in the MoNE (6 people), (3) national statistics on beneficiaries, (4) practitioners as private school administrators (11 people from 7 schools) and parents who benefitted (11 parents) and who did not in Çanakkale city center although they applied (10 parents), and (5) reports of education think-tanks as well as media news were used. The data were analyzed with thematic content analysis method for qualitative data and descriptive statistical analysis for quantitative data.

The results indicate that especially in the last two years, the eligibility criteria was diversified through the benefit of lower socioeconomic groups, and outcomes regarding beneficiaries became closer to expected objectives. However, the policy outcomes should be considered carefully in terms of access and quality, since basic high school took a prominent place in the beneficiary quotas, although their position in the private sector was temporary. It also appears that, despite the measures taken, problems were witnessed related to household income determination method, and the policy could support more often the families who

already made their choice to attend private institutions. In conclusion, it can be said that, through the EIP, the government had the opportunity to invest in the equity and quality of education with lower amount of money than the regular amount invested per student in public education system.

**Keywords:** Education policy, incentives, private schools, privatization in education, interpretive case study





## Özet

### Türkiye’de Özel Öğretim Kurumları için Uygulanan ‘Eğitim ve Öğretim Desteği’

#### Politikasının Analizi

#### Halime Öztürk Çalıkođlu

Eđitimde özelleřtirme politikaları sınırlı kaynakların etkili kullanımını, eđitim kalitesini artırma, eřitlik sađlama, okul seřiminde alternatifler sunma gibi çeřitli gerekçelerle dünyada birçok ÷lkede uygulamaya konulmaktadır. Son dönemde benzer řekilde, Türkiye’de de eđitimde özelleřtirme, politika oluřturucuların ve eđitimle ilgili diđer paydařların gündeminde daha fazla yer almaya bařlamıřtır. Bu çalıřmada, sosyoekonomik aēıdan dezavantajlı ailelerin çocuklarını merkeze alarak özel öğretim eđitimdeki payını artırmak amacıyla, 2014-2015 eđitim-öđretim yılında Türkiye’de yürürlüđe konan ‘eđitim-öđretim desteđi’ politikasının belirleyiciler, süreçler ve sonuçlar aēısından analiz edilmesi amaçlanmaktadır.

Arařtırmada, yorumlayıcı durum çalıřması tasarımıından hareketle ‘eđitim-öđretim desteđi’ politikası durum olarak kabul edilmiřtir. Bu nitel durum çalıřması, iē iēe geēmiř durum çalıřması özelliđi tařımaktadır. Veri kaynađı olarak; (1) politika belgeleri, (2) MEB bünyesinde politikayla ilgili görev yapan yetkililer (6 kiři), (3) yararlanıcılara iliřkin ulusal istatistikler, (4) uygulayıcılar bađlamında Çanakkale-Merkez’de bulunan 7 özel okulun yöneticileri ile eđitim-öđretim’ desteđinden yararlanan (11 kiři) ve bařvurduđu halde yararlanamayan veliler (10 kiři) ile (5) eđitim örgütlerinin raporları ve medyadaki ilgili haberlerden yararlanılmıřtır. Nitel veriler iēerik analizi yoluyla, nicel veriler de betimsel istatistikler kullanılarak analiz edilmiřtir.

Sonuçlar, özellikle son iki yılda yararlanıcı seřim ölçütlerinin düşük sosyoekonomik düzeydeki aileler lehine çeřitlendirilerek, yararlanıcı profili aēısından politika hedeflerine yaklařıldıđını göstermektedir. Ancak, özel okul standartlarını tam karřılamadıkları halde geēici statü verilen özel temel liselerin, yararlanıcı kontenjanları aēısından bu artışta önemli řekilde yer alması, politika çıktılarının eđitime eriřim ve kalite aēısından deđerlendirilmesi gerektiđini ortaya koymaktadır. Ayrıca, alınan önlemlere rađmen, yararlanıcı seřiminde aile

gelir düzeyinin belirlenmesine ilişkin denetim sorunlarının devam ettiği ve politikanın daha çok halihazırda özel okula devam edebilecek sosyoekonomik düzeye sahip öğrenciler yararına sonuçlar üretebildiği anlaşılmaktadır. Nihai olarak, ‘eğitim-öğretim’ desteği uygulamasında devletin öğrenci başına yaptığı harcamadan daha az harcayarak kaynakların eşitlikçi kullanımı ve eğitim niteliğini artırmaya yönelik yatırım yapma fırsatına sahip olduğu söylenebilir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Eğitim politikası, eğitim ve öğretim desteği, özel öğretim kurumları, yorumlayıcı durum çalışması



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## Abbreviations and Symbols

EIP	: Education Incentive Policy (Eđitim-Öđretim Desteđi Politikası)
ERG	: Education Reforms Initiative
MEBBIS	: Informatics System of the Ministry of National Education
MoNE	: The Ministry of National Education
OECD	: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OOKGM	: The Head Office of Private Educational Institutions
PTI	: Private Tutoring Institutions
TEDMEM	: Turkish Education Association
TURKSTAT	: Turkish Statistical Institute
UNESCO	: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

## Chapter I: Introduction

### Background

Governments choose to do or not to do some activities to solve public problems within policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation and a total of these activities is called public policy (Birkland, 2001). Education, since it is a multi-disciplinary field, is highly connected and affected by cultural, economic, social and other public policies implemented by governments (Elliot, 2011; Taylor, 1997). It is also viewed among the high-priority policy areas by governments in terms of global economic competition (Hanushek, 2009). Policy options on education influence individual and societal lives directly and indirectly. In addition, as impacts of education policies are able to be observed in long years, decisions and maintenance of education policies become more difficult for policy makers/governmental actors (Yapıcı, 2006).

Since, in today's world, national education policies in the countries across the world are uncovered by international surveys and exams such as PISA, TIMSS, and PIRLS, worldwide trends might force policy makers to reconsider curriculum standards and regulations (Güner, Çelebi, Taşçı Kaya, & Korumaz, 2014; Tatto, 2012; Taysum & Iqbal, 2012). In addition, neo-liberalism has taken place in global education reform movements (GERM) for many countries across the world where the discourse in education policies is associated to the notions such as 'global knowledge economy' and 'human capital development' (Morgan & Volante, 2016; Spring, 2008) due to the causal positive relationship between economic growth and school enrollments (Gümüş & Kayhan, 2012). As a result of these spreading trends, governments start to look for the best practices including the education policies of high achieving countries and their policy tools to improve educational systems' performances (Tatto, 2012; Taysum & Iqbal, 2012). Further, education problems are framed with neoliberal globalized education

reforms such as privatization, decentralization, and quality control (Adamson & Astrand, 2016; Robertson, 2012).

One of the widely-implemented policy actions forced by global neo-liberal trends is the quest for expanding privatization in education at K-12 level (OECD, 2017; Patrinos, Barrera-Osorio, & Guaqueta, 2009). Traditionally, K-12 education is accepted as a public good in international educational discourse; however, the notion of common good has become under discussion in terms of privatization mechanisms in education due to the global trends in education policy reforms (UNESCO, 2015b). This has brought the arguments related to funding mechanisms of education and schools. As a result, increasing number of countries across the world have introduced education reform policies enabling the diversification of K-12 institution types by private sector. Furthermore, in many countries, private institutions have become more engaged in education system through accepting public funding (OECD, 2017; Patrinos et al., 2009; UNESCO, 2015a).

On the other hand, while many governments tend to establish similar -and in some cases, isomorphic- education policy reforms concerning privatization, decentralization and quality due to the increasing influence of globalization, the processes and outcomes of such reforms may vary according to several factors including economic, cultural, social conditions in given countries. Thus, governments might face positive or negative unintended consequences of the policy implementation as side-effects (Heck, 2004; Lane & Hamann, 2003; Morestin, 2012; Yanow, 2000). In addition, since policy is a social, relational, temporal, discursive, and political process, (invested with power relations instead of a rational and ordered manner), and education includes a variety of different stakeholders, the negotiation between policy makers and affected stakeholders becomes crucial to encourage collaborative and synergic action of all partners and to reach the expected goals of policies (Mainardes, 2015; Mingat, Tan, & Sosale, 2003). At this point, policy research takes a significant role in

providing evidence-based feedback to policy makers related to their decisions and the effectiveness of policies (Weimer & Vining, 1999).

Policy studies focus on the relationships between the variables reflecting social issues and other variables directed by public policies. Besides analyzing the texts and institutions and institutional process, they also examine the interactions among policy makers by questioning the values and principles and evaluating the results (Goodwin, 2011). Therefore, asking who makes policy choices, who affects these choices, and how are they determined becomes an important question (Yıldız & Sobacı, 2013). Moreover, there are numerous stakeholders affecting educational policies (policy makers, teachers and administrators, students and their parents, employers and the public) (UNESCO, 2013). Thus, describing the policy alternatives serving the best for the country is rather difficult (Mingat et al., 2003).

Education policy analysis includes the process of providing the necessary knowledge in order to comprehend and develop policies, critical evaluation and announcement (Dunn, 2012; Yıldız & Sobacı, 2013). Hence it aims to explore the complex nature of educational issues. Analyzing education policy aims at resolving the complicated nature of educational issues by producing required information to comprehend, improve and critically evaluate the policies and report the results (Dunn, 2012; Yıldız & Sobacı, 2013). As global trends bring isomorphic reforms and policy solutions to education problems worldwide, over the last three decades, an increasing number of policy researchers prefer to use critical frameworks rather than traditional approaches to analyze and evaluate governmental reforms (Young & Diem, 2017).

There is a growing literature in education policy research arena that recognizes the impacts of privatization mechanisms on the delivery of education. The issue of privatization in education has received considerable critical attraction since the right to access quality education is questioned in the context of freedom of choice (UNESCO, 2015b). A large

number of policy studies have been published related to different examples of privatization in education in the world. Policy scholars have debated the impacts of privatization in education and found out contradictory results related to the correlation between different variables and private education (Adamson, Astrand, & Darling-Hammond, 2016; Chingos & Peterson, 2012; Gauri & Vawda, 2003).

### **Statement of the Problem**

Education policies are constructed by the factors beyond nation and the discourses framing the policies are more and more shaped by international organizations such as OECD, the World Bank, and UNESCO (Rizvi & Lingard, 2010). For example, Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Education For All (EFA) goals by UNESCO have driven national policies and development in many countries (UNESCO, 2013). In this context, competitiveness and global pressures are shown as the strong rationales for national policies in recent years (Rizvi & Lingard, 2010). For the governments adopting neo-liberal reforms, it is an expected step to employ privatization in various sectors. One of the impacts of neo-liberal policies in education can be witnessed in the shift between public and private schools. Share of private sector in providing educational service increases within the context of freedom of choice (school choice), efficiency (quality), and equality of opportunity (UNESCO, 2015b, 2015a; Yatmaz, 2012). Voucher, or school choice, is one of the privatization mechanisms emerged with neoliberal policies in education.

The market-based reforms use the privatization as a policy driver and strengthen their argument with the economic rationale which is choice and, then, they apply the voucher as education mechanisms into the schools (Adamson & Astrand, 2016). This is how initially Milton Friedman proposed a different way of financing education, providing parents a government scholarship which can be used to pay for tuition at any approved school (Spring, 2015). Many states and countries adopted the financial mechanism to provide freedom of

choice to parents and students. Although population eligible for vouchers may vary in countries, poverty-oriented or income-based programs are common in terms of student eligibility requirements.

However, studies have shown that formulation, implementation and outcomes of voucher policies may result differently and bring unexpected consequences for governments and societies due to the country-related concerns and differences (Adamson et al., 2016; Peterson, Campbell, & West, 2002). Thus, policy process related to privatization and specifically vouchers in each country requires specific attention to understand country related rationales and consequences. In addition, as voucher policies may be used to rationalize the understanding of 'education for private good' and spread trends of globalization in emerging economies, they should be carefully developed, analyzed and updated to protect the common good understanding for education in such cases. Therefore, more analysis of voucher policies is needed especially in developing countries, which newly introduced vouchers to expand privatization in their education systems.

Turkey is one of the countries that have begun to implement policies on expanding privatization at K12 plus pre-primary levels through a voucher like scheme-named as education incentive. The education incentive policy for private education institutions in Turkey has being implemented for four years since the 2014-2015 school year. Through the policy implementation, the government provides education incentive to the parents who would like to send their children to private schools. The government rationalizes the policy by underlining the efficient use of the public resources and providing equity for as well as access to quality education. The experiences in practice, on the other hand, raise questions about the implications of the policy and its outcomes. At this point, while the policy is spoken by several think-tanks and researchers, there is little comprehensive and holistic research on it based on evidences. In addition, considering the globally growing privatization and voucher

policy movements that especially influence developing countries, Turkey appears as an emerging case to analyze since the isomorphic policy reforms in the world might result in different outcomes in each case.

### **Purpose of the Study**

This interpretive qualitative case study seeks to describe and evaluate the education incentive policy initiated in Turkey. The study aims to provide insights for a holistic and intensive description of the policy process of education incentive case. Through the investigation of the policy using various data sources, this study investigates the understandings, meanings, and actions by different stakeholders of the policy. For this purpose, qualitative and quantitative data sources were utilized. Interviews were employed with governmental actors in the MoNE and private education institution administrators and beneficiary and non-beneficiary parents in Çanakkale central district. In addition, policy documents for positioning the policy and national statistical data for the beneficiary students were examined. The main driving question of this study is: “What are the identifiers, processes and results of the Education Incentive Policy in Turkish context?” To describe, explain, and evaluate the education incentive policy applied by the MoNE of Turkey, the study seeks to answer the following research questions:

1. How can we position the policy in its own terms?
2. Regarding the policy actors;
  - a. Who benefits from the policy?
  - b. How do the related actors value the policy?
3. What are the experiences of the practitioners?
4. How does the policy work?



### **Significance of the study**

The framework used in this policy analysis can guide policy analysts and researchers in their studies. Recently, several educational think tanks in Turkey such as ERG (Education Reform Initiative), TEDMEM (Turkish Education Association Publications), and SETA (Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research) publish evaluative reports regarding government policies on education. This shows that policy analysts are getting more prone to examine education policy reforms and their effects in the context of more effective and long-term policies in education. Hence, this study can contribute policy debates and discussions for the issue under study. In addition, policy researchers in the world can familiarize with the Turkey case from a comparative point of view.

Second, for policy makers, the results of this study provide evidences for the intended and unintended consequences of policy implementation. Discussion and research on social issues and policies provide a perspective related to the accomplishments and deficits as policies are implemented (Bevel, 1997 cited in Erratt et al., 2011). Further, the results of this policy analysis study are expected to contribute to the evaluation of the education incentive program in a holistic approach and to discuss about the long-term results for the sustainability of the policy implementation.

For the practitioners, this interpretive study can present them, especially educational leaders in institutions, different understandings, and meanings to gain insights concerning how the policies affect their everyday life.

### **Assumptions**

For the qualitative data source of the study, the interviews with the selected stakeholders representing the governmental actors and the practitioners are utilized. According to the subjectivity factor of qualitative data collection process, it is assumed that the participants shared their beliefs, opinions, values, and feelings truly.

## **Limitations**

The statistical analyses for the beneficiaries at the country level are based on the data provided from the Head Office of Private Educational Institutions within the body of the Ministry of National Education in Turkey. Second, the experiences of the policy practitioners are limited to local level for a deeper analysis. For this purpose, the data is gathered from the private education institutions in the central district of Çanakkale province. The policy outcomes in other cities may result in different experiences.

On the other hand, I adopt an interpretive approach in this study in which the researcher aims to discuss the conflicting proposals and outcomes by different interpretive communities. Therefore, I do not have a position to conduct this research to advocate or propose the policy.

## **Definition of Key Terms**

**Policy:** It is defined as what governments choose to do or not to do (Dye, 2005). A dynamic and value-laden process including government's objectives in written and policy actions in practice to solve a public problem (Fowler, 2014).

**Public Policy:** It refers to government actions and purposeful inactions in order to solve the problems and distribute limited resources within the context of social issues and needs (Birkland, 2001).

**Education Policy:** It stands for purposeful actions developed and formed to solve issues in education in the context of educational goals.

**Education Incentive Policy:** It is the policy to provide the amount of public expenditure per pupil to selected beneficiary students to attend a private education institution.

**Policy Makers:** They are the authorized people in the Ministry of Education, who make the decisions to develop and improve the education policies.

**Policy Analysis:** It is an exploratory process designed in order to produce data to understand and improve policies, and critically evaluate and report them (Dunn, 2012; Yıldız & Sobacı, 2013).

**Policy Analysis Framework:** It is an up-to-date tool which enables evaluating the policy holistically, shows different aspects and steps of the process and gives opportunity to raise new questions (Bayırbağ, 2013).

**Interpretive Policy Analysis:** It focuses on difference between expectations and actual experiences by means of discovering meaning by interpretive communities through text and reasons behind their acts (Yanow, 2000).

**Private Education Institutions (PEI):** They are the government-dependent private schools at pre-primary and K-12 levels under the provisions of the Private Education Institutions Law No. 5580 (TBMM, 2007).

**Private Tutoring Institutions (PTI):** They are the institutions outside of formal education system, which prepare students for especially high-stake standardized tests at national level.

**Basic High Schools:** Upper-secondary level private education institution which are being transformed from private tutoring institutions to private education institutions. These institutions are given temporary right to enroll students as private education institutions and are expected to provide basic legal requirements of private education institution by the school year 2018-2019 (TBMM, 2014).

**Privatization** is transferring the ownership and management of public education to the private sector (Adamson & Astrand, 2016).

**Voucher** is a government-supplied financial aid used to pay tuition fees at eligible private schools. Targeted vouchers are selectively provided to students or schools that meet certain criteria (OECD, 2017).

### **Structure of the Dissertation**

The study continues with the conceptual framework (Chapter 2) which gives the literature related to education policy and voucher as a privatization mechanism and its arguments based on policy-relevant studies. In Chapter 3, the interpretive case study design of the study is explained in detail including the case, data collection and analysis procedures. After that, Chapter 4 presents the findings based on the descriptive statistical data and interviews related to the voucher-scheme implementation in Turkey. In the Discussion Chapter (Chapter 5), the findings of the study are argued in light of policy-relevant literature. The study concludes with a Conclusion and Recommendations part (Chapter 6) which includes the conclusions and recommendations for different stakeholders such as policy makers, practitioners, and policy scholars.

## Chapter II: Conceptual Framework

This chapter explains the concepts related to the study including policy and education policy analysis, privatization in education in the context of neoliberal education reforms, voucher programs, and voucher policy arguments.

### Policy

Policy has various definitions in the literature. The very well-known definition is by (Dye, 2005) stating policy is ‘whatever governments choose to do or not to do’ (p.3). Policy refers to the purposeful statements related to action plans or ideals. Policy is also defined as purposes and implementations which governments seek for the social, political and economic results (Goodwin, 2011). That means, policy includes purposeful actions to solve a problem defined by governments. In addition, Fowler (2014) states that public policy is progressive and value-laden process introducing legislative statements and their enactments in practice by the government in order to get handle on public problems. Rizvi and Lingard (2010) identify they policy as ‘the authoritative allocation of values’. In other words, policy process is not only related to a bunch of decisions to solve a problem, but also includes reproducing the behaviors in society through change in values. Further, Yıldız and Sobacı (2013) list the characteristics of public policies as in the following:

- Public policies are goal and target oriented.
- Political authorities formulate, implement and evaluate public policies.
- Public policy points out a process and a complete form of governmental actions and decisions designed for a solution of certain social problems.
- Public policy is a process broader than a decision.
- Public policy includes both to act and not to act.
- Public policy is reactions of governments against pressures depend on perceived problems; thus, it is a product of demand side.

- Public policy is subject to change based on information related to the policy effects after its implementation.
- Public policy has various aims such as resolution of conflicts on resource allocation, behavioral regulation, and protection of rights.

The policy making is a circular process including the steps of agenda setting, policy formulation, policy implementation, and evaluation (Rizvi & Lingard, 2010; Yıldız & Sobacı, 2013). Birkland (2001) states the elements as to public policy cycle below:

- Policy is made in the name of public.
- Policy is initiated or made by governments.
- Policy is attempted and implemented by public and private actors.
- Policy is the things intended to do by governments.
- Policy is the things that governments choose to do or not to do.

The main stages of policies are policy formulation and implementation (Bell & Stevenson, 2006). The stage of policy formulation includes determining of objectives and priorities regarding the problem, stating policy options/alternatives to solve the problem, and choosing among alternatives (Yıldız & Sobacı, 2013). This stage is the part where policy makers express the intent of policy issue in written forms such as statute or related legal statements (Fowler, 2014).

The implementation stage is regarded how the policy is put into practice. Bell and Stevenson (2006) emphasized the dialectic process of policy implementation due to the competing values and interests of different policy actors. In addition, Ball, Maguire, and Braun (2012) describe this process as policy enactment since they believe in that policy is reproduced by the practitioners during the policy cycle's period of implementation. Further, policy makers have some concerns related to whether the policy produces desired changes in terms of policy effectiveness (Heck, 2004).

**Types of policy.** Lowi's (1964) typology divides policy types into three groups: distributive, regulatory, and redistributive (Bickers & Williams, 2001; Fowler, 2014). At first, distributive policies comprehend to distribute subsidies, contracts or non-regulatory licenses for the interests of certain groups. Regulatory policies are pursued for the reason of public good and usually restrict or ban the private sector concerning their failures in the market in order to protect the national economic situation (Aypay, 2015). Lastly, redistributive policies are common in education field and governments execute these policies by shifting economic resources or power among different social groups. This situation might cause conflicts among interest groups (Fowler, 2014).

Rizvi and Lingard (2010) explain types of policy in six groups based on their purposes: symbolic vs. material, rational vs. incremental, and distributive vs. redistributive. First, symbolic policies do not take in substantial funding; thus, this leads to less commitment to the implementation. On the contrary, material policies involve a significant amount of money and evaluation of policy consequences takes an important role due to the commitment. Second, incremental feature of policies is related to policy development depend on the previous policies. In addition, development of rational policies follows a strict pathway through policy process. Finally, distributive and redistributive policies are related to allocate the resources. Redistributive policies especially seek for the disadvantage groups concerning equity. However, an approach of distributing funding for disadvantaged groups has been applied in recent years (Rizvi & Lingard, 2010). For instance, No Child Left Behind (NCLB) policy in the US is an international example of largely distributive policy to pursue equality of opportunity for low-performing students and schools (Hannaway & Woodroffe, 2003).

**Education policy.** In social sciences, power is the dominant term since it shapes the relationships between actors through language and actions (Fowler, 2014). Therefore, power resources help to manage the public policy process. Further, education is among the

privileged policy areas of governments around the world since it is required to survive in the global economic competition today (Hanushek, 2009) and the concept of human capital (Spring, 2015).

Major education policy actors are classified as governmental and non-governmental actors (Fowler, 2014). Governmental actors include legislative, executive and judicial actors at local and national levels while non-governmental actors consist of education and non-education interest groups such as teacher unions, think-tanks, business companies (Birkland, 2001; Fowler, 2014). Each policy actor has a scope of power to apply in policy cycle. For instance, governmental actors use their power resources of economy and official position for decision-making; yet, parents and students might only use the power of numbers to force and persuade the authorities (Fowler, 2014).

### **Policy Analysis**

The purpose of policy analysis process is to produce usable knowledge to make the most appropriate and effective decisions (Bardach, 2012). With this purpose, this process is based on the evaluation of alternatives comparing their benefits related to one or more objectives and/or values and making decision among them (Munger, 2000). In other words, policy analysis can be seen as an exploratory process to find solutions to problems through an applied methodology (Dunn, 2012).

Policy analysis methods compose of two groups which are traditional and interpretive policy analysis (Diem, Young, Welton, Mansfield, & Lee, 2014; Mansfield & Thachik, 2016; Young & Diem, 2017). Traditional method seeks for measurable evidence to evaluate the effects of a policy and assumes policy analysis process including a series of steps from problem definition to evaluation (Mansfield & Thachik, 2016). On the other hand, Interpretive Policy Analysis (IPA) method points out contestable (discussable) nature of policy regarding problem definition, research findings, and arguments for solutions (Mansfield & Thachik,




2016). Further, IPA explores schools as a location of reproduction of the policy and has some concerns; the difference between policy text and practice, policy development in historical and contextual basis, benefits in terms of stakeholders, and how policy provides equity (Diem et al., 2014).

Interpretive policy analysis particularly started to be applied in the field of public policy after 1960s (Orhan, 2013). IPA has an inductive approach emphasizing meaning making from data by close readings of policy discourse (Mansfield & Thachik, 2016). In addition, IPA seeks to discover the meaning of the policy and also its applications to specific situations. Further, Yanow (2000) describes that IPA examines the policy implementation process in terms of insights of the practitioners and makes comparison between the actual meaning and real-life practice of the policy. Representative meanings are hidden in the policy artifacts and IPA is interested in what the policy means and for whom (Yanow, 2000). Such analysis aims to explore the complex nature of policy making process through the politics of discourse related to a policy (Taylor, 1997).

**Framework for policy analysis.** Policy analysis framework enables the researchers to form a basis for the studies by determination of variable classifications and the relationships between variables. The framework should serve as a determinant in the conceptualization of the policy problem and its content with a flexible approach to produce new questions and present a current context mapping (Bayırbağ, 2013; Tatto, 2012). Theories of policy process are taken into account (Petridou, 2014; Sabatier, 2007) and used to determine the conceptualization of the policy issue and its context (Jones, 2013). The frameworks below were given information briefly related to their stages and how they design the policy analysis process.

Cheng and Cheung (1995) frame the policy analysis process into four stages which are analysis of background and underlying principles, analysis of policy formulation process,

analysis of educational policy implementation (gaps between implementation and planning), and analysis of educational policy effect. Further, Cheng, et.al. (2002) report simplified procedures of analyzing education policies from the economic perspective. They take into account the economic issues and concerns in education policy analysis including demands for education and supply of education, structure of education system, economic effects and benefits in education and relationships between them (Cheng, et. al., 2002) (Figure1).



*Figure 1.* A policy analysis framework for economic consideration in education policy.

Source: Cheng, Ng & Mok, 2002, p.2.

Another framework is Bardach's (2012) structured eight-fold framework which simply includes the steps: defining issue as problem, finding evidence, selecting criteria, projecting outcomes, confront trade-offs, deciding, and telling the story. Bardach (2012) suggests a simplified and evaluative definition of policy problem. He draws that assembling evidence is important to convince the stakeholders' beliefs about how to solve the policy problem and the alternatives should be taken into account before data collection. He also emphasizes that criteria are generated to evaluate the projected outcomes not directly the alternatives; that means how does an alternative affect the outcomes. During the projection of outcomes, the best and worst scenarios are evaluated according to the criteria. After that, within the context of cost vs. benefits and cost-effectiveness relations, tradeoffs are confronted again amongst projected outcomes. Having made decision from the point of view of decision makers, the story is told including what is important, why and how the conclusion has been reached.

National priorities of a country affect the policy constitution process and these priorities are stated in the key official strategy documents and plans that define policy directions to be implemented (UNESCO, 2013a, 2013b). UNESCO published a two-volume handbook on *Education Policy Analysis and Programming* and offers a framework which is mostly based on international policy organizations' policy related documents including globalized goals. In addition, identification of the key stakeholders is drawn in the report since it takes important place in order to understand the political dynamics of education policies. UNESCO (2013) emphasizes the importance of analyzing national education policies and their implementation that it is useful to verify what extend the countries take into consideration and implement the international and regional conventions and agreements. While a conceptual framework for policy analysis was given in Vol. 1 with detailed information on sub-sectors, dimensions and issues related to education system, Vol. 2 includes a methodological approach and practical tools with set of matrices.

When the frameworks for analyzing education policies in the literature were examined, the existing frameworks seem mostly based on interpretive and critical policy analysis approach as Young and Diem (2017) assert that increasing number of policy researchers use critical frameworks rather than traditional approaches over last three decades. One of the interpretive policy analysis frameworks is Stephen J. Ball's interpretive policy toolbox approach. Ball (1993) reports two conceptualization methods policy as: *policy as text* and *policy as discourse*. Ball states in an interview (Alevar, 2016) that the role of international organizations in policy making process now (e.g. World Bank, OECD, etc.) makes policy researchers have to think about policy differently. He remarked to dematerialization of policy analysis for the reasons of this situation (Alevar, 2016) and he suggests the re-materialization of policy in terms of context including facilities, people, and money. He also mentions the scope of context by underlying that education policy was about buildings, money, power relations, and other things within his Foucauldian post-structuralist perspective. In other words, Ball's toolbox includes the heuristic divergence between policy text and discourse, the notion of policy cycle and the relationship between text and action (Alevar, 2016; Ball, 1993).

The interpretive policy analysis has an important place in the policy analysis methodology and Yanow (2000) offers the framework of interpretive policy analysis as well. She focuses on unveiling ideological basis by analyzing the meanings of values, feelings, or beliefs expressed in policy artifacts and on the processes how those meanings are perceived by various audiences. The five-stage of interpretive analysis process includes: identifying of the artifacts having significant meaning for the policy; identifying communities of meaning/interpretation; identifying the specific meanings mentioned in policy discourses and artifacts; identifying conflict points between interpretations of different communities related to policy; and effects/reflections and consensus scenarios related to these differences.

Another framework by Tatto's editorship (2012) emphasizes the problematic situation about precise and valid constructive and summative feedback on policy implementation. Their framework follows three key strands: the conceptualization of the policy issue, the use of theory based on the definition of policy-theory-in-action and the collection of multi-perspective sound research studies to criticize the effects of policy implementation and make valid recommendations for policy. The policy analysis process within this exploratory approach includes the following stages: conceptualization of policy problem, development of policy research questions and theoretical framework, collection of precise evidences regarding the policy issue, critical analyses of the findings, resulting in a feasible and evidence-based policy option, and recommendations for further policy research on the policy under study.

Alexander (2013) offers a framework which has both rational and critical approach in a practical policy analysis guide. After policy analysts establish their guiding values and philosophies and define the policy issue, they assemble most valuable qualitative and/or quantitative data for evidence. Then they determine the policy alternatives and evaluate them according to the criteria: effectiveness, equity, cost, political feasibility, and implementation feasibility. This ten-step approach to policy analysis emphasizing both theory and practice include in detail: defining the problem, making the case, establishing the driving values, developing alternatives, weighing the options, making recommendations, persuading the audience, implementing the solution, monitoring outputs, and evaluating outcomes.

In Jones's study (2013), she asserts a conceptual framework based on education orientations (conservative, liberal, critical and post-modern) which provides a multi-perspective literature review required before the policy analysis. The orientation-based conceptual framework is based on three aspects: *education orientation* (broad description for the selected education policy area), *approach or discourses* (fitting with the orientations), and *ideology* (explanations or key ideas/traits/indicators). The suggested conceptual framework

has been drawn attention for ensuring a complete literature review before the analysis. The author specified the benefits of using this frame: advantage of using an explicit conceptual frame, creating a common language for conflated policy terms, providing comparison between analysis of policy types, and allowing orientation change monitoring over time by policy discourses in policy types, education sectors, and countries.

Bell and Stevenson (2006), on the other hand, argue their interpretive analysis framework within the scope of the themes of last two decades in their book which are human capitalism, citizenship and social justice, and market choice and accountability. Their four-stage analysis framework is based on a policy approach seen both as product and process in order to explore the dynamic relationship between power (state) and policy development.

According to Bayırbağ (2013), producing institutional matrix, timing and contextual analysis mapping regarding the policy issue will be useful to explore the meaning and context of the policy in question. The researcher featured the policy implementation instead of decision making in the public policy analysis process since policy implementation as an action already includes the decision-making mechanisms, action is taken as a prerequisite for policies to actualize, and street level bureaucracy has an increasing role in policy process.

The frameworks mentioned above have similar aspects and several common stages interested in exploring the formulation and implementation processes of policy cycles. Some of the frameworks offer a linear set of stages for analyzing policy while others present a flexible way of analysis due to the complexity of policy process. Traditional frameworks offer mostly quantitative analysis methods for measurable evidences of policy (Cheng & Cheung, 1995; Cheng et al., 2002) as well as the interpretive policy analysis approach in particular takes into account values and power influences on the policy making process benefit from a discourse analysis of policy artifacts (Alexander, 2013; Ball, 1993; Ball et al., 2012; Bayırbağ, 2013; Bell & Stevenson, 2006; Jones, 2013; Tatto, 2012; Yanow, 2000).

Policy analysis studies provide evidences for decision-making processes of policy makers. In addition, policy analysts interview and discuss the conflicting proposals and outcomes (Yanow, 2000) and can have influence on policy development process. Furthermore, there is an increasing number of policy studies related to globalized education policy reforms affecting education policies of many countries. These neoliberal reforms take place in education system with different mechanisms such as privatization and decentralization. Concerning the policy subject under study, the next section will give the concepts in detail.

### **Neoliberal Reforms in Education Policy**

Neoliberal reforms in public policies started to take place across the world in the 1980s, which has restricted the solutions of public problems based on market-oriented frames (Polat, 2013; Saltman, 2014). Neo-liberals within politics of education are grouped in fiscal conservative perspective; that means the evolution of governance in education shifted into private funding (Jones, 2013). The role of private schools in the provision of education is a controversial issue in terms of access to quality education as a public right (UNESCO, 2015b). Therefore, there is a trend toward marketization in education which politics of education change about government and public delivery of educational services (Mitchell et al., 2011). Neoliberal policies in education can be have impacts that education is seen as a consumable service and presenting various alternatives to provide education service in the name of increasing quality (Saltman, 2014).

Neoliberal reforms promoting educational standards and for marketization of education have impact all over the world which based on development of knowledge and skills of student for individual decisions (Jones, 2013). For example, it takes place in the “2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)” of UNESCO within the context of all children’s access to quality education which is stated as “Ensure inclusive and equitable

quality education for all” (UNESCO, 2015a). In addition, the report of “UNESCO 2030 Education Goals” emphasizes that private financing resources can be oriented to reinforce with the aim of reaching the related goals in the context of transparency and accountability (UNESCO, 2015a). Privatization has been introduced in education systems against public investment as a result of global education reform movement throughout the world (Adamson et al., 2016).

**Privatization in education.** Privatization is shown as neoliberal policy driver which public ownership and responsibility are transferred to privately operated organizations (Adamson & Astrand, 2016; Patrinos et al., 2009). Thus, profit motives drive neo-liberal privatization or public-private partnerships in education (Saltman, 2014). Four main objectives of public-private partnerships were stated as: increasing private enrollment, improving overall student achievement, increasing equality of opportunity, and reducing education expenditures (Patrinos et al., 2009). In addition, efficiency in delivering educational services is seen as the primarily economic rationale for privatization (Adamson & Astrand, 2016).

There is a common perception regarding that public education fails and this view creates a strong pressure for change and reform in the traditional public education system (Mitchell et al., 2011). At this point, school choice includes multiple considerations that cause parents send their children to private schools instead of public schools (Tam, 2002). Thus, parents can choose among the alternatives in according with their satisfaction from public schools (Bagley & Woods, 1998).

Private schools are operated as government-independent or government-dependent (OECD, 2011). Private schools are usually run by autonomous boards and they control their curriculum to be taught and how. Nevertheless, e.g. private schools in the US are not independent since they follow the government law and regulations. Similarly, K-12 level



private education institutions in Turkey are also government-dependent schools. Private education institutions in Turkey follow the same curriculum in public schools. The students attending private education institutions take the national exams for upper secondary and higher education levels. Further, in Turkey, private education institutions follow a free admission system to register students since September 1<sup>st</sup>, 2014 ([www.ozelokullardernegi.org.tr](http://www.ozelokullardernegi.org.tr)).

Governments apply various kinds of public-private partnerships to support private schools for different purposes regarding the education system. Patrinos, Barrera-Osorio and Guaqueta (2009) describe the ‘integral public-private partnership’ as the strongest one where government provides public funding to private schools by subsidizing voucher to students. The students receive this money to participate in a private school they choose; hence this strengthens student choice and competition among schools.

**Voucher programs.** Voucher is one of the demand-side financing mechanisms whose benefits are; choice, equity, better quality education, and efficient resource allocation (Vawda, 2000). Voucher programs are demand-side intervention by government to provide public funding directly to parents to attend a private school they choose. Thus, voucher programs differ from other private school choice mechanisms since they provide funding indirectly (Shakeel, Anderson, & Wolf, 2016).

There are some key elements to take into consideration in designing voucher and voucher-like systems: finance, regulation and support services (Levin, 2002). These elements are important for the government to manage the criteria and they are explained in the following. First, finance is related to the magnitude of voucher, which can provide more alternatives to parents in school market for their children. Second, regulation refers to the eligibility requirement determined by the government for both schools and students to take place in the voucher system. Last, support services to be provided by the government and

private schools facilitate parents' conditions to involve in voucher system such as transportation and information about school choices.

A universal voucher program is firstly proposed by Milton Freidman in 1960s for Chilean case in which governments supply voucher amount to parents for approximately equal to per pupil expenditure in public schooling system in order to purchase educational service in the approved educational institutions operated by both for-profit and non-profit organizations (Witte, 2009). Freidman promotes the individual and rational choice paradigm based on the idea that individuals invest in their education due to the economic returns (Spring, 2015). Thus, the proposed voucher system enables parents to be able to determine the value of educational services. Furthermore, Patrinos et al. (2009) states the features of voucher systems as follows:

- Funding is based on expressed demand,
- All private schools share the risk of not attracting enough students,
- Private schools have a diverse student profile since they reflect the preferences of specific communities,
- Parents make school choice freely among public and private schools,
- Finance and provision of education are separate,
- Private schools must follow the educational standards legislated by the government.

**Types of vouchers.** Voucher programs are usually categorized into two: universal and targeted voucher programs (Patrinos et al., 2009; Shakeel et al., 2016; Witte, 2009). Universal voucher programs are applied to all students attending private schools with no eligibility requirements. For instance, the universal voucher programs in Chile, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, France, and other European countries are some examples in the world (Patrinos et al., 2009; Shakeel et al., 2016). On the other hand, targeted voucher programs have restrictions such as geographical region, income level or disadvantageous status (Patrinos et

al., 2009; Shakeel et al., 2016; Witte, 2009). For example, the entire voucher programs in the U.S. are geographically restricted (e.g. Louisiana, Ohio, Wisconsin,), some of them are targeted restricted with income or disability status (e.g. Maryland, North Carolina, India, D.C. for income-based and Florida, Arkansas, Georgia for disabled students), or some of them are both (ECS, 2017; Witte, 2009).

In addition, Peterson, Campbell and West (2002) point out two main types of voucher programs in the context of the U.S. as direct voucher programs and tax-credit programs which are both income targeted so they cover low- and lower middle- income families. Further, there are examples of targeted voucher programs in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and South Africa to increase access for under-served parts of the community since various factors including gender, geographical development and poverty (Patrinos et al., 2009).

Universal voucher programs aim to increase access to quality education and diversify the school alternatives for parents to choose, while targeted voucher programs improve the equality of opportunity for disadvantaged groups of students such as girls, disabled, and minority students (Patrinos et al., 2009). OECD (2012b) reported that universal and targeted voucher programs have different outcomes. Similarly, they emphasize that targeted voucher programs promote the equity while universal programs increase the quality in education via competitive school market.

The voucher models can also be categorized into two groups according to their goals to pursue: merit-based and need-based financial aids. Merit-based financial aids are given to students based on their academic and other achievements while need-based aids are given according to the financial status of students. Regarding to the eligibility criteria of voucher systems to allocate voucher money, it can be called as merit or need based financial aid for students to attend private schools. For example, income-targeted voucher programs indicate the feature of need-based financial aids.

**Voucher programs in international context.** After the proposal of Milton Friedman in 1955, voucher policy implementations started to be applied in many countries across the world such as several states of USA, Chile, Colombia, India, and European countries such as Sweden, the Netherlands, and Belgium. OECD (2017) reports the data of 2009 that seven of the included OECD countries were providing vouchers from primary through secondary education (e.g. the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark). There are given some examples below with respect to different voucher policy implementations across the world.

*Chile.* The truly universal voucher program in Chile initiated in 1981 in which each student receive a considerable subsidy to use in public or private schools including secular and religious schools (Witte, 2009). Over 50% of students attend private subsidized schools across school levels. Private schools should meet the minimum requirements given below to receive voucher (Erişen, 2013; OECD, 2017):

- To be recognized by the educational authorities,
- To include at least 15% of disadvantaged group of students in education,
- To meet the regulations for minimum and maximum number of class-size,
- To have the all grades for the educational level,
- To have an internal regulation concerning rights and responsibilities of the school, parents and students.
- To have a publicly available admission and disciplinary rules related to expulsion, suspension and schools' transfers procedures,
- They must give information to parents about their educational mission
- They must make the payments for the staff on time,

Erişen (2013) examined the Chilean voucher system and she reported the factors for the emergence of the program as; (1) decentralization in the school management, (2) giving private sector opportunity in provision of education in order to increase education quality, (3)

equality of opportunity by paying equal amount of money for every student in both public and private schools, (4) assessment system gathering data about student achievements which provides information to parents for school choice.

There are numerous studies with mixed results relevant to the effectiveness of vouchers in Chile (Adamson et al., 2016). In addition, Chilean case allows parents to choose any public and private schools; therefore, this situation has caused segregation in many ways such as socioeconomic status, income, student selection based on academic achievement, and parental choice (Portales & Heilig, 2012). Further, voucher receivers include mostly the parents selected based on their social class and socioeconomic status (Witte, 2009). To prevent this circumstance, in 2016, the voucher policy was regulated as eligible private schools should admit at least 15% of students from disadvantaged group. Hence, previously private schools serve less for disadvantaged groups due to selectively admissions. The regulation in 2016 forbids selectively admissions based on social, economic and academic criteria (OECD, 2017).

***The Netherlands.*** Among European countries, it has the oldest choice program (Witte, 2009). Targeted voucher program is applied since mid 1980s based on eligible students' and parent's background. More than two thirds of 15-year-old students are enrolled in publicly funded private schools in which selectively admissions are applied lightly than not-publicly funded private schools. Further, private schools have high level of school autonomy and decentralized governance; hence, the system gives chance for innovative schools and education alternatives for parental choice based on pedagogic and religious approaches and socio-economic profile. In addition, wide variety of alternatives for school choice, quality increase by competition among schools, high level of school autonomy, and equity in the overall achievement are expressed among positive effects of school choice (OECD, 2017).

**Belgium.** The Flemish Community of Belgium is another European country where most of students at primary and secondary levels attend government-dependent private schools. Private schools selectively admit students based on test scores, performance, religious background or gender according to school missions and profile. Public funding is allocated to private schools per student public expenditure since 2003. The positive effects of publicly funded private schools are to provide wide variety of school alternatives for parents, to limit inequality, and raise quality by motivating competition among schools. The concerns, on the other hand, are socioeconomic segregation among schools and relationship between learning outcomes of students and their family background (OECD, 2017).

**Estonia.** Public funds aim to broaden school choice in Estonia. First, subsidy was given as grant for teacher salaries in private schools. In 2011, it was expanded to grant per student funding for operating costs of private schools. Informed choices of parents are provided in Estonian school choice system to encourage competition among schools which increases education quality in schools. However, it is observed that more smaller schools and classes are established without their significant contribution for overall achievement (OECD, 2017).

**Denmark.** By 2013, 19% of students attend in private schools in Denmark. On average, socio-economically advantaged students are likely to attend private schools. Publicly subsidized private schools are seen positively in terms of improvements and innovations in education; however, competition among schools cause to increase in expenditure per student, no improvement in student performance, and segregation among schools. In addition, there is need for informed choices by parents (OECD, 2017).

**Sweden.** In 1992, the Swedish government initiated a large-scale voucher program to allocate public funds to private schools in providing education service. The rationales for the program were to increase competition and alternatives for school choice (Adamson et al.,

2016). In addition, private schools work government-dependent; thus, they follow the national curriculum and apply no charge for extra fees from enrolled students (Kalkan, 2014; OECD, 2017).

*USA.* The voucher program in the United States is limited geographically (14 states and the D.C.) and income-targeted. The first program was introduced as a targeted low-income program in Milwaukee, Wisconsin in 1990. The voucher programs in the U.S. have different names mainly including parental and school choice, scholarship, opportunity, succeed, disability, and special education (ECS, 2017). As it is understood from the keywords for the names of voucher programs, they are all targeted based on income, geography and special education need. Moreover, voucher amount is determined primarily based on the State's per pupil expenditure. Yet, cost of private school tuition and fees are more effective to determine the amount in disability programs (Witte, 2009).

Most of the private schools are religious in the U.S. Therefore, parental choice based on ideological considerations gain importance. Further, students in most of the U.S. voucher programs are required to take nationally recognized standardized tests and parents are informed about it. The ones do not ask for testing requirements must give a portfolio or progress report to parents. Furthermore, there are no limits for enrollments in voucher schools in the programs. That means, the private schools enroll as many students as possible in the voucher programs according to its target. However, they can give priority to students with low-performance, scholarship status in the previous year, and having siblings in the same school. Nearly half of the voucher programs does require student attendance at public schools previously (ECS, 2017).

*Colombia.* The large-scale voucher program in Colombia is also another long-standing example in the world. The Colombian government initiated the voucher program targeted low-income students at secondary level in 1991. The Ministry aimed to use the stagnant

capacity of secondary level private schools and to reduce over-enrollment in public schools. In addition, the program is restricted to only secular private schools (Arenas, 2004).

In summary, the emergence of voucher policy in countries have several goals; to broaden school (individual) choice (e.g. Chile, Sweden, Estonia), to promote competition among schools and increase the quality of education (e.g. Chile), and to increase equity to access quality education (e.g. Colombia and the U.S.). Moreover, there are universal (e.g. Chile and Sweden) and targeted voucher and voucher-like schemes (e.g. Colombia and the U.S.) across the world. In addition, the voucher models vary in their features in terms of the eligibility criteria and restrictions.

Regarding the neoliberal policy reforms in education, privatization and school choice might result in unexpected consequences such as inequality of opportunity and segregation. This has lead some of the countries to make regulations in their policy implementations (e.g. Chile and Sweden) (Adamson et al., 2016; OECD, 2017).

### **Voucher-like Scheme in Turkey**

In recent years, market-based reforms have being applied as a solution for several public problems in Turkey (Kalkan, 2014). In education sector, the governments applied different education mechanisms including voucher-like schemes in provision of education service. For example, the incentive policy was applied firstly in the field of Special Education in 2006. The government directed the students who need special education to the government-dependent private special education institutions instead of opening new schools (Polat, 2013). Further, another incentive implementation was initiated for the private vocational high schools established in the organized industrial regions in 2012 (TBMM, 2007). This education incentive was expanded for private vocational high schools outside of the organized industrial regions in the 2016-2017 school year (MEB, 2016). Afterwards, a nationwide incentive policy



initiated for students attending pre-primary and K-12 level private education institutions with the aim of increasing the share of private education in total.

The education incentive policy for private education institutions at pre-primary and K12 education levels in Turkey has targeted characteristic. Because the policy aims to increase the access of low-income students to private education. The students who would like to benefit from the incentive must apply for it and they are deemed eligible according to several eligibility criteria including household income, academic and social achievements, parental vitality and marital status, siblings attending school, and special conditions. For this reason, the policy gains a targeted voucher-like system.

### **Voucher Policy Arguments**

There are many voucher policy implementations across the world; thus, countries have different experiences in terms of policy consequences. Several arguments appear from these cases for opponents and proponents of voucher programs. The main arguments are given below and discussed in the following section.

Table 1

#### *Main Arguments of Voucher Systems*

	<b>For Vouchers</b>	<b>Against Vouchers</b>
1	Efficiency in resource use	Economically well-off use vouchers (public funding)
2	Quality Competitive school market Improved education quality	Poorer students left in public schools Selective admissions to private schools
3	School choice	Racial/income segregation Socially divisive
4	Equality of opportunity / Equity	School stratification
5	Civic socialization	

Source: (Arenas, 2004; Levin, 2002; Patrinos et al., 2009; Vawda, 2000; Witte, 2009)

**Access to education and equity.** A normative argument exists related to if education is a public or common good since educational right should not be depending on family income or wealth to purchase better or high quality of education (Jones, 2013).

Proponents of voucher claim that it improves the equality of opportunity by supporting low-income group families (Metcalf & Legan, 2002). Witte (2009) states that advocacy for voucher program use this argument to provide vouchers only to low-income families. In addition, targeted voucher model examples aim usually to increase equity based on income and achievement; however, gender-based and spatial inequality of opportunity to access education around the world still exist as a major problem in terms of educational right. Turkish education system also struggles with the gender-based and regional inequity problem in terms of access to quality education for years (Gümüş & Gümüş, 2013; Kavak, 2010; Kavak, Ergen, & Gökçe, 2007; Maya, 2013).

Another dominant discourse for the advocacy of voucher programs states that the law would give parents more options to choose the right school for their children. Parental choice that gives opportunity to families to choose the types of education in a school where their children are exposed to certain values (Metcalf & Legan, 2002). In addition, parental choice or school choice leads to competition among schools since they try to attract students. Thus, equality goes with the opportunity to pursue competitive excellence (Jones, 2013). On the other hand, Witte (2009) emphasizes that parents cannot easily afford to depart from public schooling system which forces children to attend a school assigned according to residential location instead they can only move to send their children to better schools.

**Quality in education.** Increasing education quality is one of the crucial arguments of voucher advocacy. Reducing class-size and competition among schools are two factors which are said to increase the quality in education. First, voucher systems are believed to support public education by reducing class size in public schools. In addition, for parents, class size in private schools is one of the effective rationales on school choice (Schwartz, Zabel, & Leardo, 2017). In addition, Ann and Brewer (2009) indicate the benefits of small class size as better and easier classroom management for teachers, opportunity for more attention per student,

and spending more time on curriculum topics, and diminished interruptions. Further, Yatmaz (2012) suggest that voucher policy reform can reduce class size and education quality in terms of their causal-relationships.

In contrast, class-size reduction is a controversial topic. Although it is immensely popular and demanded issue by the stakeholders, it is the most expensive policy reform in education. In addition, there are few qualified research on class-size (Whitehurst & Chingos, 2011) and they show very little impact on student performance (Ann & Brewer, 2009; Hoxby, 2000; Krueger, Hanushek, & Rice, 2002). Further, class-size reductions does not guarantee the similar effects in different school systems (Woessmann & West, 2002).

School choice system results in a more competitive school market in countries. In addition, it encourages public and private schools to develop better and innovative education systems to attract parents and students. For example, the U.S. educational voucher shows the competition among the private schools to attract students and their vouchers. This competition results in efficiency and innovation in education since schools have fiscal vouchers to increase and maintain the enrollment ratio (Levin, 2002). On the other hand, residential school choice, e.g. the U.S. case, limits the competition among schools (Peterson, 2017).

Shakeel, Anderson and Wolf (2016) point out the purpose of voucher programs to increase student performance and parent satisfaction as well as the increase in school and education quality due to the competition between schools. There are mixed results of numerous studies around the world ranging from positive to no difference between voucher and public schools in terms of achievement (Witte, 2009). PISA 2015 results showed that school type has no relationship with the performance of students (OECD, 2017). On the other hand, in many developing countries including Ghana, India, Kenya, Nepal, and Pakistan, studies showed that students attending private schools perform better than the ones in public

schools (UNDP, 2016). Hence, there is no strong evidence to show a difference in student performance in public and private schools (Peterson, 2017).

Educational enrollment, retention and graduation rates are some of the indicators used to discuss the effects of voucher programs in the world. For instance, Washington D.C. voucher program study found that students receiving vouchers were 20% more likely to graduate from high school (Wolf et al., 2010). In addition, studies from Milwaukee and New York City have found similar positive effects of voucher programs on high school graduation rates and college enrollments (Chingos & Peterson, 2012; Wolf, 2012). In Turkey, education upper secondary and higher education faces educational attainment and retention issues based on the rapid growth (Aypay, Çekiç, & Boyacı, 2012); thus, voucher systems can be effectively used for the disadvantaged groups at these education levels.

**Accountability and efficiency.** The notion of accountability is related to performance measures in terms of impacts of educational policies. Thus, accountability for voucher system works with success and failure mechanisms in order to provide equity for all children (Brighthouse, Howe, & Tooley, 2010; Scheurich, Skrla, & Johnson, 2004). In other words, in market-based education policy reforms, teachers and school administrations become accountable towards government, local governmental actors, and parents with regard to performance-based evaluations and student academic achievements (Emre, 2016).

Efficiency is another concern in policy evaluation based on the discussions in the context of education finance. A policy program is called efficient if resources are used in the best way. When beneficiaries of the program are required to pay for the program themselves, it becomes unacceptable to support (Bickers & Williams, 2001). Therefore, how much does the government spend per pupil in a school year gives clue about whether he made profit from the implementation or not (Shires, Krop, Rydell, & Carroll, 1994). In contrast, Psacharopoulos notices the role of education in income distribution in society which might be

the transposer of the status quo or a tool providing equity (Woodhall, 1994). In addition, the opponents of voucher programs criticize that voucher programs cause to move public money/funds to private schools instead of improving public education quality. Proponents, on the other hand, advocate that competition in marketplace would promote efficiency and reduce educational costs (Spring, 2015).

On the other hand, accountability requires transparency. Parents need more information when the number of alternatives increases to make school choice for their children. The government should organize the required platform to provide necessary information if private schools cannot do it (Cinoglu, 2006). Hence, the government could support in provision of available accurate and comparative information for parents to make informed school choices for their children (Levin & Belfield, 2004).

**Segregation.** Voucher systems are discussed in terms of several ways of segregation such as social class and schools. Opponents of voucher systems state that choice schemes bases segregation in schools. Brighthouse, Howe and Tooley (2010) emphasize that neighborhood schooling system includes allocation of children to schools based on the choices of their parents, who are mostly middle-class and wealthy and have mobility to change the school. For instance, Saltman (2014) points out the situation in US related to student profile in public schools. He states that children from high-income families mostly attend successful public schools while children from families below poverty levels attend troubled public schools in the areas with high rates of violence and crime.

One of the important claims of voucher system is that it allows disadvantaged, low and middle-income class parents to send their children more qualified schools (Spring, 2015). Studies indicate that universal voucher programs lead to more stratification compared to publicly subsidized targeted voucher systems (e.g. Chile, Sweden and New Zeland) (OECD, 2012b). For example, having increased the segregation significantly between schools, the

universal voucher system in Chile changed into a weighted voucher and raised the voucher amount for disadvantaged children, which contributed to decrease the segregation effects (OECD, 2012a).

Regarding quality of education, Arenas (2004) emphasizes the creaming and peer effect in private schools which academically most skilled students and involved parents gather in private schools whereas public schools have less talented students to produce positive educational outcomes. In addition, in most of OECD countries, data related to the comparison of school characteristics between public and private schools show that parents with higher socio-economic level are more likely to send their children to private schools (OECD, 2011).

Proponents of neo-liberal education policies based on school choice criticize voucher systems in terms of the notion of segregation regarding several factors such as social class, quality of teachers and students. Ünal et al. (2010) found in their study that social differences between schools empowered social class segregation in favour of privileged socioeconomic groups. Further, Vawda (2000) points out that voucher financing schemes might cause selective admissions in private schools and social segregation. Negative outcomes of privatization policy reforms in education might be resulted in government's losing control over education service as a public good, socioeconomic segregation as a result of high-quality schools are selected by 'better prepared students', and poorer students left in worsening public schools stay as deprived of the support of more educated parents (Patrinos et al., 2009).

### Chapter III: Methodology

This chapter provides information about the methods used according to the purpose of the study. In this chapter, firstly, the design and the process of the research explained. Then the data collection procedures utilized in the study were presented. The chapter concludes with the explanations of data analysis and discussions of validity, credibility and ethical issues in the study.

#### Research Design

The research paradigm applied in the study is social constructivist or interpretivist. Guba and Lincoln (1994) explain that knowledge in constructivism piles up relatively through the formation of informed and sophisticated constructions forever via the hermeneutical and dialectical process. The nature of reality based on relativist approach is called constructivism. Reality has social and experimental basis; further, it is local and specific in nature (Creswell, 2009). In constructivist paradigm, findings are generated as the research proceeds. The researcher has a transactional and subjectivist perspective in data collection procedures to understand social and historical constructs (Creswell, 2009; Guba & Lincoln, 2004).

In this study, I have the aim of describing and evaluating the first four-year implementation process of the incentive policy applied in Turkey using an interpretive case study. In this context, the interpretive design allowed me to determine the meanings, relationships and the connections associated with the development and implementation of the incentive policy.

**Interpretive policy analysis.** Policy analysis methods are classified in two groups: traditional and interpretive. Traditional method seeks for measurable evidence through scientific application of management skills, program design, and implementation in order to make objective and value-free assessments using mainly the legislation and implemented actions in practice. The interpretive policy analysis approach, on the other hand, points out

questionable nature of policy concerning problem definition, research findings, and discussions for solutions focusing on meanings related to the policy problem with a wide range of policy actors (Mansfield & Thachik, 2016; Yanow, 2000). In addition, interpretive policy analysis has an inductive approach emphasizing meaning making from data by close readings of policy discourse to interpret the perceptions of the respondents in studies (Mansfield & Thachik, 2016).


Yanow's (2000) work has a major place in the interpretive policy analysis methodology. Focusing on unveiling ideological underpinnings, she offers a framework for interpretive policy analysis by examining the meanings of values, feelings, or beliefs that the policies express and how those meanings are communicated to and read by various audiences. The five-stage of her interpretive analysis process includes identifying: (1) the artifacts having significant meaning for the policy; (2) communities of meaning/interpretation; (3) the specific meanings mentioned in policy discourses and artifacts; (4) conflict points between interpretations of different communities related to policy; and (5) effects/reflections and consensus scenarios related to these differences (Yanow, 2000).

Interpretive policy analysis focuses on what does the policy actually mean and what it means for various constituents (Yanow, 2000). Thus, interpretive methods focus more on words and meaning-making than data collection instruments, analysis tools, research report formats, or contents (Yanow, 2007). Munger (2000) also states that policy analysis could be the strategies and techniques used to settle on conflicts among politics, market and experts. Policies are formulated and shaped in different levels of local and national private or public living spaces in our public and private life which make policy formulation into a complex structure (Meenaghan, Kilty, & McNutt, 2004). Further, critical thinking becomes an important and valuable aspect of policy analysis process. The reason for that is policy analyst has a role to make difficult choices about data sources and analysis methods to uncover the



policy issue (Dunn, 2012). At this point, interpretive policy analysis accepts the complexity of policy in advance and focuses on to assert the meanings, values and beliefs related to a policy and how to make sense of them (Yanow, 2000). Further, Ball (1993) states that policy analysis should be carried out to provide a conceptualization of the overall and local consequences of politics.

All in all, in the current study, interpretive case study design helped to discover what was done and why were the actions taken by the stakeholders related the policy issue. In addition, it provided a road map on what can be taken into consideration for improvement. The Figure 2 summarizes the methodology of the current study as an interpretive qualitative case study.



*Figure 2.* Research design of the study (Adapted from Creswell, 2009).

**Case-study design.** Qualitative case-study method is defined by Bogdan and Biklen (1998) as a “detailed examination of one setting, or a single subject, a single depository of documents, or one particular event” (p.54). In addition, Yin (2008) describes the case study method as an inquiry-based investigation using evidences from multiple sources within the real-life context of a phenomenon. In addition, (Patton, 2001) also states that a person, event, program, organization, place, time dimension, group or community can be examined as a case in detail, holistically and contextually. The characteristics of a case study includes intensive,

holistic description and analysis of a single unit or bounded system (Creswell, 2013; Miles & Huberman, 1994). It is usually conducted to obtain an in-depth understanding of the policy issue and meaning for whom involved and interested more in process instead of outcomes (Meriam, 1998).

Case studies play an important role in policy analysis research; because insights are gained from case studies and they can directly influence policy, practice, and future research (Meriam, 1998). With regard to policy analysis research, Heck (2004) emphasizes that it can be bounded by policy actors or certain reform period in the context of policy type, location, time, and theoretical statements (cited in Keser Aschenberger, 2015). Similarly, Stenhouse (1985) defines case study design in policy research as the one conducted in details in order to collect data to understand and evaluate the values and benefits of educational policies, programs, and institutions in terms of the actors in education and/or decision makers such as administrators, teachers, parents, and students.

Qualitative case studies focus on insight, discovery, and interpretation to uncover the interaction of significant factors. Meriam (1998) suggests that the best choice of case study research design occurs when focus is on process with the following purposes: (1) monitoring the process by describing the context and people and (2) exploring the extent or causal explanation by discovering or conforming the process. On the other hand, the researcher investigates the beliefs and values of individual respondents in case studies based on respondents' perceptions of actions and activities (Bogdan & Biklen, 1998; Stake, 1995). Therefore, the researcher applies fieldwork and focuses on interaction between him/her and participants of the study.

In the current study, interpretive case study design was employed with the purpose of investigating the four-year (2014-2018) implementation period of the education incentive policy process. To describe the case in detail, policy documents, statistical data, and

interviews with governmental actors and practitioners were used. In order to obtain an intensive and holistic description of experiences of the practice, I took Çanakkale province as a sub-case. The experiences of the practitioners was taken into account because they directly influence the reproduction of the policy application boundaries (Bayırbağ, 2013). Case studies can be classified in various types depending on the subject, purpose, or the number of cases that will be included in the study.

*Types of case studies.* There are different types of case studies in the literature depending on what the research aims to explore and achieve, for what purpose, and how. The researcher should also consider and focus on the feasibility of study as well as the procedures to employ (Bogdan & Biklen, 1998; Stake, 1995). Various authors defined different types of case studies according to the study unit, number of cases, or the purpose of the study. Stake (1995) classifies case studies into intrinsic, instrumental, and collective according to the unit selected for the study. Intrinsic case studies enable the researcher to understand a particular given policy in detail. Yin (2002), on the other hand, takes into consideration the number of cases to be analyzed and states four types of case study: single holistic, single with embedded units, multiple holistic, and multiple with embedded units. Further, Meriam (1998) points out the purpose of the study and states three types of case study: descriptive, interpretive, and evaluative. With the aim of enhancing a much better comprehension with reference to the dynamics of a policy, Meriam (1998) describes evaluative case studies referring to description, explanation and judgment of the case under study.

In the light of explanation above regarding types of case study, this study has the characteristics of an intrinsic, evaluative, and single case with embedded units. First, the education incentive policy was selected as the case of the study since the research aimed at examining specifically the rise of publicly funded private education in Turkey; thus, the incentive case is dominant in the study. Second, the case has embedded units such as various

stakeholders of the policy issue including Çanakkale sub-case and the four-year period of policy implementation. Last, as an interpretive policy analysis, the study was also designed to explore and evaluate the conflicting views of different stakeholders regarding the education incentive case in Turkey and how it can be improved according to the results. The first step in case study research is to describe the case and set the limits in terms of time, place, participant etc.

***Description of the case.*** The case in this study called as “Education Incentive” which was introduced by the Turkish government in the school year 2014-2015 so as to increase the private education institution enrollments. It has being implemented for four years by the school year 2017-2018. In addition, the scope of the education incentive implementation comprehended K12 plus pre-primary private education institutions and students attending private education institutions. Further, the beneficiary private education institutions and students were selected for the publicly funded incentive scheme according to the eligibility criteria determined by the government. The eligibility criteria included several aspects such as household income, academic and social achievement, family-related status, and special conditions. One of the most important elements in a case study is to define the unit of analysis to define the case and draw its borders for the researcher and the readers.

***Unit of analysis.*** Unit of analysis in a case study is important to keep data in context (Meriam, 1998; Patton, 2001; Stake, 1995). Mapping of time, space and institution was constructed in order to determine the boundaries of policy issue (Bayırbağ, 2013) under the consideration of time and space limitations of fieldwork (Stake, 1995). Considering the available and usable data for holistic and intensive description of the case as much as possible, I determined the unit of analysis as school year and education level. I took the four-year period of the policy issue; thus, I could compare the changes in each school year. In addition, educational level was a comparable unit in several points as a complementary aspect. For

instance, the interviewees in Çanakkale were selected from different education levels and I analyzed their views by categorizing under the education level. Therefore, I used school year and education level as the units of analysis in this study.

### **Participants of the Study**

Case studies use various data sources such as documents, interviews, and observation in which the exclusive use of qualitative data sources are included. In interviews, it is important to reach as many people as possible to gather rich data from different aspects of the issue (Patton, 2001). In qualitative case study designs, it is very common and most of the time, necessary to use purposeful sampling strategies such as snowball or chain, network, and maximum variation (Meriam, 1998; Patton, 2001) so as to focus on the key participants having the most appropriate and thorough information and experience (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Patton, 2001). After the first step which identifies unit of analysis, the researcher selects the participants of study within the case (Meriam, 1998).

In this study, I considered and noticed the criteria of (1) being involved in the policy formulation and implementation process directly, (2) being from different groups of practitioners, (3) the principle of accessibility and (4) voluntariness while determining the participants of study. Also, I asked to the interviewees for other potential participants related to the case. For example, when I interviewed with the Head of the related department in the Ministry, who also directs the policy process, s/he informed me about the related people I could interview, and it referred to snowball sampling in this part. Similarly, I followed the same strategy for the interviews with the private education institution administrators and parents.

It is also important to take into consideration of the meanings and value-laden experiences of the practitioners of a policy during the analysis process since they reconstruct the policy by means of their active role in practice (Yanow, 2000). Policy actors are grouped

into two: the ones influencing the policy-making and the others influenced by the policy. Yanow (2000) states about the three main groups actively take role in policy process: policy makers (the influencers), policy practitioners, and the citizens affected by the policy (influenced groups). Figure 3 shows the related groups in the policy of “*education incentive*”: (1) governmental actors who actively have taken role in the policy formulation and implementation within the body of the MoNE, (2) private education institutions as the practitioners, and (3) parents and students who are the citizens benefited from the incentive or not.




Figure 3. The participant policy actors in the study (adapted from Yanow, 2000).

Table 2 below states the participants for the group of governmental actors related to EIP which I could reach in the study. This group provided information about policy formulation and implementation process of the EIP.

Table 2

*The Participants of Study Related to Governmental Actors*

<b>Participant Code</b>	<b>Institution</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Number of Interviewees</b>
MoD1	The Ministry of Development <i>The Ministry of National Education, Head Office of Private Education Institutions</i>	Expert	1
MoNE1	Office of Student Affairs and Social Activities	Director	1
MoNE2	Office of Student Affairs and Social Activities	Officer	1
MoNE3	Office of Private Schools	Director	1
MoNE4	Office of Private Education Institutions	Director	1
	<i>Ministry of National Education</i>		
MoNE5	The Ministry of National Education	Internal Supervisor	1
	<i>Çanakkale Provincial Directorate of National Education</i>		
MoNE6	Office of Çanakkale Provincial Directorate of National Education	Chief Officer	1
		<b>Total</b>	<b>7</b>

The participant from the Ministry of Development told about their meetings and conversations with the bureaucrats and other authorized people in the MoNE. In the end, I understood from the interviews that the specialist thesis of a specialist in the Ministry of Development was used as a spark for the policy formulation process. The content of the specialist thesis was completely different from the policy in practice right now. The analysis of the interview with the specialist was not included in the findings of the study. However, the aforementioned thesis enlightened me and provided insight into the first stages of the policy formulation process and gave chance to get more information about the voucher system in terms of education finance. Moreover, I interviewed with (1) three directors of the main offices in the Head Office of Private Education Institutions within the body of MoNE, (2) one officer who was one of the key people responsible for the implementation process, (3) one internal auditor who was involved in the policy making process at the very beginning, and (4) chief officer of the Çanakkale Provincial Directorate of National Education, who was a governmental actor at the local level.

Table 3 below introduces the private education institutions included in the study regarding the sub-case of central district in Çanakkale province. There were seven beneficiary

private education institutions in the central district at the period that I conducted the interviews.

Table 3

*Information as To the Participant Private Education Institutions in Çanakkale Province*

Participant school code	Type of school	Grade	Establishment year of school	Beneficiary status for EIP	School size*	Class size max.	Number of students enrolled**
A	Pre-primary	3 - 4 - 5 years old children	2010	for 4 years	48	15	48
B	Pre-primary	3 - 4 - 5 years old children	2015	for 2 years	45	15	45
C	Primary School	1st to 4th grade	1996	for 4 years	570	24	482
	Lower Secondary School	5th to 8th grade			340		272
	Anatolian High School	9th to 12th grade			168		112
	Science High School	9th to 12th grade			332		304
D	Primary School	1st to 4th grade	2004	for 4 years	256	24	254
	Lower Secondary School	5th to 8th grade			150		148
E	Primary School	1st to 4th grade	2015	for 3 years	392	24	376
	Lower Secondary School	5th to 8th grade			312		277
	Anatolian High School	9th to 12th grade			240		151
F	High School	9th to 12th grade	2013	for 4 years	240	24	97
G	High School	9th to 12th grade	2014	for 3 years	459	24	370

\* School size refers to the max number of students and the data belong to the 2017-2018 school year.

\*\* Data related to the number of students were obtained from the interviews.

Source: The interview data and OOKGM, 2017.

The beneficiary private schools in the study consisted of 2 pre-primary schools (A and B), 2 schools having all K-12 grades (C and E), 1 elementary school (D), 1 vocational high school (F), and 1 basic high school (G). According to the table, the oldest participant school was established in 1996 while the youngest ones were founded in 2015. Moreover, the



beneficiary status of the participant schools was varied from two years two 4 years. The maximum class-size in the schools were also differed, it was 15 in two pre-primary schools and 24 for the others. Lastly, the maximum number of students enrolled at the schools was 482, while the minimum was 45.

Beside the beneficiary private education institution in the study, Table 4 below gives information about the interviewees of the study from the second and third groups of policy actors, which are practitioners and citizens affected by the policy.

Table 4

*The Participants of Study Related to Practitioners and Citizens Influenced By the EIP*

Participant school code	Education level	SA	PY	PN	Total Parents
A	Pre-primary	1	-	-	-
B	Pre-primary	1	-	1	1
C	Primary School	2	1	1	2
	Secondary School		-	-	-
	High School	1	2	1	3
D	Primary School	2	2	1	3
	Secondary School		1	-	1
	Primary School	1	1	1	2
E	Secondary School	1	1	1	2
	High School		1	1	1
F	High School	1	1	2	3
G	High School	1	1	2	3
<b>Total</b>		<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>21</b>

From seven private education institutions in the central district of Çanakkale province, totally 12 private school principals and 21 parents were interviewed. I also tried to balance the number participants in terms school type, education level, number of parents receiving incentive and not receiving incentive. I only had difficulty to reach the parents from beneficiary pre-primary level private education institutions. The administrators of those schools could not help about it. They said that the parents were not voluntary to participate in

the study. Thus, I tried to use my other networks to reach the parents; however, I could just only make interview with a parent not receiving incentive.

The purpose in qualitative studies is to gain an in-depth understanding of the situation; thus, I started with my research case with the emergence time and place. Bayırbağ (2013) mentions the timing of the policy formulation and critical periods in this process and their importance in understanding the policy background. Therefore, I started to get insight related to the policy from a broad view into more particular unit of the case. In other words, I interviewed with the individuals involved in the formulation and first-hand implementation processes of the policy in the Ministry for Research Question 1 as well as I collected data from the parents and private education institution managers who are affected by the policy in practice in the context of Research Question 3. Table 5, Table 6, Table 7, and Table 8 indicate demographic information of interviewees including governmental and non-governmental actors.

Table 5

*Participant Information for the Interviewees in the MoNE*

<b>Participant Code</b>	<b>Institution</b>	<b>Seniority in their position (years)</b>
MoD1	The Ministry of Development	3
MoNE1	The Ministry of National Education	3
MoNE2	The Ministry of National Education	5
MoNE3	the Ministry of National Education	6
MoNE4	The Ministry of National Education	4
MoNE5	The Ministry of National Education	14
MoNE6	Çanakkale Provincial Directorate of National Education,	5

I conducted interviews with each school administrator of the private education institutions. In the private education institutions having different education levels, I completed at least two interviews. Except for the new established schools, the administrators have been working for a long time in their current school.

Table 6

*Participant Information for the Interviewees in Çanakkale (School Administrators)*

No.	Participant code	School type	Position	Seniority in the current school	Educational background
1	ASA	Pre-primary	Administrator	5-10 years	Child Development
2	BSA	Pre-primary	Administrator	2 years	Vocational High School
3	CSA1	Elementary	Administrator	15 years	Mathematics
4	CSA2	Elementary	V. Administrator	8 years	Guidance and Psychological Counseling
5	CSA3	High School	Administrator	3 years	History
6	DSA1	Elementary	Administrator	5 years	Turkish Language Teaching
7	DSA2	Elementary	Measurement-Evaluation Specialist	8 years	Measurement and Evaluation
8	ESA1	Elementary	Administrator	2 years	Mathematics Teaching
9	ESA2	High School	Administrator	3 years	Metallurgy
10	FSA	High School	Administrator	5 years	Religious Culture and Moral Teaching
11	GSA	High School	Administrator	13 years	Physics Teaching

Table 7

*Demographic Information for the Interviewees in the Practice (Parents Receiving Incentive)*

No.	Participant code	School type	The implementation year they began to benefit from EIP	Beneficiary's grade level	Job status of mother	Job status of father	EIP's effect on decision for private education institution enrollment	Number of children attending school
1	CPY1	Primary	2015-16	1st grade	Civil servant	Real Estate Agent	Already decided to attend	2
2	CPY2	High School	2014-15	9th grade	Academic Personal	Public Administration	Already decided to attend	2
3	CPY3	High School	2014-15	9th grade	Teacher	Academic personnel	Already decided to attend	2
4	DPY1	Primary	2015-16	2nd grade	Unemployed	Academic personnel	Motivated (facilitated) to attend	1
5	DPY2	Primary + Lower Secondary	2014-15 / 2015-16	1st grade - 6th grade	Unemployed	Engineer	Motivated (facilitated) to attend	2
6	DPY3	Lower Secondary	2014-15	6th grade	Retired- No salary	Retired - Salary	Already decided to attend	1
7	EPY1	Primary	2015-16	1st grade	Lab Technician	Accountant	Provided to attend	2
8	EPY2	Primary + Lower Secondary	2015-16	1st grade - 6th grade	Teacher	Academic personnel	Provided to attend	2
9	EPY3	High School	2015-16	11th grade	Engineer (Public)	Engineer - Manager	Already decided to attend	1
10	FPY1	High School	2015-16	10th grade	Retired- Self-employed	Retired - Salary	Already decided to attend	2
11	GPY1	High School	2016-17	9th grade	Civil servant	Divorced	Already decided to attend	1

Table 8

*Demographic Information for the Interviewees in the Practice (Applicant Parents Not Receiving Incentive)*

No.	Participant code	School type	The implementation year they applied for the incentive	Applicant's grade level	Job status of mother	Job status of father	EIP's effect on decision for private education institution enrollment	Number of children attending school
1	BPN1	Pre-primary	2016-17	5th age	Teacher	Teacher	Already decided to attend	1
2	CPN1	Primary	2015-16	3th grade	Teacher	Self-employed	Already decided to attend	2
3	CPN2	High School	2015-16 /2016-17	9th and 10th grade	Civil Engineer	Self-employed	Already decided to attend	1
4	DPN1	Primary	2014-15 / 2015-16	3rd grade	Teacher	Lawyer	Already decided to attend	2
5	EPN1	Primary	2015-16	3rd grade	Teacher	Divorced	Already decided to attend	1
6	EPN2	High School	2016-17	11th grade	Unemployed	Military Personnel	Already decided to attend	2
7	FPN1	High School	2016-17	10th grade	Unemployed	Retired salary	Already decided to attend	1
8	FPN2	High School	2016-17 / 2017-18	9th grade	Unemployed	Unemployed salary / min wage jobs	Already decided to attend	2
9	GPN1	High School	2015-16 / 2016-17	10th grade	MoNE personnel	Civil Servant (Director)	Already decided to attend	2
10	GPN2	High School	2016-17	11th grade	Unemployed	Electrical Technician	Already decided to attend	2

On the other hand, when we look at the demographic information related to the parents receiving incentive in Table 3.6, we see that most of them started to benefit from the incentive in the first two years of the program. Most of the students are in the first grade of their educational level. The parents have only one or two children and except two families, both parents work. Further, most of the families had already decided to send their children to private education institutions independently from the incentive. Two of the families stated that the incentive motivated/facilitated to afford private education institution tuition and fees. Two of them, who were sending their only two children to the private education institution, said that the incentive enabled them to afford it.

Similarly, when we look at the demographic information related to the parents not receiving incentive in Table 3.7, it is visible that they applied for the education incentive mostly in the second and third year of the policy implementation (2015-2016 and 2016-2017). Most of the students are in the middle grades of their educational level. In half of the families, both parents work. The parents have only one or two children. Further, all of the families had already decided to send their children to private education institutions independently from the incentive.

**Analysis tool.** The analysis tool for this policy study was developed within the context of a doctoral research project sponsored by the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK 2214-A Doctoral Research Fellowship Program). The purpose of the project was to develop a policy analysis framework based on the lived experiences of education policy researchers related to their policy analysis methodology besides the literature on policy analysis methods. The study utilized interviews with international education policy researchers about the methods they follow in their policy analysis work. 11 policy researchers in the field of education were interviewed in the school year 2016-2017 regarding their methodology they apply during their analysis.




Figure 4. Analysis framework for the policy under study.

According to the results of the research visit abroad, I, as the researcher, developed a policy analysis framework (Figure 4). The framework proposes a four-stage analysis tool to define, describe, and evaluate educational policies. These stages are: (1) positioning the policy, (2) defining the policy actors, (3) experiences of the practice, and (4) evaluation and improvement. The figure shows the main questions to be asked related to each aspect of policy analysis in order to understand, make sense and evaluate a policy issue by the researchers. In this study, I developed my research questions based on this analysis tool by taking into account the feasibility of the selected policy and the procedures to employ in the analysis.

In this study, the aim was to describe, explore, and evaluate the Education Incentive scheme introduced by the government to increase the number of students enrolled in private education institutions for preprimary and K-12 education levels. Drawing on the framework above, I selected the questions from each stage in order to describe and analyze the education incentive case in a holistic way. For this purpose, the following questions were determined:

1. How can we position the policy in its own terms?
2. Regarding the policy actors;
  - a. Who benefits from the policy?
  - b. How do the related actors value the policy?
3. What are the experiences of the practitioners?
4. How does the policy work?

The research questions were determined to account for a holistic description and evaluation of the policy as a case. In accordance with the analysis tool and the research questions developed with the use of the framework, the details for each question were discussed under the heading of data collection in this chapter.



## **Data Collection**

Data collection is a vital part of the case study. Questions like: what kinds of data, when, how and by whom, becomes important questions to answer in data collection process in case studies. Yin (2008) states three main principles of gathering data in case studies: multiple data sources, database for the case, and evidence-based progress. Thus, triangulation is an important factor to take into account in qualitative case studies so as to provide thick description of the policy issue under study. In addition, Stake (1995) emphasizes that the first criterion in a case should be to maximize what we can learn. In order to enrich data related to the research topic adopting qualitative method, Yanow (2007) offered to use at least one of three methods to gather, access or generate data: (1) observation and maximum participation, (2) conversational interview, and (3) examination of the documents.

In the current study, I have observed and followed the policy implementation process since the school year 2014-15, which is the first year of policy implementation. Thus, I was able to follow the changes throughout the four-year period of the policy issue. In addition, I accessed the policy-relevant documents and datasets to both understand the policy issue better and determine the beneficiaries of the policy. Further, the interviews provided conversations with several governmental actors and practitioners in Çanakkale province to gather data and to make sense of the practice. Figure 5 below explains the data sources and pathway of data collection and analysis for each research question in details.




Figure 5. Data collection and analysis framework for the research questions.

**Primary data sources.** The primary sources related to the policy include the first-hand information for the nature of development and implementation processes of the policy. These sources in the study are policy documents, interviews, and statistical data.

**Policy documents.** In this study, constitutional and statutory policy documents are the primarily used sources to situate the policy in its own terms. The national policy documents including strategies and goals related to the increase private sector in education were taken into account to see the historical background of the policy. Countrywide development plans and MoNE strategic plans are the main policy documents used as data sources. Some of them as follow:

- 9<sup>th</sup> Development Plan by the Ministry of Development (2007-2013)
- 10<sup>th</sup> Development Plan by the Ministry of Development (2014-2018)
- The MoNE Strategic Plan (2010-2014)

- The MoNE Strategic Plan (2015-2019)

The main legislative documents regulating the education incentive program are given below. The interviewees in the study provided information about the policy documents and they were available online in the websites of the governmental institutions and the MoNE.

- Law No. 6528 regarding the changes in National Education Fundamental Law and some other decree laws
- Private Educational Institutions Law No. 5580
- The Regulation of the Head Office of Private Educational Institutions
- Official statements explaining the ‘education incentive’ application and placement process by the Head Office of Private Educational Institutions
- E-Guides for the application and placement process of education incentive for four school years (2014-2018)
- Other official correspondences regarding the policy implementation

**Interviews.** Interview method has strengths since it enables researchers to get information about we cannot see and to make alternative explanations regarding what we see (Glesne, 2013). In the current study, I used semi-structured interviews as data collection method for the first three research questions in order to position the policy appropriately with the insights of the policy makers and to uncover the experiences of the practitioners.

For each interview group in the study, I developed different interview protocols (See Appendices). In this study, there are three groups of interviewees mentioned in the participants of the study: (1) the authorized people in the MoNE related to the policy formation process, (2) private education institution administrators, and (3) beneficiary and non-beneficiary parents who applied for the incentive. The participants were informed related to the research topic, and then they were asked for the participation in the study voluntarily,

each participant was given an informed consent form developed by the researcher (See Appendices).

I conducted most of the interviews face to face. Only two interviews with parents I had to complete via phone because of the time and scheduling problems. The interviews were recorded using a digital voice recorder upon on the approval of the participant. One of the private school administrators refused the interview to be recorded, so I took written notes from the interview. However, to make up for data loss, I interviewed with other administrator from the same school and recorded the interview.

The interviews with governmental actors mostly conducted in the school year 2015-2016, which was the second year of policy implementation. However, I have maintained the connection with the MoNE officers for several reasons such as updating data and additional questions. The details about the interviews were given in the table below.

Table 9

*The Participants of Semi-Structured Interviews with Governmental Actors*

<b>Participant Code</b>	<b>Interview Date</b>	<b>Interview Place</b>	<b>Time</b>	<b>Duration</b>
MoD1	7.23.2015	Office in the Ministry of Development, Ankara	1:00 PM	70 mins
MoNE1	14.12.2015	Office in the Ministry of National Education, Ankara	2:00 PM	42 mins
MoNE2	17.12.2015	Office in the Ministry of National Education, Ankara	11:00 AM	40 mins
MoNE3	15.12.2015	Office in the Ministry of National Education, Ankara	2:15 PM	45 mins
MoNE4	15.12.2015	Office in the Ministry of National Education, Ankara	11:00 AM	47 mins
MoNE5	6.20.2017	Çanakkale	3:00 PM	45 mins
MoNE6	5.30.2017	Office in the Provincial Directorate of National Education, Çanakkale	3:40 PM	25 mins

I conducted the interviews with the practitioners between the fall semester of the school year 2015-2016 and fall semester of the school year 2017-2018. The information related to the number, date, and length of the interviews was given in Table 10. The

interviews performed with the participants from the Ministry took for about an hour. The interviewees with the practitioner group lasted mostly about half an hour except for several school administrators with whom I had longer interview sessions.

Table 10

*The Participants of Semi-Structured Interviews with the Practitioners in Çanakkale*

	<b>Level of Education</b>	<b>Interview Date</b>	<b>Duration</b>
<b>School Administrators: 12</b>			
ASA	Pre-primary	2017, May 4 <sup>th</sup> / 10.00 am	30 mins
BSA	Pre-primary	2017, May 5 <sup>th</sup> / 14.00 pm	45 mins
CSA1	Elementary	2017, April 27 <sup>th</sup> / 13.00 pm	35 mins
CSA2	Elementary	2017, April 27 <sup>th</sup> / 14.40 pm	30 mins
CSA3	High School	2016, January 22 <sup>nd</sup> / 14.00 pm	45 mins
DSA1	Elementary	2016, January 9 <sup>th</sup> / 13.40 pm	70 mins
DSA2	Elementary	2017, May 30 <sup>th</sup> / 14.00 pm	45 mins
ESA1	Elementary	2017, May 9 <sup>th</sup> / 13.00	30 mins
ESA2	High School	2016, February 11 <sup>th</sup> / 14.00 pm	30 mins
FSA	High School	2017, May 3 <sup>rd</sup> / 14.30	30 mins
GSA	High School	2018, March 16 <sup>th</sup> / 14.30 pm	40 mins
<b>Parents Receiving Incentive: 11</b>			
CPY1	Primary	2017, April 27 <sup>th</sup> / 14.00 pm	29 mins
CPY2	High School	2016, February 11 <sup>th</sup> / 15.20 pm	38 mins
CPY3	High School	2016, February 11 <sup>th</sup> / 11.00 am	37 mins
DPY1	Primary	2016, January 21 <sup>st</sup> / 14.30 pm	28 mins
DPY2	Primary + Lower Secondary	2016, January 21 <sup>st</sup> / 16.00 pm	20 mins
DPY3	Lower Secondary	2016, January 21 <sup>st</sup> / 15.20 pm	32 mins
EPY1	Primary	2016, February 11 <sup>th</sup> / 18.00 pm	40 mins
EPY2	Primary + Lower Secondary	2016, February 10 <sup>th</sup> / 16.30 pm	52 mins
EPY3	High School	2017, June 13 <sup>th</sup> / 12.00 am	23 mins
FPY1	High School	2018, March 19 <sup>th</sup> / 13.30 pm	20 mins
GPY1	High School	2017, May 4 <sup>th</sup> / 13.00 pm	31 mins
<b>Parents Not Receiving Incentive: 10</b>			
BPN1	Pre-primary	2017, June 13 <sup>th</sup> / 10.00 am	22 mins
CPN1	Primary	2016, February 13 <sup>th</sup> / 14.20 pm	35 mins
CPN2	High School	2017, May 6 <sup>th</sup> / 15.00 pm	25 mins
DPN1	Primary	2016, January 22 <sup>nd</sup> / 16.20 pm	23 mins
EPN1	Primary	2016, February 10 <sup>th</sup> / 18.20 pm	24 mins
EPN2	High School	2017, July 7 <sup>th</sup> / 12.30 pm	32 mins
FPN1	High School	2018, March 19 <sup>th</sup> / 16.00 pm	20 mins
FPN2	High School	2018, March 19 <sup>th</sup> / 16.30 pm	24 mins
GPN1	High School	2017, May 30 <sup>th</sup> / 15.30 pm	30 mins
GPN2	High School	2017, May 6 <sup>th</sup> / 11.00 am	20 mins

**Statistical data.** I requested for the datasets from the Private Educational Institutions Division of the MoNE including information of the applicant private schools and students who applied to benefit from the education incentive (See Appendix for the request and approval correspondences). Firstly, I applied for the first two-year implementation period (2014-2015 and 2015-2016 school years) on 02.19.2016, the second time was for the 2016-2017 school year on 04.07.2017, and the third time was for the 2017-2018 school year on 12.27.2017. For the last two years, there was missing data regarding the household income for the applicants. Thus, I asked for the new data sets for these school years and I obtained them. These data sets included the data as to the eligibility criteria in the application form for each applicant whether they receive the incentive or not (See Appendices). The dataset of each year was in the same format.

Besides, I drew on the National Education Statistics published every year by the MoNE. I used the relevant data to determine the change in private education development in the last five years (2012-2017). The period included the EIP implementation. I used the following statistics:

- Number of private education institutions in total
- Number of students attending private education institutions
- Number of students per classroom in private education institutions

**Secondary data sources.** Examination of secondary sources provided information about public discourse regarding the policy. They also give additional perspectives and clarifications as to the intentions of the policy in accordance with the interpretive approach of the study. The secondary sources in the study compose of think-tank reports and related media news.

**Think-tank reports.** There are specifically three educational think-tanks in Turkey which publish regular monitoring reports related to the educational policy issues in Turkey:

Education Reform Initiative (ERG), TEDMEM by Turkish Education Association, and Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA). While the first two focused only on national educational developments and issues, the third one produced analyses and reports about national and international issues in a wide range of areas from politics to energy.

These educational think-tanks address and discuss the current educational problems, policy implementations and evaluations related to the policy actions taken by the government via their publications and policy research. Further, the aforementioned think-thanks published reports related to the incentive policy, private education in Turkey, and other related topics such as public expenditures for pupils. Therefore, I used these reports to gain alternative approaches and views regarding the policy issue. In addition, the reports of ERG and TEDMEM were used in the study since they publish annual reports on education policies in Turkey.

**Media news.** The EIP is spoken frequently on media since it has a large audience in public such as parents and educational institutions. Regarding the research questions of the study, internet sources such as newspapers, popular journal articles, and interviews with the authorized or expert people on the issue, and TV programs on education were collected in order to get information from different perspectives as much as possible. For instance, the speeches of political actors and newspaper articles are used for the first research question to understand the historical development of the policy.

**Data saturation.** Corbin and Strauss (2015) describe data saturation for a researcher with the situation when s/he cannot acquire data any more. According to Patton (2001), data collection ends as the available time and funding expire. For this study, a four-year outsider observation, discussions and reports on and by media and think-tanks and interviews with the stakeholders of the policy yielded a rigorous data to analyze.

The number of interviews for each stakeholder varied according to the number of people authorized for the policy implementation and their knowledge about the policy process. For governmental actors, I made pre-interviews with people in the Ministry to get a better handle on the data collection. After that, I interviewed with the key participants, which are authorized people in the related offices. On the other hand, for the practitioners, I choose the Çanakkale as a sub-case for in-depth analyses where there were all types of schools and levels.

### **Data Analysis**

Case studies have various and rich data sources and apply different data collection methods, it is common to analyze these different types of data by using particular analysis methods (Meriam, 1998; Yin, 2002). There are two main data sources in the current case study: interviews with the governmental actors and the practitioners and statistical datasets of the applicant students according to the eligibility criteria to benefit from the incentive. As the researcher, I had an interpretive approach for my entire policy analysis process. Therefore, I had this approach also for the quantitative data to describe and examine the case in detail regarding my research questions. That refers to a meaning-making activity in the policy analysis and a thick description of the case.

Content analysis is one of the qualitative data analysis techniques which focuses on the contextual meaning of qualitative text data (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). The core of qualitative analysis is characterized with describing the phenomenon, classifying it, and connecting the concepts related to the phenomenon (Dey, 2005). First, context is a principal factor to take account in description aspect of qualitative analysis since meaning through communication can be understood differently according to the relevant context. In this study, I analyzed the interview data by taking into account that how the participants of the study articulate, describe, perceive, and argue the EIP in the context of private education.



Second, classifying includes the breaking apart data and bring it together again by following reasoning, using conceptual framework, categorizing, conceptualizing based on the research questions. Lastly, making connections between the categories is required to find out a pattern of meaning by using statistics, visual aids within the context of a theoretical basis if necessary.

Regarding these classifications and categorizing steps, the recorded interviews were transcribed. I imported the documents into the qualitative data analysis program MAXQDA 12. Then, I followed the content analysis technique to interpret the content of text data. First, I employed open coding to see the relevant content of the interviews within the context of my research questions. After that, I started to make connections between codes and sub-codes and construct a pattern of meaning related to the experiences of the practitioners that they encountered during the policy enactment process. Finally, the categories and themes came out through the systematic classification process (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).

As mentioned earlier, interpretive policy analysis provided to reveal and examine how the interpretive communities talk about the policy. In the study, semi-structured interviews with the governmental actors and the practitioners in the study showed the values, beliefs, and feelings of these interpretive communities with regard to the incentive policy. Yanow's (2000) interpretive analysis framework aims to identify the conflicting views and ideas of the stakeholders in the related interpretive community. For example, the interviews with the governmental actors in the MoNE provided insights about the policy formulation of the EIP as well as the interviews with the practitioners/citizens who are affected by the policy ensured different views about the policy implementation.

The participants were categorized according to their position and group of policy actors in which they were involved. Table 11 below explains the abbreviations used in the

study to refer the interviewees. In the further tables, analysis results, and the quotations from the interviews, it will be given according to these abbreviations on this table.

Table 11

*Abbreviations and Explanations Related To the Study Participants*

<b>Abbreviation</b>	<b>Explanation</b>
MoNE	Governmental actors from the Ministry of National Education
SA	Private education institution administrator
PY	Parents receiving incentive (YES)
PN	Parents not receiving incentive (NO)
A...G	Participant School Code
E.g. ASA1	1st numbered school administrator in Private School A
E.g. APY2	2nd numbered parent who benefits from Education Incentive in Private School A

Having applied the interpretive analysis had given an overall picture of the case to determine how well the policy was developed and adapted into practice. Further, the changes based on the implementations of the policy over time gave clues regarding how does the policy work and in which ways it can be improved.

The other data source was composed of statistical data obtained from the MoNE including the yearly datasets for the applicant students. I utilized descriptive statistics to reveal who benefits from the education incentive according to the eligibility criteria. Throughout the analysis, I used the parameters below to make comparisons and examinations.

- School year (2014-2015, 2015-2016, 2016-2017, and 2017-2018)
- Educational level (pre-primary, primary, lower secondary, upper secondary)

I used the parameters above to analyze and compare how the beneficiary schools and students change over the four-year period. Some of the indicators to analyze the policy case are the number of applicants and beneficiaries, the beneficiary student profile, the incentive amount, and the recipient caps. For instance, I examined how the beneficiary student profile changed over the school years in terms of the eligibility criteria groups such as household income, academic achievement, and number of siblings attending school. In addition, I

compared to the numbers of beneficiary students, incentive amounts, and recipient caps according to education levels.

### **Credibility, Trustworthiness and Ethics**

**Credibility and trustworthiness.** Credibility in qualitative research refers to high-quality data. Triangulation is one of the common elements which provide the rigorous data to enhance the analysis (Patton, 2001). Triangulation could be achieved by using various data sources, time intervals, people, or types of data (Meriam, 1998; Stake, 1995). In this study, I used different data sources to ensure having high-quality data: interviewing, document and datasets gathering, and observing the policy issue as an outsider. Regarding the interviews, two experts examined the interview protocols. In addition, the authorized institutions in the province approved the ones for private schools and parents. With the purpose of understanding the policy process, I used a similar set of questions for each group of interviewees to keep data in the context.

Yanow (2000) emphasizes that policy analyst has his/her own beliefs, values, and feelings and it is difficult for them to stand outside of the policy issue completely. The potential subjective interpretation as a source of bias related to researcher's position is another crucial factor in qualitative paradigm. To avoid bias related to the policy issue, I, as the researcher, conducted the preliminary interviews and tried to listen and understand as many relevant-people as possible before my actual interviews. Further, maximum variation in sampling for the participants enabled me to actualize a versatile perspective to the policy issue. In addition, I observed the policy case for a long time, nearly four-year period, which enhanced the quality of meaning-making process (Meriam, 1998). Therefore, I focused on the process and meaning of the policy through description with words since qualitative research has an inductive process.

Interpretive policy analysis process gives importance to the position of researcher which requires the analyst to have a critically reflexive disposition (Rizvi & Lingard, 2010; Yanow, 2000). Background experience of the researcher plays an important role in policy analysis to uncover the desires of the interpretive communities of the policy and understand the case in the study (Meriam, 1998; Yanow, 2000). In the process of examining the education incentive case, my intention was to provide an intensive and holistic description of the Turkish experience. Based on the thick description and interpretive evaluation of the case, different stakeholders of the policy or policy researchers across the world can familiarize with the case from a comparative point of view.

**Ethics.** Ethics is intrinsic in interpretive paradigm due to the inclusion of participant values in qualitative inquiry while the researcher uncovers the participants' existing constructions and constructs new ones on them (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). In the study, informed consent form provided the voluntary participation of the interviewees and enabled to provide data available in the study and further studies. Thus, they were ensured about confidentiality of the data by using their personal information and views anonymously. Further as the researcher, as much as I can, I tried not to exert my values and opinions on to the participants.

## Chapter IV: Findings

In this chapter, findings and interpretations pertaining to the research questions were explained. The four-year period of education incentive (from 2014-15 to 2017-18) was analyzed in terms of how the policy was articulated by the policy makers and first-hand implementers, who benefits from the policy, experiences of the practitioners, and how the policy works.

### Positioning Policy in Its Own Terms

With the purpose of understanding and framing the policy issue correctly, first, it was important to present how the policy was told in the legislative documents and by policy makers. The first research question of the study was “*How can we position the policy in its own terms?*” This was the first step to get a better handle on the policy issue. Accessing data through written language in the policy documents and verbal language used by the policy makers helped further in the analysis process. The brief history of education incentive policy was given under the heading voucher-like scheme in Turkey in the Chapter II. Here, I draw upon the policy documents such as the related law and regulations and the narratives by the participating governmental actors.

**Historical background.** The very first form of education incentive policy was set into agenda as early as 2002 by the administrators of the Ministry of National Education. In 2002, the policy was formulated on a merit-based public funding for students, especially low-income and high-achieving, to attend private schools by allocating 1,000 TL per year for their private education institution tuition fee (Çelik & Gür, 2013). The criteria to receive incentive were based on academic achievement of students and household-income. Although a bill related to education incentive passed by the Parliament in 2003, the President in charge vetoed it in August, 2003 (Radikal, 2006; Sezer, 2003).

Late in 2005, another bill was introduced into parliament by the government. The Minister in charge at that moment explained the situation in the meetings as follows:

Opening private education institutions is for the benefit of low-income citizens. Private education institutions take the load off from the government's shoulders in terms of school buildings, facilities, wages, etc. Thus, we do not spend any money for the students attending private schools. In addition, we can spend our money for the rest of the students in public schools. Private schooling is more common in Russia and the ratio is about 20% in Europe while it is not even 2% in our country. (Çelik, 2006; TBMM, 2005)

In October, 2006, however, the education bill was vetoed by the President again with similar reasons that the bill is unconstitutional according to the 42<sup>nd</sup> article of the constitution, which states that the educational right of children is under the responsibility of the government (Sezer, 2006). The bill was discussed in Turkish Grand National Assembly on February 13<sup>th</sup>, 2007, and passed by the government as the Private Educational Institutions Law No. 5580 but articles related to the scholarship to be given to students attending private education institutions were subtracted (Sezer, 2007). One of the interviewees from the MoNE group having been in the policy-making meetings indicated the situation regarding that first attempts as:

There were public arguments criticizing the decision of allocating money to private education institutions, which causes ignoring the needs of public schools. Further, the administration in charge at that moment decided to delay it. ...However, low-income students could be funded for attending private education institutions. This would not only decrease the class size in public schools but also support private education institutions financially and the government would make sort of an effort to improve the inequality in income distribution. (MoNE5, 2017)

Beside the critics on publicly funded private education, he also added the structural problem in the Ministry at that time and explained the following:

The reason how the policy issue was not able to be on the agenda was also related to the change in administration of the MoNE repeatedly. Important administration changes happened under

the same government in power. The Minister changed, then the undersecretary changed, and other changes followed it. Thus, it caused a waste of time since it took time for the new administration to get adapted to the Ministry, to adopt the policies, to adjust and get to work. That might cause to miss some opportunities. (MoNE5, 2017)

The frequently change in the administration of the MoNE and the critics on allocating public funding to private education institutions might be understood that neoliberal policy reforms in education were not allowed for several reasons at that time. On the other hand, there were goals in the policy documents related to developing public-private partnership in provision of education service. The Ministry of Development emphasizes the goals in their development plans related to the expansion of private sector and to encourage entrepreneurs to provide services. First, in the last decade, the 9<sup>th</sup> Development Plan 2007-2013 by the government stated some goals related to the development of education system and human capital (*Kalkınma Bakanlığı, 2006*). In more detail, the plan addressed the specific goals below:

- The share of local administration, voluntary associations, and private sector as well as central administration will be increased in providing education (587<sup>th</sup> item).
- Private resources will be allocated to education sector to increase the equality of opportunity. The share of private sector will be increased at all educational levels and public resources will be allocated to the levels which require the most (597<sup>th</sup> item).

Second, the 10<sup>th</sup> Development Plan 2014-2018 also mentioned about the policies to increase the share of private sector in providing education. For this purpose, the Ministry of Development highlight the increasing role of private sector in provision of education service. It is stated in the following (*Kalkınma Bakanlığı, 2013*):

- Alternative education finance models will be developed. Private sector will be encouraged to open educational institutions. Private sector and professional

organizations will also be motivated in providing vocational education in terms of administrative and financial participation (156<sup>th</sup> item).

Class-size was used as an indicator to monitor progress in education quality in the policy documents. Table 12 shows the developments and goals in education sector for K-12 levels given in the 10<sup>th</sup> Development Plan.

Table 12

*Developments and Targets as to Education in 10<sup>th</sup> Development Plan 2014-2018*

	2006	2012	2013	2018
<b>The number of provinces in which class-size is 30 or below</b>				
Elementary level	51	63	66	76
Upper secondary level	57	55	57	66
<b>Gross school enrollment ratio in pre-primary education level (4-5 years old) (%)</b>	24,0	44,0	47,0	70,0

Source: The Ministry of Development (2013).

According to the Plan, the Ministry aimed to lower maximum class-size to be 30 at 76 provinces, out of 81, at elementary school level and 66 provinces at upper secondary level by 2018. The reason for the importance of class-size indicator was that the Ministry pointed out the positive outcomes of increasing the share of private sector in education. In other words, pressure on class-size reduction led the government to introduce privatization alternative in provision of education service. In addition, the positive indirect impact of new private schools and classrooms on students in public education were highlighted in the plan. Therefore, it was expected that an increase in the number of provinces in which class-size is 30 or below might be caused, in a way, due to increased number of private schools and students attending private education institutions. Moreover, another indicator given in the plan was concerning the gross enrollment ratio in pre-primary education level. The incentive policy aims to increase access to private education at K12 plus pre-primary education levels; thus, the increase in the enrollments in private pre-primary schools would contribute to pre-primary gross school enrollment ration at this level.



The goals set in the policy documents constituted the policy drivers for the expansion of private sector in education. As well as the development plans, MoNE mentioned about the private sector in education under the heading of access to education (MEB, 2009; MoNE, 2015a). The Strategic Plan 2010-2014 had strategic goals and strategies related to private education expansion in the following (MoNE, 2009, p.112):

*Strategic Goal 5:* To make private sector invest in education to increase the share of private education in total, to create technologically and physically up-to-date learning environments under the regulatory, supportive and inspector roles of the government, to meet the changing and diversified educational demands of the public, and to make contribution to educational development in the country.

*Strategy 5.1.* To increase the proportion of the government-dependent private institutions from 5.21% to 9% by the end of the planning period to benefit from the financial sources of the private sector.

*Strategy 5.2.* To increase the share of private education in total from 2.76% to 5% by the end of 2014, with comparison to the number of students in public education.

*Strategy 5.3.* To provide incentives to private tutoring institutions for their conversion into private education institutions at 70% by the end of 2014.

The strategic goal 5 mentioned above refers to the expected innovative role of private education in terms of learning and teaching methods, which can also be transferred to other schools. Similarly, the Strategic Plan 2015-2019 also pointed out that private sector investments in education were not in the desired level. Further, the relevant strategy was mentioned as: “Incentive mechanisms will be developed to increase the share of private sector in education. Related departments will empower monitoring and evaluation of these incentive and finance applications” (p.76).

As mentioned above, goals and strategies related to public-private partnership in education sector continued to take place in development and strategic plans of various

government offices. Further, in 2012, the government was able to proceed about the issue and introduced the education incentive policy first for vocational upper secondary education. According to this policy implementation, students attending vocational and technical private high schools established in the organized industrial zones were given education incentive, including full tuition starting the 2012-2013 school year (MEB, 2016; TBMM, 2012). Since this incentive implementation was not included in this study, the details were not provided here. Although the eligibility and scope of policy differed in the two incentive policy implementations, in the interviews with governmental actors, they mentioned that they got experienced as a natural pilot study through this version of the incentive (MoNE2 and MoNE3, 2015).

In 2014, the ruling party passed the Law No. 6528 Articles 12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> related to close down private tutoring institutions (PTI) and to transform them into upper secondary level private education institutions (TBMM, 2014). The schools were given the opportunity to transform into private education institutions, called as ‘basic high schools’, if they meet the necessary legal standards for private schools within a four-year period by the end of school year 2018-2019.

The initiation of EIP overlapped with the policy of closing down PTIs. The reason for this was that PTIs transformed into the temporary upper secondary level private education institutions (basic high schools). In consequence, this situation affected the share of private education directly by increasing the number of private schools and the students attending these schools. Therefore, the transformation process of PTIs caused some consequences related to the EIP policy. To illustrate that period, in his press conferences, the serving Prime Minister at that time explained the reason for education incentive policy and attempts to shut down PTIs as:

We asked the representatives of private sector and foundation of private education institutions to send them students to enroll in their schools and pay some for their tuitions, and to get

education service in turn. We said we would fill the empty spaces in private schools. This would provide us save money since we would not have to spend for new school buildings by allowing students to attend private schools. Thus, we could have used the stagnant capacity in private schools. However, the Council of State rejected it. (Hurriyet, 2013)

This statement showed the support for the policy at the top level. One of the interviewees in the MoNE group also mentioned the influence of the Prime Minister and the ruling party on putting the law into force as:

The policy could not pass due to the concerns since the money would be used to support schools of the religious communities in education sector until 2012. At that time, the Prime Minister's underpinning political speech on the transformation process of private tutoring institutions into private schools had effect on agenda setting of the policy. His speech included that if students attended these schools, the government would support to complete the enrollment capacity. The statute was based on this political discourse. The statute law passed on 3/14/2014 and pointed out in the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> paragraphs of additional 1<sup>st</sup> item as: "...over the minimum number of students for each classroom...". (MoNE3, 2015)

Following the long-term debates for the emergence of the policy since 2002, the policy legalization occurred in 2014, which was described in the coming section.

***Policy legalization.*** To begin with, there were two laws representing the legal basis related to the regulation and passage of education incentive policy. The first one was the Law No. 6528 enacted on 3/14/2014 as to change in related laws and decree laws (TBMM, 2014). The 12<sup>th</sup> article of the law included the relevant item of the EIP to add into the Law No. 5580. The education incentive policy was stated first in the amended 1<sup>st</sup> article of the Private Education Institutions Law No. 5580 dated 1/3/2014 (TBMM, 2007). It says:

Within the context of this Law, students with Turkish Republic citizenship attending primary, secondary and upper secondary level private schools giving formal education might be provided education incentive only if it does not exceed the regular educational period for each level according to school type. The beneficiaries attending pre-primary private schools must be

between 48 and 66 months old and they could just receive the incentive maximum for one school year.

Education incentives are allocated taking into account the minimum number of students per classroom at each educational level and the maximum number of students determined per classroom in any case. The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Finance collectively determine total number of students who would benefit from education incentive policy every year.

Education incentive quotas are allocated according to several criteria such as priority degree of the region in development and its developmental status, household income of student, number of students in educational region, and achievement level of supported student and the private school they attend. The Ministry might evaluate these criteria separately or together. (TBMM, 2007)

The Law No. 5580 restricted the evaluation criteria for the EIP. It provided the general framework and allowed the Ministry to determine how it was going to proceed. For example, the last paragraph of the amended 1<sup>st</sup> article asserted the framework which built the criteria in terms of achievement status, household income, development levels of geographic regions, and special conditions. In addition, the incentive amount was determined through the coalition between the MoNE and the Ministry of Finance.

Regarding the policy making process, one of the interviewees from the MoNE group involved in this process asserted that they examined the related policy cases in the world in terms of such subsidies for private education. As a result of the examination of sample applications and visits to abroad, he mentioned that, the MoNE started to implement the education incentive for vocational high schools. He stated that this application was meant a pilot study for them to initiate the education incentive policy for K-12 level private schools in Turkey. He continued to describe the policy as follows:

We have been slightly affected by voucher system for our education incentive policy. The voucher system guided us during this time. Parents would choose the school they wanted. We

would pay the school for them. The difference is that we follow the process on e-school system and make payments instead of giving incentives to parents and making them pay to schools. Our application involves various parts from several countries. Finally, this form of the policy was decided to initiate as a result of the cooperation among the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Development, and the MoNE. (MoNE2, 2015)

NGOs and related foundations had also an active role in this process besides the formal policy actors in the policy-relevant Ministries. For example, one of the governmental actors (MoNE2, 2015) told that brainstorming meetings and sessions including presentations by experts were held in the MoNE to decide about the most appropriate alternative for our country. After the discussions with bureaucrats and NGO representatives, they presented it to the government for policy legalization. Later, politics had shaped the policy legislation with small-scale interventions and it was published on March 14, 2014 (MoNE2, 2015). Further, another participant from the MoNE group told about the actors in policy making process and stated that the bureaucrats in the MoNE, the representatives for the association of private education institutions, and the private school owners in Turkey were also placed in the process. He mentioned that the private school owners and the aforementioned representatives also demanded for the policy to take action and there was an interaction among them in the policy process (MoNE5, 2017).

The relevant articles in the Law No. 5580 provided the MoNE authority to make the necessary regulations for the policy implementation process. The MoNE follows the details about the EIP implementation through the Regulation of the MoNE Private Educational Institutions in the amended 2<sup>nd</sup> Article (MEB, 2012). Besides, the MoNE publishes an electronic guide, “E-Guide for the Implementation of Education Incentive” every school year in August before the application period. This e-guide explains all the information and steps through the calendar for the application and placement process of education incentive to be followed by the Ministry, local educational institutions, schools, and students’

parents/guardians. In addition, the information including application and placement calendar, terms of application, procedures for application, school choice, and procedures for placement, enrollment in schools, school transfers, and exceptional circumstances regarding the education incentive policy are explained in this guide.

According to the explanations of the participant governmental actors, the MoNE had a new organizational structure since 2011, which includes process-based head offices (MoNE2 and MoNE3, 2015). In addition, this circular structure starts with the Head Office of Education Policies, follows with executive head offices such as the Office of Private Schools, the Office of Private Education Institutions, the Head Office of Student Affairs and Social Activities, and ends with Head Office of Monitoring and Evaluation. Furthermore, he stated that executive offices take an active role in the policy implementation process after the related policy statutes passed. The office of monitoring and evaluation presents its policy effects and outcomes based on performance indicators to the Office of Education Policies. The executive offices also provide data to the Office of Monitoring and Evaluation as well.

In the light of structural explanation above regarding the MoNE, the Head Office of Private Educational Institutions (OOKGM) within the body of the MoNE organizes and executes the implementation and evaluation process of education incentive. Further, the Office of Student Affairs and Social Events manage the policy process working in cooperation with the other offices. For example, as they need to change any legislation, they work together with the Office of Education Policies and the Office of Private Schools on it. Submission of the related information for private schools is in the charge of the Office of Private Schools such as school-size, number of classrooms and students (MoNE2, 2015). The Office of Student Affairs and Social Events used these data in the processes of application, selection and placement of students to benefit from education incentive. I started my interviews with the Head Office of Student Affairs and Social Events.

The implementation of the education incentive was initiated by the 2014-2015 school year with several goals to pursue. These goals and how the governmental policy actors rationalize the policy would provide insights about what they intend to accomplish.

**Goals and rationales.** One of the ways to understand and position the policy in its own terms was to look at what people were saying about the policy issue. When the participants from the MoNE were asked why the government would like to increase the share of private schools in education, they listed several rationales in terms of the EIP:

- To increase the share of private schooling in education (MoNE1)
- To increase access of low and middle-income families to private schools (MoNE1)
- To transfer educational added-value to private schools (MoNE1)
- To support the transformation process of private tutoring institutions (PTI) (MoNE1)
- To benefit from full-size capacity of private schools (MoNE1, MoNE3)
- To lessen the need for additional classrooms in public education (MoNE2, MoNE3)
- To decrease the class-size in public schools (MoNE5)
- To support private schools financially (MoNE5)
- To improve injustice in income distribution (MoNE5)

The governmental actors interviewed in the study stated the goals and rationales of the EIP based on the concepts of access to private education, efficiency, equity, and quality. One of the interviewees worked in the MoNE explained the policy making process of education incentive based on the laws and noted the efficiency as economic rationale of the government as follows:

According to the 42<sup>nd</sup> Article of the Constitution, the government has to design and plan educational institutions taking into account the school-age population and to invest in providing education service. The number of schools is definite. You have a certain budget every year to make investments. You build new schools, but your aim is to provide a more qualified

education. We have a purpose in the Basic Law of National Education No. 1739 as to provide a more qualified education at better educational institutions and make the citizens educated and skilled. You cannot build new school beyond a certain number. This policy was developed at this point. Today the public opinion understands it better as they saw the successful consequences of the policy. However, we knew it before hand as it was the rational thing to do. (MoNE5, 2017)

Another participant in the MoNE group described the emergence of EIP as follows:

It is a different application than voucher system. Regarding its point of emergence, it is a process related to transformation [of private tutoring institutions]. In other words, it was not initiated as an incentive policy for private schools at first since the private tutoring educational institutions were transformed into private schools as basic private high school. Thus, we understand that it is an incentive to be allocated primarily to these private basic high schools. However, we extended the policy for all private schools. (MoNE1, 2015)

The descriptions above concerning the policy formulation process showed that transformation of PTIs into private schools took a crucial place in the EIP. Because it revealed that, the MoNE would reserve a significant amount for this transformation process. In addition, the transformation of PTIs would increase the number of private schools and students attending private schools, which was one of the leading goals of the policy.

The interviewees in the governmental actor group stated that the government has benefited from this situation in any case. The reason was that the government got service from private schools for the money allocated and got taxes on it. Further, the MoNE uses the resources of private schools such as teachers, school buildings, and utilities. One of the interviewees working in the MoNE (MoNE2, 2015) stated this point as, “The government has private schools providing higher quality with less expenditures”. Another governmental actor pointed out the main benefits of the government related to the EIP as follows:

The main issue or paradigm of education incentive is to *increase the share of students attending private schools as it is in OECD and European countries* or aim to reach those ratios. Within



this framework, the share of students attending private schools is on the average 15% in OECD and 16,2% in European Union countries. However, it was 4% in Turkey before the initiation of education incentive policy and now it is 7,1%. I hope that if this implementation continues like this, we will reach to our goals by two-three years in the Strategic Plan in which it is given as 11-12%. And then I hope we will achieve those numbers in international level. The first issue of the policy is to make the students attending public schools benefit mostly from private schools. The *second issue is access to private schools* in Turkey. (MoNE1, 2015)

Another participant in the MoNE group (MoNE5, 2017) also emphasized the class-size comparison between OECD countries and Turkey, which were higher in TR and differed from region to region. He specified the data on MEBBIS system related to the educational indicators such as development levels of each province and region its use in formulating the processes of the policy implementation. He expressed that the basic parameters of this policy consisted of the indicators taken from MEBBIS. He continued that, unlike European and OECD countries, Turkey was far behind in private sector participation in education. He indicated that every sector that the government provided incentive and funding had development and progress. Thus, he questioned the fact that there were not enough students in private schools and drew attention to the steps to be taken by the government (MoNE5, 2017).

Another issue emphasized by the Ministry is the stagnant enrollment capacity of private schools. One of the interviewees from governmental actor group expressed the situation in private education institutions as follows: “Enrollment capacity of private schools was half the size or lower than the capacity of schools for a long time in Turkey, so the government would like to use this stagnant enrollment capacity (MoNE1, 2015)”. Another participant from the Ministry group expressed about the actions they took, and the policy impacts on class-size in public schools as follows:

To decrease the need for new classrooms and class size in public schools, it was decided to provide education incentives to students attending private schools. The implementation of

education incentive for vocational private schools was successful and people demanded for more in 2013. There was stagnant enrollment capacity in private schools as well. These empty classrooms are also public resources. On the other hand, students obtain education in the classrooms having 60, 50 or 40 students. The MoNE has the goal of decreasing class-size to 30 in schools. With the purpose of both decreasing the number of students in public schools and increasing the education quality in public schools, it was decided to support private schooling and the students attending private schools with an incentive amount equals to educational spending for each student in public schools. (MoNE2, 2015)

One participant from the Ministry added about the quality rationale for education incentive policy and mentioned the collaborative role of private sector in education. Emphasizing the public-private partnership to increase the quality of education, he stated the following:

We need to consider education incentive policy in the context of transformation of private tutoring institutions in Turkey. As the added-value of education related to private tutoring is transferred to private schools, the situation can be rearranged through students attending private school. ...the government would put forward a paradigm including concurrently constructing partnership with private sector in education. In this framework, private and public sector together could have collaboration in education which is not segregated much, instead be integrated and homogenous. (MoNE1, 2015)

Similarly, another participant from the MoNE group mentioned the limited public resources for new schools. He explained the need for extra classrooms regarding its role in increasing education quality as follows:

The priority in education is the need for classrooms. If you cannot take students into the classroom, then it does not make sense to talk about educational content. Thus, you should first take students to the classroom and then education in public schools will be improved in long term as to education quality. (MoNE2, 2015)

So far, I gave information about historical background, the legalization process, and rationalization of the education incentive in the context of the first research question. The governmental actors based the emergence of policy issue several economic rationales using the educational resources efficiently and increase in education quality. Here after, I address the process of four-year application of the policy (2014-2018) including the eligibility criteria for the applicant private schools and students, the procedures of application and placement processes to benefit from the incentive, and the process of allocation of funding.

**Eligibility criteria.** As showing the targeted voucher characteristics, the eligible private schools and students were selected according to the several criteria. To settle on these eligibility criteria, the amended 1<sup>st</sup> article of the Law 5580 determined the general rules of the education incentive implementation as:

The students, who have citizenship of Turkish Republic, attending private primary, lower secondary, and upper secondary level private schools depending on the Ministry of National Education can be provided education incentive according to the education period of their grade levels. In addition, the beneficiary students attending pre-primary level private schools can benefit from the incentive for maximum one school year under the condition that they are 48-66 months old.

The definition given above in the Law No. 5580 enabled pre-primary and K-12 level private schools and students attending these schools to benefit from the incentive. Additionally, The MoNE takes into account several criteria separately or together to allocate the education incentive quotas across the country and among schools. The criteria were mainly based on:

- (1) priority degree of the region in development and its developmental status,
- (2) household income of student,
- (3) number of students in educational region,
- (4) achievement levels of beneficiary students and private school they attend, and

(5) privileged students.

The main elements of selective criteria above directed the detailed eligibility criteria to seek for applicant private schools and students to benefit from the education incentive. Each school year the scope of the eligibility criteria was changed or regulated. The next section presented the details of eligibility criteria for private schools and students.

***Private education institutions.*** Several types of private schools can apply to benefit from the education incentive including minority schools at pre-primary and K12 education levels. There are several criteria to determine private schools, which would benefit from the incentive. The following criteria were determined to select the eligible private schools for education incentive (OOKGM, 2014):

1. Incentive area of province which the school locate (Range between 1 and 6)
2. Evaluation score for transformation program
3. Student's average academic performance score
4. Number of students having free education who are children of veterans or disabled on active duty
5. Average number of students enrolled in a classroom
6. Number of students per classroom in the schools of the district in the previous school year
7. Number of private schools in the district
8. Number of students per teacher in the schools of the district
9. Number of permanent teachers in the school
10. Maximum number of students in the school
11. Classification of the school

These relevant-data for applicant private schools were retrieved from the MEBBIS system. Private schools processed the data for their schools on this e-system. In addition, the

Provincial Directorates of the MoNE supervised the data entering process. The Office of Private Educational Institutions (OOKGM) monitored the required data on the MEBBIS to determine the beneficiary student caps for private schools.

*Students.* The MoNE formulated the eligibility criteria for the beneficiaries of education incentive according to Amended 1<sup>st</sup> article in the Law No. 5580. Further, the application score of a student composes of several criteria based on:

- Student achievement
  - Academic achievement at the previous school year
  - Social achievements
- Representation in the international Olympics
- Awards in the national competitions (1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, and 3<sup>rd</sup> order)
- Awards in the provincial competitions (1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, and 3<sup>rd</sup> order)
- Household income (total income for a month)
- Family-related
  - Siblings attending school
  - Parents' marital and vitality status
- Special conditions.

Beside the criteria above, to be deemed eligible, the students who would like to attend a private school and apply for the education incentive must have the following specifications (OOKGM, 2014):

- a) To have the citizenship of Turkish Republic,
- b) To be 48-66 months old for the pre-primary education by September 15 of the application year,
- c) To meet registration conditions as of September 15 at the 1<sup>st</sup> grade in primary school level,

- d) To meet registration conditions as of September 15 at the 5<sup>th</sup> grade in lower secondary school level (including imam & preacher lower secondary schools),
- e) The students apply for upper secondary schools at 9<sup>th</sup> grade level and preparatory class must have finished lower secondary or imam and preacher high schools and not be older than 18 as of September 15 of the application year,
- f) Not to repeat the class they are already attending except for long-term medical reports
- g) To be registered at interim class in official primary, and lower and upper secondary schools or minority schools.
- h) To be provided with the registration and transfer conditions of the private school that s/he would like to attend within the context of the incentive policy.

The beneficiary students were selected according to the eligibility criteria, which was shaped depending on the relevant items of Law No. 5580. One interviewee from the governmental actors (MoNE1, 2015) stated that they prepared the guide within the framework of 3<sup>rd</sup> article of the policy-relevant Law and highlighted the positive discrimination towards martyr and veteran family children and the children of family given protection and care. He also emphasized that they used the disciplinary penalty as a criterion to encourage social achievement and thus to increase education quality in schools.

There were also some other conditions for the applicants to be able to apply for the incentive. For example, in the first year of policy implementation, the applicants had to be enrolled in public schools, however it was applied flexibly. Hence, the students attending private schools could apply for the incentive after they were transferred into public schools. One of the interviewees from the Ministry group (MoNE1, 2015) explained the first-year experience of the incentive scheme as: “Our aim was to increase the number of students attending private schools and to transfer as many students from public schools to private schools as possible at first; indeed, and we succeeded”. In the school year 2015-16, this

obligation was abolished; thus, both students enrolled in public schools and private schools could apply. The same interviewee (MoNE1, 2015) explained the base for this obligation as “to maintain the raise in private school enrollment by means of providing support that prevents dropouts from private schools. We also wanted to enable participation of new private schools in private education system as new stakeholders”.

The scope of eligibility criteria changed through the four-year period. The following table (Table 13) presents a detailed comparison in the eligibility criteria for four-year period of the education incentive implementation.



Table 13

*Comparison of the Eligibility Criteria for the EIP (2014-2017)*

<b>Evaluation Criteria</b>	<b>2014-2015</b>	<b>2015-2016</b>	<b>2016-2017</b>	<b>2017-2018</b>
Academic achievement at the previous school year	20 10 5	Directly added	Directly added	Directly added
Social achievement	15 10 5 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0	70 50 40 340 330 320 310 280 250 200 100 80 40 0	50 70 40 340 330 320 310 280 250 200 100 50 20 0	50 70 40 340 330 320 310 280 250 200 100 50 20 0
Total household income for a month (TL)				
Representation in the international Olympics				
Awards in the national competitions (1 <sup>st</sup> , 2 <sup>nd</sup> , and 3 <sup>rd</sup> order)				
Awards in the provincial competitions (1 <sup>st</sup> , 2 <sup>nd</sup> , and 3 <sup>rd</sup> order)				
Less than 750				
Less than 1000				
Btw 751 or 1.500				
Btw 1000 or 1.500				
Btw 1.501 or 2.500				
Btw 2.501 or 3.500				
Btw 3.501 or 4.500				
Btw 4.501 or 6.000				
Btw 6.001 or 7.500				
Btw 7.501 or 9.000				
Btw 9.001 or 10.500				
More than 10.501				
None				
Pre-primary and/or elementary school students (Max 2 siblings / 2 points) (Max 3 siblings /20 points)	4	60	60	60
High school students (max 2 siblings / 4 points) (Max 3 siblings /20 points)	8	60	60	60
Open education or military school students (Max 3 siblings /20 points)	-	60	60	60
University and college students (Max 2 siblings/ 5 points) (Max 2 siblings /40 points)	10	80	80	80
If both are dead	10	100	100	100
If mother or father is dead	5	80	80	80
If mother and father are alive and separate	3	40	40	40
Disability status (family members at least 50% disabled)	-	-	50	50
If mother or father work as MoNE Staff (died MoNE personnel as active on duty)	-	70	70	70
Disciplinary penalties	-10	-100	-100	-100
Children of martyr and veterans (the 13 <sup>th</sup> item of relevant Law)	10	100	100	100
<b>Maximum Total Score</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1000</b>	<b>1000</b>	<b>1000</b>



To start with, the school years were indicated in different colors to see the changes between years. The related change continued with the same color to show the beginning of change. It can be seen from the table that the scoring system changed in the second-year implementation. It changed into hundred-system from decimal system. Thus, the application scores were started to calculate out of 1,000 points instead of 100 points since the 2015-2016 school year.

There are seven groups for the evaluation criteria. First, academic achievement criterion was evaluated based on high grades getting high scores in the application. In the 2014-2015 school year, it was divided into three parts for the grade points between 0 and 100; but in the next three school years, it was directly added to the application score. In addition, there is no grade point in pre-primary and the first-three grades in primary level students; thus their academic achievement was not included in the application score. Second, social achievement was evaluated according to the students' achievement in national and international competitions in various fields. The scores for degrees and participation in the competitions were increased in the second year (2015-2016). The representation in the Olympics held the highest score. However, the points of representation in the Olympics and awards in the national competitions were exchanged in the 2016-2017 school year. Thus, the highest score was for the degrees in national competitions. This was kept in 2017-2018 school year.

Third, total household income for a month was evaluated in ten different income intervals, and the lowest income interval was 'less than 750 TL' for the 2014-2015 school year. The highest interval was 'more than 10, 501 TL'. The less income the applicant has, the higher score s/he gets for the household income criterion. Later, the lowest income interval was expanded to 1,000 TL. Except for the first-two intervals, the rest of income intervals were the same in 2015-2016 school year. Further, the income intervals completely changed in the

2016-2017 school year. The lowest income interval was again expanded and it changed as 'less than 5,000 TL'. The number of intervals was decreased to seven. The highest income interval changed as 'more than 12,501 TL'. The household income intervals were kept as the same in 2017-2018 school year.

Fourth, siblings attending school was another criterion for the incentive eligibility. This was evaluated according to the number of siblings attending school and education level they were attending. In 2014-2015 school year, the maximum number of the siblings to be scored was two for all education levels including pre-primary and elementary, upper secondary, and university and college. The maximum numbers increased in 2015-2016 school year for pre-primary plus K12 schools as well as it kept the same for university level. The points for each level were 2, 4 and 5 points (respectively) per sibling according to education level in the first year. The points changed into 20 points per sibling for pre-primary plus K12 schools and 40 points per sibling for university level. Overall, the maximum score that applicant can get was the highest for university level.

Last, applicant parents' marital and vitality status and special conditions were evaluated in the application for the incentive. Except for increase in scores for marital and vitality status of applicants' parents, it was the same for all the school years. For disadvantaged group of applicants, children of martyr and veterans (according to the 13<sup>th</sup> item of the relevant Law) got extra scores since the first school year. Besides, the applicant students whose parents are the MoNE staff were scored in 2015-2016 school year. Then, it was changed as the parents who died as active on duty. In addition, disability status of family members (at least 50%) was started to be scored in 2016-2017 school year. Moreover, disciplinary penalties of the applicant students were evaluated, and this situation caused a decrease in the application scores of the students.

The private schools willing to be placed in the incentive scheme, and students who intend to attend a private school and benefit from the incentive can proceed their applications according to the incentive agenda. The next section described the procedures and responsibilities of the stakeholders of the policy related to application and placement process.

**Application and placement.** I examined the relevant policy documents including the Private Education Institutions Regulation (MEB, 2012) and the e-guides of EIP implementation (OOKGM, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017) in terms of the application and placement process. In addition, the interviewees within the MoNE group (MoNE1 and MoNE4, 2015) described the process. Three important phases emerged which the applicants must complete to benefit from education incentive: (1) applications of private schools and students/parents, (2) school choice, and (3) placements. I gave the details related to the application and placement process of the education incentive below.

**Application process.** The e-guides involved the application and placement procedures, terms and conditions, and agenda for applicant private schools and students/parents. The processes for the applicant private schools and students, which they must proceed, were given below.

*Private schools.* Private schools must apply to the incentive program to become a beneficiary school. It is necessary since some schools might not want to involve in the policy implementation. School administrators of the applicant private schools complete the application process on the MEBBIS system. The school administrators are responsible for the control and process the data for their school on the system. For instance, they complete the information regarding the students having free education according to the 13<sup>th</sup> article of the Law No. 5580.

First, they demand for the maximum number of beneficiary students at the grade levels they would like to benefit from the incentive. This was equal to half of school size in the first-

two years of implementation; then it changed as 40% of school size in pre-primary private schools and 60% in elementary and upper secondary private schools. They must also take into account that the enrolled students per class must be at least 12. In addition, the administrators of the applicant schools giving inaccurate information would be taken legal action against. Moreover, the Ministry supervises the applicant private schools, if they have any problem with their financial situation such as debts (taxes) to the state.

Private schools can make their applications until September 2<sup>nd</sup> of each year because the deadline of opening a private school is September 2<sup>nd</sup> of year according to the Law (MEB, 2012; TBMM, 2007). Each evaluation criterion in the application provides scores to the schools and then they are evaluated according to their total scores in order to be able to benefit from the incentive.

*Students.* First, parents/guardians of students who would like to benefit from education incentive make their applications to the schools they enrolled according to the evaluation form in the Appendix 12 of the Application and Placement E-Guide. However, the first-year of the implementation, students could only apply for the incentive if they were enrolled in public schools. This was changed in 2015-2016 school year; thus, students enrolled in public and private schools could apply. The applicant students/parents completed their application form on e-school system, which asked for the information such as household income, students achievements, siblings, parental status, and special conditions. They submit their forms and required documents to the school administration in the public or private school they enrolled. The school administrators check and process the data in the form and complete the application process. They got a copy of the approved application form. Moreover, the applicants get an application score out of 1000 points except for the first-year implementation that the total score is 100 points. Their scores are ordered from the highest to the lowest. One interviewee from the MoNE group summarized about the application process of students/parents as:

The applications are made in the schools where students are enrolled. The applicants go to the school they are enrolled, and they complete the form on e-school and submit the necessary documents to the school. There is nothing to do with Provincial and District Directorate of the National Education. All the procedures except for the application process in the school are managed by the central administration. (MoNE4, 2017)

As cited above, the chief officer (MoNE6, 2017) in Çanakkale Provincial Directorate of National Education stated that they had a role only to make the money transfers for the incentive amounts to the beneficiary private schools. Except for that, they work collaboratively with the MoNE to monitor and supervise the private education institutions.

***School choice.*** After the application period, the results were announced for the students who deserve to make school choice. Students together with their parents make their private school choices on e-school system between September 4<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> for maximum 15 schools in the country level (MoNE4, 2017). Another participant governmental actor stated related to this process as:

The selected applicants make their choices in the 6-day period on agenda with the applicant score we announced. They are given a space to make their choices freely since they can even do that on their phone or computer. They also can choose any school from the applicant private school pool in Turkey without any restriction as to province or district. (MoNE1, 2015)

The placement process follows school choice by the selected applicants. The selected applicants who made their school choices for the first placement are ordered based on their applicant scores recorded on e-school system. The central administration in the Ministry manages this placement process. After the first placement, empty spaces might occur due to some situations such as students/families may give up attending a private school or have disagreements with the school. For empty spaces, the Ministry applies a second placement

over the selected applicants' choices in the first placement. Then the placement process is completed.

One participant from the Ministry group reported the details about incentive quotas of private schools as follows:

Let's say a province's recipient cap is 500. The applicant scores of students are ordered. The process starts based on the grade quotas. For example, ranking in 5<sup>th</sup> grade is done up to 40% cap. If 200 students would be provided, then ranking is done for 200 applicants. The first 20 students chose School A. Its recipient cap was 20. Further, students from 20 to 25 in ranking chose School B. Then its quota stayed as 5. In addition, there are boutique schools with school size for 50 or 100 students. Their quotas full quickly. 70 students in the first 500 ones in ranking chose that school. Since the recipient cap is 50 for that school, 20 students stayed out. If they would have chosen more than one school, they could be placed in another school. However, they could not be placed due to single school choice and full quota in chosen school. They cannot benefit from additional placement since they made single choice. For this reason, we suggest parents/students to make up to 15 choices. Of course, they need to learn the enrollment conditions of other schools such as tuition fee, educational opportunities, and facilities. After all, it is parents'/students' decision. If they make more choices, they might increase their chance to benefit from the incentive. (MoNE4, 2015)

In other words, if the school size of a private school is 120 and there are 100 students already enrolled, only 20 students from outside the school can benefit from the incentive. The rest of the incentive quota must be in-house enrolled students. Further, if there are 120 students who are already enrolled, i.e. the school size is full, then all the beneficiaries will be in-house students. At this point, the interviewee in the Ministry group clarified it as follows:

For example, a boutique private school filled with 60-students school size. There are 60 students already enrolled in this school. Then this school is not seen for outsider applicants on the web-

page in the incentive application process. However, in-house applicant students can see this school and choose it. (MoNE4, 2015)

**Placement process.** After the application process, the Ministry proceeded with the placement process to select and place the beneficiary schools and students. Principles and procedures of the placement process were stated in the guide as follows (OOKGM, 2016):

1. Placement scores of the selected applicants will be evaluated separately according to the grade level. Placement process starts with the beginning grades of each school level and proceeds with upper grade levels.
2. 1<sup>st</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup>, and 9<sup>th</sup> grades of private schools will be provided 40% of education recipient cap separately. Other grades will get 20% education recipient cap separately.
3. There is an exception for basic high schools related to the distribution of school quotas. 9<sup>th</sup>, 10<sup>th</sup>, and 11<sup>th</sup> grades in Basic High Schools will be provided 20% of education recipient cap separately. Further, 40% of the education recipient cap will be placed in 12<sup>th</sup> grade.
4. Regarding the empty spaces of school capacity as to education incentive quota, outsider students selected private schools and students enrolled in private schools according to the ranking will be placed. When private school capacity is full, the students enrolled at the private school will be placed based on the highest score.
5. At the end of students' school choice process, two placement scores for private schools will be announced. The lowest scores come out from placement results; the lowest score for the public-school students and the lowest score for the students enrolled at private schools.

6. No more placements will be acquired for the private schools over their maximum quota of education incentive.

*Private schools.* Quota of the provinces is another critical issue about placement process before the determination of school quotas. Before the yearly announcement of education incentive to the public, negotiation meetings are held between the Ministry of Finance and the MoNE to identify the total number of students and amount to be allocated to education incentive. The overall quota is distributed according to the six development regions determined by the Ministry of Development. One interviewee working in the MoNE explained this process as, “We apply coefficients to the six development regions to determine regional incentive quotas. The coefficients range between 0.95 and 1.30. Thus, the Ministry applies positive discrimination to the less developed regions” (MoNE1, 2015).

Private schools have a recipient cap, which refers to the maximum number of beneficiaries they can admit. One of the participants working in the MoNE explained the calculation process of private school recipient cap. He stated the following:

The calculation of the recipient cap for private schools is in the following: Beneficiary Cap= School Size x %50– For pre-primary schools, this ratio is %40. For instance, in a beneficiary private school, whose school size is 100, maximum 50 students can benefit from the incentive; but that does not mean all of the cap would be full. Only 10 students might apply and be placed for that school. It all happens according to students’ choices based on their applicant score superiority and school recipient cap. (MoNE4, 2015)

The formulation- and program-based application and placement process indicated that the policy process had a base for accountability, especially when the applicants objected to the results. Thus, they can check the data on e-system to provide an evidence-based explanation for the objections.

In the first-two years of the policy implementation, in terms of the school and grade quotas, placement procedures are proceeded based on the grade level of education. The



beginning grade levels (1<sup>st</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup>, and 9<sup>th</sup>) get 40% of education incentive overall quota for the beneficiary private schools and the other grade levels get 20% for each level. The reason for this difference was that the number of new coming students was greater at the first-grade levels of school type (MoNE1, 2015). In the last two-year period of the policy, on the other hand, the distribution of placement proportions at grade levels changed. All the grade levels got the same rates of quota from the school recipient quota.

The process was the reverse in basic high schools, i.e. 9<sup>th</sup>, 10<sup>th</sup>, and 11<sup>th</sup> grades got 20% for each and 12<sup>th</sup> grade got 40% of the overall quota. On the contrary, the distribution of rates for the grade levels in basic high schools was kept the same in the last-two year period of the policy. One participant from the MoNE group explained why there was an exception for basic high schools as follows:

The number of 12<sup>th</sup> grade level students attending private basic high schools is higher compared to other types of upper secondary schools. Due to the transformation process of private tutoring institutions into private schools, we applied a positive discrimination strategy towards these schools. (MoNE1, 2015)

The placement started with 9<sup>th</sup> grade and then continued with the others. In addition, they are deemed eligible throughout their educational level at all the grade levels. Moreover, the OOKGM followed a set of rules in the placement process. One of the governmental actors mentioned about the placement methods as external and internal placement, which is unique for the education incentive. He stated the process as follows:

Beneficiary private schools might not be willing to accept beneficiary students due to lack of space in their school. We can inspect this situation on e-school system whether there is space. We apply two placement models: *external* and *internal*. We have just developed the internal one, which is an unusual model in Turkey.

The internal placement happens when school is full. For example, if there is a 10-student space in a school with a 1000-student school size, 10 students from outside are accepted first according to the score. When the school is full, the system makes placement from inside. The enrolled students are placed according to their score considering the province quotas. The system takes the place of beneficiaries empty and replaces from inside.

We take this kind of statements as investigation cases. We do the examinations and give penalty if necessary. If institutions make the same mistake twice, they might be banned from the incentive system. (MoNE1, 2015)

When one of the interviewees from the MoNE group was asked about how school size is determined, he answered as follows:

School size is determined by the Ministry (MoNE) when schools get their authorization. There are standards to establish a private school. For example, maximum 24-student class-size, school area, garden, floors, restrooms, ladders, and all other things must be convenient. Let's say there are 5 classrooms, and then the school size is given as 120 (since  $5 \times 24$  is equal to 120). If they have small classrooms, class-size must be 12. The supervisors of the Ministry examine these conditions during the school opening process and report it. The schools are started according to these examinations. (MoNE4, 2015)

For private schools, they must follow the standards for private schools to benefit from the incentive including class-size and school facilities. The MoNE apply these factors in the system to determine the school quotas.

*Students.* Concerning the placement process of the selected applicants at the beneficiary private schools, the number of beneficiary students to be enrolled at the school is determined by the related regulation. The relevant item in the Law states that education incentives are allocated to the students after the minimum number of students enrolled at the beneficiary private school. In addition, the minimum number of students must be 20 per classroom at the pre-primary level private schools and 24 at the higher-level according to the

48<sup>th</sup> article in the Regulation (MEB, 2012). One participant governmental actor explained this as:

For example, the school size of a beneficiary private school is 1000. For each grade, we assume that there are at least 12 students per classroom. The maximum number of beneficiary students to be placed at this school cannot be more than 500. The system is processed automatically; thus, we cannot favor anyone and any school. The system is updated automatically as any information change related to the schools such as school size, and number of students. (MoNE1, 2015)

Another participant in the MoNE group also clarified a misunderstanding by the applicants related to recipient caps of private schools and commented as follows:

Parents and private schools think that the central Ministry administration provides incentive quotas for private schools. For example, there is a perception like 10 for School A, 50 for School B, and 30 for School C. They complain about the low recipient cap of their school or high quota of another school. (MoNE4, 2015)

Another point that required attention in the placement process is related to the applicants' status for in-house or outside of the institution. One participant from the MoNE group who took an active role in the implementation process expressed the following:

We applied two ways of placement for the applicants: outside of the institution [private school] and in-house. For instance, 90 students are enrolled in a school with 100 school size. There are 10 empty spaces with respect to the school size. That means 10 students could attend from outside of the school. It is impossible for the 101<sup>st</sup> student to attend that school. The scores were ordered from highest to lowest. 15 students with higher scores chose the school. 10 of them were placed and the other 5 stayed out since the school was full.

On the other hand, if a student took first place for her score as an in-house applicant, that student enrolled in her own school would be placed first. Besides, if an applicant in the second place was an outside for the institution (from public school) chose that school, he was placed as

the 91<sup>st</sup> student enrolled in that school. If the applicant in the third place for his score was an in-house student, then he was placed. Similarly, if 4<sup>th</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup> to 10<sup>th</sup> students chose the institution as outsider, they were placed.

When the school size is full, they cannot enroll student from outside of the school. This time it continues with the in-house applicants. The applicants outside of the school are eliminated. Thus, we recommend parents to investigate those situations well regarding how many students were enrolled already in the school and how it could be possible to benefit from the incentive if they were enrolled in that school. It is not a problem for large-size schools since students outside of school can attend if a small number of students are already enrolled. However, small-size schools especially kindergartens should be searched well by parents. (MoNE4, 2015)

The Figure 6 illustrates the application and placement process of the education incentive scheme according to the policy-relevant Law and statutes. It showed the flow of policy process including the phases that applicants must follow.




Figure 6. The flowchart for implementation process of the EIP

Having completed the procedures related to placement and enrollment, the students were deemed eligible to receive the education incentive. The government proceeded the allocation procedures of the incentive amounts according to the Law and regulations. The next section informed about the

**Allocation and payment terms of money.** According to a participant from MoNE, the authority to spend the money on behalf of the MoNE belongs to the Provincial Directorates of National Education. One participant from the MoNE group told about this process as the following:

How do schools get that money? They will print-out the list of beneficiary students on e-school system and go to the Provincial Directorate of National Education. The Provincial Directorate will check the list to see if they are the beneficiaries by creating a new list or compare the coming list from the schools. Then they approve it and send to the Fiscal Office of the District. The schools withdraw the money from the Office and deposit to their own bank account. Otherwise, the District Directorate might want to proceed all together and send them all to the Fiscal Office at the same time. (MoNE4, 2015)

It was stated that although some parents assume that the payments could be deposited directly to beneficiary families, the government avoid this way due to some potential problems in the allocation process (e.g. wrong account numbers, closed accounts of parents) and prefers allocating many to schools. The settlement then should be between institutions and parents (MoNE4, 2015).

According to the Regulation (MoNE, 2012), the MoNE allocate the incentive amount for a school year to the beneficiary private schools in three parts: 35% in November, 35% in February, and 30% in June. Further, the government prefers depositing the payment in three phases instead of allocating it completely at once to overcome some other potential problems in the process. A governmental participant explained the reason for this three-phase allocation choice and commented on the potential problems in the process as follows:

It is as it is because the MoNE did not have to allocate all the money at once. Further, some parents and/or students might want to drop out the school due to several reasons such as not being able to afford the school tuition, parents' appointment and not finding an appropriate private school in the new place. If we paid the whole money at once and they left the school in the first month, then it is difficult to follow these situations for the MoNE. Thus, we pay partially. For example, when we pay in November for the first part of the incentive, the beneficiary student deserves this part of money since s/he was enrolled at the school until that time. Yet, if s/he leaves in early November, the school is excluded from the beneficiary list and the student will not be paid in February for the second payment. On the other hand, if the student wants to make school transfer in December, his/her second payment will be paid to the new school based on the school type incentive amount." (MoNE4, 2015)

The education incentive amount was determined because of the cooperative work by the MoNE and the Ministry of Finance every year. They take into account the number of beneficiary student cap in the provinces and school types. The incentive amount cannot exceed one and a half times more than the public spending per pupil in public pre-primary, elementary, and high schools. The government applied the data of previous year for his calculations. The incentive amounts according to the school year and education level were given below in Table 14.

Table 14

*Incentive Amounts According to School Year and Educational Level (2014-2017)*

No.	Education Level	Incentive Amount (TL)			
		2014-2015	2015-2016	2016-2017	2017-2018
1	Pre-primary	2,500	2,680	2,860	3,060
2	Primary	3,000	3,220	3,440	3,680
3	Lower secondary	3,500	3,750	4,000	4,280
4	Upper Secondary	3,500	3,750	4,000	4,280
5	Basic High School	3,000	3,220	3,440	3,680

Source: OOKGM (2014, 2015, 2016, 2017)

According to education level, the lowest amount belongs to pre-primary level. The incentive amounts for private primary and basic high schools are the same. Besides, the

incentive amounts for lower and upper secondary level private schools are the same. In addition, the change in incentive amounts in all education levels indicated that they increased nearly 20% in four-year period.

The maximum number of beneficiaries for education levels was determined each school year. The recipient caps for the education incentive according to education levels in four-year period were given below in Table 15.

Table 15

*The Recipient Caps According to School Year and Educational Level (2014-2017)*

No.	Education Level	Recipient Cap				Total
		2014-2015	2015-2016	2016-2017	2017-2018	
1	Pre-primary	50,000	20,000	6,000	6,000	82,000
2	Primary	50,000	50,000	15,000	15,000	130,000
3	Lower secondary	75,000	50,000	15,000	15,000	155,000
4	Upper Secondary	75,000	110,000	15,000	15,000	263,000
5	Basic High Schools			24,000	24,000	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>250,000</b>	<b>230,000</b>	<b>75,000</b>	<b>75,000</b>	<b>630,000</b>

Source: OOKGM (2014, 2015, 2016, 2017)

As it can be seen from the Table 4.3 above, at the first-two school years, the maximum number of beneficiary students for the incentive was high compared to the last-two years. The beneficiary cap in the third year decreased one fourth of the cap in the first-two years. The recipient cap for pre-primary level private schools decreased in years. On the other hand, the recipient caps for upper secondary level increased in total. Specifically, the caps for private basic high schools in the first-two years were given combined with upper secondary level while it was given separately in the last two years. When we look at the proportion of basic high school cap in total for the last two years, it showed that one third of total beneficiary cap was composed of the beneficiaries that would attend basic high schools. The explanation for this was related to the governmental support for the transformation of crams schools into private schools.

In brief, I presented the results of the first research question of the study for an intensive description of the education incentive case in Turkey. The findings provided a

holistic description of the case in terms of its emergence and implementation phases according to the views of the governmental actors and policy documents. After several attempts to pass the law in the formulation process of the policy, the education incentive policy was introduced in 2014-2015 school year. The goals of the policy were stated to widen access to private education, use the education resources efficiently, and increase education quality by reducing the class-size in public schools.

To broaden the access to private education, the education incentive was allocated to the students attending private schools in terms of several eligibility criteria including household income, academic and social achievements of students, siblings attending school, parental vitality and marital status, and special conditions. Further, the incentive scheme evolved into a more targeted feature regarding the eligibility criteria, in which extra scores were given to socioeconomically disadvantaged students in terms of the beneficiary profile.

The maximum number of beneficiary students to receive incentive was lowered in the last two school years; however, the numbers of private basic high schools kept a significant proportion of the total. The transformation of PTIs was initiated concurrently with the incentive policy; thus, the incentive amount was allocated to private basic high schools to support the transformation process until the 2018-2019 school year.

### **Defining the Policy Actors**


The second research question was related to the policy actors of the EIP. I examined this research question based on two sub-questions: (1) Who benefits from the education incentive? (2) How do the policy actors value the policy? To answer these questions, I drew upon the statistical data provided by the MoNE, and interviews with the governmental actors and the practitioners in Çanakkale, and the reports of educational think tanks.

**Who benefits from the policy?** There are three groups of stakeholders benefitting from the EIP at the first sight: (1) the government as legislative and executive branch, (2)



private schools (entrepreneurs or investors) as interest group, and (3) parents/guardians of beneficiary students as citizens. Beneficiary students and their families might seem as the first in ranking since they are the group that directly uses the money to attend a private school as well as the government has its own benefits. To answer this question, I analyzed the datasets for the applicant students according to different variables based on the change in school years and education levels. I presented the analyzed data as descriptive statistics in tables and figures to reveal the beneficiaries of the incentive. In addition, I made further explanations about the data using the quotations from the interviews where it was applicable.


**Beneficiaries: students.** First, I present the analyses for the beneficiary profile of the incentive in four-year period according to several variables. Figure 7 below shows the numbers of applicants and beneficiaries in the four-year period. It revealed that both the decrease in the national incentive recipient cap and the increase in the number of applicants resulted in a dramatic difference for the applicant/beneficiary ratio for students/families who wants to receive the incentive. The finding showed that there was an increasing demand to receive incentive to attend a private school. In addition, the recipient caps were lowered in the last two school years, thus, the beneficiary/applicant ratio was higher in these years



*Figure 7.* The numbers of applicants and beneficiaries of the EIP (2014-2017).  
Source: The author arranged the data obtained from the OOKGM.


Concerning the numbers in Figure 7 above, it is seen that the reports of educational think-tanks (ERG, 2015a; TEDMEM, 2014) mentioned different numbers of applicants and beneficiaries for the first school year. The reason for the difference might be related that the numbers of beneficiaries might have changed due to the dynamic process of the incentive beneficiaries such as drop out from the EIP implementation. Thus, the numbers might be different according to the dates of data used in reports and the data I obtained. Since I used my own data source provided by the MoNE, I adhered to the validity of those datasets. However, it should be considered whether this difference was related to the dropouts from private schools.

According to gender variable, Figure 8 below shows the gender ratios for the beneficiary students in four-year period. It shows that the numbers of female and male students benefitting from the incentive was remarkably close to each other especially in the last two school years (49% female, 51% male beneficiaries in school year 2017-2018). The results showed that female and male students had the same opportunity to use the incentive to attend a private school.



*Figure 8.* The percentages of beneficiary students in four years according to gender. Source: OOKGM, 2017.

Occupancy rate refers to the ratio of the used incentive to the total quota of available. When I looked at the occupancy rates of each school year, only 53.5% of the quota for the 2014-2015 school year was used (Figure 9 below). It was the first year of policy implementation. Further, the occupancy rates increased for the last three years, which were around 98%. According to some of the interviewees from the governmental actors and the private school administrators in Çanakkale (MoNE1, MoNE4, CSA2, DSA2), dropouts from private schools due to several reasons and shortcomings during the school choice process might have caused that unused 2%.



*Figure 9.* The occupancy rates of the incentive recipient caps (2014-2017).

Concerning the first year of implementation, there were some shortcomings in practice related to the announcement to a broader group of applicants through official correspondences and news on media. In addition, the obligation of public school enrollment restricted the number of applicants since most of families had made their children enrolled in a private school (ERG, 2015a). Hence, the period of application process was stated as late for parents to make such decisions. Some of the participants stated about the problems they experienced. For example, some school administrators stated that

every applicant already received the incentive in the first-year (CSA1, CSA3). Regarding the reason for this situation, a school administrator commented as: “For several reasons such as not being able to fill the quota, they [the government] extended the application period repeatedly for a long time” (CSA1). Another private school administrator, similarly, added:

Surely, parents were not informed well about the education incentive in the first year. However, almost all of the applicants were deemed eligible to benefit from the incentive. The next year, there were many applicants. (CSA3)

As I explained about the E-Guide, it includes the information about the eligibility criteria, which determine the application score of applicants. I analyzed the number of applicants and beneficiaries according to these criteria group. First, students’ academic achievement in the previous year and social achievements were analyzed in the four-year period (See Table 16 below).

Table 16

*The Numbers of Applicant and Beneficiary Students According to Student Achievements*

Evaluation Criteria	School Year							
	2014-2015		2015-2016		2016-2017		2017-2018	
	Applicant (A)	Beneficiary (B)	A	B	A	B	A	B
Academic achievement in the previous year (A)								
85-100	116,147	71,414	172,590	66,825	198,899	27,247	224,620	28,710
70-84	31,786	19,790	132,678	49,654	110,223	17,654	111,407	17,185
55-69	17,784	10,910	94,382	34,097	66,443	7,381	59,570	6,608
0-54*	70,631	31,635	195,386	74,691	173,076	21,337	172,167	21,456
<b>Total</b>	<b>236,348</b>	<b>133,749</b>	<b>595,036</b>	<b>225,267</b>	<b>548,641</b>	<b>73,619</b>	<b>567,764</b>	<b>73,959</b>
Social Achievements (B-C-D)								
International Olympics (B)	320	210	648	336	587	351	629	375
Awards in the national competitions (C)	965	683	2,891	1,430	2,297	1,436	2,850	1,730
Awards in the provincial competitions (D)	3,167	2,262	10,567	4,732	9,594	4,120	12,310	5,446
<b>B-C-D Total</b>	<b>4,452</b>	<b>3,155</b>	<b>14,106</b>	<b>6,498</b>	<b>12,478</b>	<b>5,907</b>	<b>15,789</b>	<b>7,551</b>

\* Pre-primary, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd grade levels have no academic achievement score. Therefore, their D item score are seen as "0" (zero).

Source: The data was obtained from OOKKGM.

For academic achievement, distribution of the beneficiaries showed that the students with higher academic performance were more likely to benefit from the incentive in each year. However, it would be better to remind that the achievement interval of 0-54 included the number of students who did not have any grade point in pre-primary and 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, and 3<sup>rd</sup> grades of primary level. Considering this detail, we can say that more than half of the beneficiaries had important level of achievements. For the social achievements of applicant students, the criterion was based on the international Olympics representation and degrees (1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, and 3<sup>rd</sup>) in national and provincial competitions. Expectedly, there were not many beneficiary students with such awards; but both the numbers of applicants and beneficiaries having social achievement increased in each school year.

The second criterion was household income of applicant families. Table 17 below shows the numbers of applicant and beneficiary students in four years.

Table 17

*The Numbers of Applicant and Beneficiary Students According to Household Income Level*

Household Income (TL)**	2014-2015		2015-2016		Household Income (TL)**	2016-2017		2017-2018	
	A*	B*	A	B		A	B	A	B
Less than 750	14,465	9,148			Less than 5.000	401,991	64,892	408,960	71,872
Btw 751 or 1.500	46,063	27,945			Btw 5.001 or 6.500	59,439	1,791	57,691	266
Less than 1000			102,596	53,401	Btw 6.501 or 8.000	34,070	670	71,785	58
Btw 1000 or 1.500			91,612	43,153	Btw 8.001 or 9.500	18,122	320	22,264	15
Btw 1.501 or 2.500	36,902	21,991	93,021	38,371	Btw 9.501 or 11.000	11,940	192	13,195	6
Btw 2.501 or 3.500	37,082	21,234	85,664	32,498	Btw 11.001 or 12.500	6,723	117	7,646	0
Btw 3.501 or 4.500	25,467	14,271	55,944	17,345	More than 12.501	16,355	271	16,223	8
Btw 4.501 or 6.000	40,153	20,858	67,174	18,327					
Btw 6.001 or 7.500	17,756	9,275	41,083	9,898					
Btw 7.501 or 9.000	7,331	3,686	19,915	4,415					
Btw 9.001 or 10.500	4,535	2,159	12,100	2,587					
More than 10.501	6,594	3,182	25,927	5,272					
<b>Total</b>	<b>236,348</b>	<b>133,749</b>	<b>595,036</b>	<b>225,267</b>		<b>548,640</b>	<b>68,253</b>	<b>597,764</b>	<b>72,225</b>

\*A refers to the number of Applicant Students, B refers to the number of Beneficiary Students

\*\*Intervals of household income level have changed in the school years 2015-2016 and 2016-2017.

Source: The data was obtained from OOKKGM (2016, 2017).

For the last two years, there were not consistency with the actual total number of applicants and beneficiaries. It was because, as mentioned earlier in Chapter 3, a second dataset was used for the last two years' household income variable since it was missing in the first dataset.

Household income intervals had changed slightly in 2015-2016 school year and completely in 2016-2017 school year. Thus, the interval of low-income level was expanded in years. While the lowest interval was 750 TL in the 2014-2015 school year, it became 5.000 TL in the 2016-2017 school year. What stands out in the table was the difference in the distribution of beneficiaries between the first two and the last two school years. The numbers of the beneficiaries having less than 5.000 TL-household income increased in years. In other words, the percentage of the beneficiaries having less than 4,500 TL-household income was around 70% in the first year and 83% in the second year. This percentage for 5.000 TL-household income was 96% in 2016-2017 school year and 99% in 2017-2018 school year. This result indicated that the low-to-moderate income families had opportunity to benefit from the incentive. Therefore, the government pursued to reach socioeconomically disadvantaged families. However, it is difficult to say to what extend low-income families benefited from the incentive since the interval covered low- and lower middle- families together.

Another evaluation criterion for applicants is number of siblings attending school. The Table 18 below presents the analysis results of the numbers of applicants and beneficiaries in four year for this criterion.

Table 18

*The Numbers of Applicant and Beneficiary Students According to the Siblings Attending School*

Number of siblings attending school	2014-2015		2015-2016		2016-2017		2017-2018	
	A*	B*	A	B	A	B	A	B
0	91,635	48,221	225,972	77,432	207,963	12,847	214,996	13,906
1	109,196	63,898	272,165	102,967	250,386	28,987	265,165	29,394
2	28,057	17,024	73,976	33,209	68,485	21,210	68,751	21,226
3	5,498	3,390	16,178	8,215	15,283	7,108	13,684	6,546
4	1,345	844	4,337	2,225	4,185	2,103	3,460	1,888
5	402	240	1,558	766	1,566	876	1,211	707
6	136	86	570	302	508	312	331	191
7	52	31	176	90	167	105	103	64
8	20	11	61	39	64	45	47	25
9	4	4	43	22	33	26	16	12
10+	19	17	30	18	37	31	22	13
<b>Total</b>	<b>236,348</b>	<b>133,749</b>	<b>595,036</b>	<b>225,267</b>	<b>548,641</b>	<b>73,650</b>	<b>567,786</b>	<b>73,972</b>

\*A refers to the number of Applicant Students, B refers to the number of Beneficiary Students

Source: The data was obtained from OOKKGM.

Closer inspection of the table above revealed that the applicants who had one sibling attending school had the highest percentage in each school year. The first two years, 98% and 95% (respectively) of the beneficiaries had maximum two siblings attending school. In the last two years of implementation, 85% of the beneficiaries had maximum two siblings attending school. When we think about the private expenditures for private school tuition and fees, it is expectable that parents having more than two kids had difficulty to send their children to private schools.

The marital and vitality status of applicants' parents is another evaluation criterion. Table 19 presents the number of applicants and beneficiaries according to their parents' marital and vitality status.

Table 19

*The Numbers of Applicant and Beneficiary Students According to Parents' Marital and Vitality Status*

Parents' Marital and Vitality Status	School Year							
	2014-2015		2015-2016		2016-2017		2017-2018	
	A*	B*	A	B	A	B	A	B
Both are dead	48	34	205	128	183	163	146	128
Either is dead	3,452	2,427	12,608	7,828	10,815	9,051	9,410	7,832
Alive and separate	11,632	7,738	40,264	21,512	38,638	18,204	40,179	17,954
Alive and together	221,216	123,550	541,959	195,799	499,004	46,201	518,029	48,045
<b>Total</b>	<b>236,348</b>	<b>133,749</b>	<b>595,036</b>	<b>225,267</b>	<b>548,640</b>	<b>73,619</b>	<b>567,764</b>	<b>73,959</b>

\*A refers to the number of Applicant Students, B refers to the number of Beneficiary Students

Source: The data was obtained from OOKKGM.

It is seen from the table above that most of the parents of the beneficiaries are alive and together. Most of the parents of beneficiary students were alive and together in the first two years of the incentive (92% and 87% respectively). On the other hand, those ratios decreased in the last two years (63% and 65% respectively). That means, more applicants from disadvantaged group of students could receive the incentive. To illustrate, roughly 25% of the beneficiaries' parents were alive and separate in the last two years of the policy implementation. Similarly, 12% the students, whose one of parents was dead, benefited from the incentive.

The rest of evaluation criteria were related to special conditions. One of them was being a child of mother or father who died as MoNE staff when s/he was active on duty. This criterion was added in the 2015-2016 school year (as only for the children of MoNE staff, but there was no data available for this year). The other criterion in this group was for the children whose parents are disabled and/or veteran according to the related law. Besides, MoNE evaluates disciplinary penalty status of the applicants. Table 20 indicates the numbers of applicant and beneficiary students according to the aforementioned special conditions.



Table 20

*The Numbers of Applicant and Beneficiary Students According to the Special Conditions*

Special Conditions	School Year							
	2014-2015		2015-2016		2016-2017		2017-2018	
	A*	B*	A	B	A	B	A	B
Children of martyr parents as MoNE staff			-	-	76	71	60	50
Children of disabled and/or veteran parents	857	561	1,022	576	786	624	719	489
Disciplinary penalties	681	280	1,731	340	4,290	18	3,292	14

\*A refers to the number of Applicant Students, B refers to the number of Beneficiary Students

Source: The data was obtained from OOKKGM.

According to Table 20, the numbers of beneficiaries who had martyr parents that were MoNE staff and the numbers of beneficiaries who had disabled or veteran parents did not change much in the four-year period of the policy implementation. The numbers of beneficiaries who had disciplinary penalty decreased in years, especially in the last two school years. The policy legislation of the EIP showed that the policy design provided the opportunity for low-to-moderate income and successful students to attend private schools. Further, the eligibility criteria scored several special conditions in families such as disability and veteran situations. In terms of equality of opportunity notion, that means the policy aimed at providing opportunity for disadvantaged students to access private education.

**Beneficiaries: private schools.** Private schools are the second group of beneficiaries as entrepreneur or investor among interest group. The incentive policy includes pre-primary and K12 level of private schools. Table 21 shows the number of applicants and beneficiaries according education levels.

Table 21

*The Numbers of Applicant and Beneficiary Students According to Educational Level*

School Year	Education Level									
	Pre-primary		Primary		Lower Secondary		Upper Secondary		Total	
	Q*	B*	Q	B	Q	B	Q	B	Q	B
<b>2014-15</b>	50,000	28,094	50,000	47,627	75,000	54,908	75,000	34,031	250,000	164,660
<b>2015-16</b>	20,000	-	50,000	-	50,000	-	110,000	-	230,000	-
<b>2016-17</b>	6,000	5,983	15,000	14,958	15,000	14,985	15,000	38,970	75,000	74,896
<b>2017-18</b>	6,000	6,000	15,000	14,990	15,000	15,000	15,000	38,991	75,000	74,981

\* Q refers to Quota provided for education level and B refers to number of Beneficiary students

Source: Data for the first two years were obtained from TEDMEM Education at a Glance 2014 and 2015 Reports. Data for the last two years were retrieved from OOKKGM (2017).

As we look at the table above, in the first school year, nearly half of the quotas were used in pre-primary and upper secondary levels while it was two third in lower secondary level and approximately full in primary level. For the last two years, on the other hand, the occupancy rates are almost full at all education levels. The results showed that while the number of quotas and beneficiary students in pre-primary level private schools decreased in four years, the numbers increased in upper secondary level private schools increased. Table 22 below presents the data for the numbers of the recipient quotas, applicants, and beneficiary students in four-year period of policy implementation according to school type.

Table 22

*The Numbers of Recipient Caps, Applicants and Beneficiaries According to Education Level*

School Type	School Year											
	2014-15			2015-2016			2016-2017			2017-2018		
	Q*	A*	B*	Q	A	B	Q	A	B	Q	A	B
Pre-pri.	50,001	-	28,094	20,004	-	20,635	6,000	70,621	5,983	6,000	63,652	6,000
Primary	50,000	-	47,627	49,996	-	53,969	15,000	97,887	14,958	15,000	103,492	14,990
Lw.Sec.	75,003	-	54,908	50,003	-	53,749	15,000	153,403	14,985	15,000	163,244	15,000
Up.Sec.	75,001	-	34,031	109,999	-	113,855	39,000	256,848	38,970	39,000	259,127	38,991
Bas. H.S.	-	-	3,438	-	-	41,127	24,000	-	23,992	24,000	-	23,994
<b>Total</b>	250,005	-	164,660	230,002	-	242,208	75,000	578,759	74,896	75,000	589,515	74,981

\*Q refers to the incentive Quota for the education level, A refers to the number of applicants at the education level, and B refers to the number of beneficiaries at the education level.

The results in the table above indicated that the quotas of pre-primary schools and upper secondary level private schools were not occupied in the first year of policy implementation. Yet, in the next three school years, they were nearly occupied completely. In the last two years, the applicants exceeded the beneficiaries, the most in pre-primary and lower secondary education private schools. Therefore, it can be said that demands for the private schools at these education levels were high.

Basic high schools have a specific situation in the context of education incentive since it was an overlapping policy implementation to transform the PTIs into private schools. Table 23 below provides data specifically for basic high schools.

Table 23

*The Numbers and Share of Beneficiaries Attending Private Basic High Schools*

School Year	Quota	Beneficiaries	Share of in Total Upper Secondary (%)	Share in Total (%)
2014-15	***	3,438	10.1	2.1
2015-16	***	41,127	36.1	17.0
2016-17	24,000	23,992	61.6	32.0
2017-18	24,000	23,994	61.5	32.0

\*\*\*Quotas for basic schools were not presented for these years.

Source: Number of beneficiaries was retrieved from TEDMEM Education at a Glance 2014 and 2015 Reports. The data for 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 school years were obtained from OOKGM.

One can note that the quotas of basic high schools were almost occupied completely by the beneficiaries. In addition, most of the beneficiaries (roughly two third) for upper secondary education level were from basic high schools in the last two years (61.6% and 61.5% respectively). Further, the data for share of basic high schools in total showed that it had a significant place in total.

**Beneficiaries: the government.** Third, the government also benefitted from the incentive policy. The government had some goals to pursue in return of the public funding they allocated to private schools. Table 24 provides the allocated public funding in four-year period according to education level.

Table 24

*Total Incentive Amounts Spent According to Education Level (2014-2017) (Thousand TL)*

School Year	Education Level					Total Amount Spent for Beneficiary Students
	Pre-primary	Primary	Lower Secondary	Upper Secondary (Total)	Basic High Schools	
2014-15	70,235	143,421	193,235	118,122	10,314	525,013
2015-16	55,302	173,780	201,558	426,956	132,429	857,597
2016-17	17,111	51,455	59,940	155,880	82,533	284,387
2017-18	18,360	55,163	64,200	166,882	88,298	304,605

Source: Calculated by the researcher using the data provided by the OOKGM Statistics and TEDMEM Reports

Closer examination of the data revealed that the money allocated for lower secondary and primary level had the highest share in total in the first 2014-2015 school year. In the next

three years, the government allocated the highest proportion of public funding to upper secondary level and lower secondary level private schools. Moreover, the public funding spent for private basic high schools received sizable portion of total funding and upper secondary level funding except for the first school year. The amount of funding for private basic high schools corresponded to one sixth of total funding and one third of upper secondary level funding in 2015-2016 school year, and one third of total funding and nearly half of upper secondary level funding in the last two years (2016-2017 and 2017-2018).

Comparing the two results regarding the beneficiary profile and the eligibility criteria of the incentive policy, in the last two school years more disadvantaged families/students received the incentive. The next section of the second research question was concerned with the dominant values that the policy actors attributed to the education incentive policy.

**How do the related actors value the policy?** This research question focused on the dominant value(s) attributed to the education incentive policy by main policy actors. For this purpose, interviews with related actors were used as the primary data source. Considering different beneficiaries of the policy, the findings are presented in three categories: (1) parents, (2) private schools, and (3) the government.

The dominant parental value attributed to education incentive policy was linked to the financial facilitating role of the policy. Several parents whether they received the education incentive or not emphasized that they mostly valued the amount of money provided by the government and the role of this amount in the affordability of their children's private education (EPN1, EPY2, CPY3). For example, a parent (EPN1) said that although s/he did not benefit from the incentive s/he thought that "the amount of incentive could help afford the tuition fee or other costs in private schools and organize the family budget more effectively". A beneficiary parent (EPY2) similarly commented on the incentive amount and said that

“although the payment did not contribute to school tuition of my children directly, it went into my spending deficit. So, I should say that it [the incentive] was worth applying.

The interviews with private school administrators indicated that they valued the policy mostly in terms of recruitment and increasing the legitimacy of their schools in society. According to private school administrators, their institutions benefitted from the policy not only directly; by increasing the student numbers, but also indirectly; by becoming more on the stage and providing opportunities to introduce their institutions to the society (ESA1, CSA3). For example, one school administrator (CSA3) emphasized that they had positive experiences about explaining themselves to the parents after the incentive implementation. S/he said: “The education incentive policy affected our school in a positive way. The more we benefited from the incentive and parents learned about it, parents had more chance to visit private schools”. Another school administrator, similarly, commented on the positively changing society manner towards private education (ESA1). S/he told that although the incentive amount may be considered limited, it has increased the attention to private education especially paid by middle-income families. S/he said: “In the previous years, people assumed that there were only rich and spoiled children in private schools. This idea does not exist anymore, and everyone can attend”. S/he added that “education incentive encourages especially parents to private schools since tuition fees are average in small cities. The incentive does not make any sense for private schools with remarkably high tuition fees in metropolises”. S/he (ESA1) finally emphasized that “due to the decreasing quality in public education, more people seek private education”, and “medium income level families’ children can also benefit from private education opportunity when they benefit from the incentive and get some discounts from the schools”.

Several governmental participants highlighted the value of education incentive policy in the context of improving equity and the quality of education across the country. For

example, one of the interviewees from the MoNE group (MoNE3, 2015) emphasized that one of the most important effects of the policy was the change in the public understanding towards access to private schools and quality education. According to her/his experiences, “the policy influenced people’s mind in a way that more people -even people from low income groups- started to think that they can pay private school tuitions and get quality education for their children”. Another governmental participant (MoNE4) similarly underlined that the policy has brought equal education opportunity especially for lower socio-economic groups. S/he commented as follows:

Low-income families’ children get chance to attend private schools. This happens especially in the cities of eastern region. This is a substantial change for the Anatolian people to have their children attend private schools. They look the West; see on TV and media that students attend private schools as a luxury. But this opportunity is provided to the people in the East by the government. Private school tuition fees are cheaper (and reasonable) in the East. There are schools with 6-7 thousands-fee. When the government gives the half price, they can send their children to the school for 200-300 liras per month. This is a big chance for them. We get feedback like this. I think it works and it is a beneficial implementation. (MoNE4, 2015)

In summary, students/parents, private schools, and the government are the beneficiaries of the policy. First, the results for the beneficiary student profile based on the eligibility criteria indicated that most of the beneficiaries were mostly high- achieved students, from low-to-moderate income families, and with maximum two siblings attending school. In addition, especially in the last two years, the incentive policy was targeted more disadvantaged families in terms of parents’ marital and vitality status and special conditions in families such as disability and martyr and veteran status. Second, private schools benefited from the incentive in terms of increasing of the access to private education. Basic high schools, specifically, had a considerable proportion in upper secondary level and in total. Third, the government had the goal of widening access to private education. In parallel with

the recipient caps and the number of beneficiaries at education levels, the government spent more money on upper secondary level private schooling in four years while spend less money on pre-primary level.

The policy actors attributed different values to the policy. Financial facilitating for parents, recruitment and societal legitimacy for private schools, and equity, and quality for the government were the dominant values for the policy actors. Therefore, we can infer that publicly funded incentive influenced the perception shift towards private schools or education from the point of view of parents. Further, low- and lower-middle income families' access to private education had also contributed to this perception shift since private education started to become normalized in the eyes of society.

### **Experiences of the Practitioners**

The third research question of the study was '*What are the experiences of the practitioners?*' To examine this, the private schools in the central district of Çanakkale province were selected as the sub-case. The private school administrators and parents, whose children were attending private schools, were asked about their own experiences related to EIP process.

Çanakkale is a province in the Marmara region of the country, in which Istanbul is the most crowded city. The central district of Çanakkale province has all types of school in terms of education level. Therefore, it will provide a small picture of the policy issue and make better sense of the policy.

The Figure 10 shows the maximum number of incentive recipients for Çanakkale province in four-year period. Like the tendency of grand total cap for the country, the recipient cap in the last two years is lower than the first two years.




Figure 10. The EIP recipient caps for Çanakkale province (2014-2017)

The number of beneficiaries according to gender variable is given below in Figure 11. The numbers of female and male beneficiaries are close to each other in every school year where it is the closest in the last two years.




Figure 11. The number of beneficiaries in Çanakkale according to gender (2014-2017)

The Figure 12 gives information about the share of central district in Çanakkale in terms of the number of applicant and beneficiary students. Like the countrywide trend, the results revealed that while the number of applicants increased in years, the number of beneficiaries decreased. The quotas of the first two years were higher than the last two years.



in addition, the share of the central district in the last three years was around two third of total recipient cap in Çanakkale.




Figure 12. The share of beneficiaries in Çanakkale central district (2014-2017)

The gender ratio and the ratios for the numbers of applicants and beneficiaries in the central district and/or Çanakkale showed a similar tendency at the national level. The next sections described in depth the experiences of the practitioners in Çanakkale.

**Practitioner experiences: private schools in Çanakkale.** In terms of education incentive policy in Turkey, school administrators and parents are primary practitioners and affected partners. For this part of the study, I focused on Çanakkale province case. There were seven private schools in central district when the interviews were still going on in the school year 2016-2017. I conducted interviews with all of them.

Private school administrators in central district of Çanakkale province were asked about their experiences as to the policy and the implementation process. The main categories and codes are given in Figure 13 and 14 below under the groups of education level including pre-primary, primary/lower secondary (since their administrators are usually the same person), and upper secondary levels. The number of participants in educational level was

written on the table. For example, the number of participant school administrator in pre-primary level was given as 2SA. The categories were formed under the themes below:

*Beneficiaries*

- Rationales for private school choice
- Description of beneficiary family profile

*Policy implementation*

- Application and placement process
- Eligibility criteria

*Policy outcomes*

- Impact on access to private education
- Impact on education quality
- Recommendations

Pre-primary: 2 SA	Primary & Lower Secondary: 5 SA	Upper Secondary: 4 SA
<p><b>Rationales for private school choice</b></p> <p><i>School climate</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Intimate atmosphere (A) (B)</li> <li>• Environment for raising self-confident and self-care skilled children (A) (B)</li> <li>• Family-school cooperation (A) (B)</li> <li>• Comfortable access to school administration (B)</li> </ul> <p><i>School facilities</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Social activities (B)</li> <li>• Rich education materials (A)</li> </ul> <p><i>Education quality</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Foreign language education (A) (B)</li> <li>• Active family participation in classroom (A) (B)</li> <li>• Flexible curriculum (A)</li> <li>• Low class-size (A)</li> <li>• Education quality (A)</li> <li>• Full-day schooling (B)</li> </ul> <p><b>Family profile</b></p> <p><i>General family profile</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Civil servant and self-employed people (A) (B)</li> </ul> <p><i>Beneficiary family profile</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Low-to-middle socioeconomic group (A) (B)</li> <li>• Their children already attend private school (A)</li> </ul> <p><b>Application and placement process</b></p> <p><i>Process</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Schools guide parents one by one (B)</li> </ul> <p><i>Problems</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No problem in implementation process (A)</li> <li>• No intervention on the placement (A)</li> <li>• Many applicants but few beneficiaries (A) (B)</li> <li>• Parents rely much on incentive (A) (B)</li> </ul>	<p><b>Rationales for private school choice</b></p> <p><i>School climate</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Family-school cooperation (C1) (D2)</li> <li>• Intimate atmosphere (D2)</li> </ul> <p><i>School facilities</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Social responsibility projects (C1) (D1) (D2)</li> <li>• Social activities (C1) (C2) (E1)</li> <li>• Physical facilities (C1) (C2)</li> </ul> <p><i>Education quality</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Foreign language education (C1) (C2) (D1) (E1)</li> <li>• High academic achievement (C1) (D1) (D2)</li> <li>• Teacher quality (C1) (D2)</li> <li>• Well-established education system (C1) (E1)</li> <li>• Low class-size (C2) (E1)</li> </ul> <p><b>Family profile</b></p> <p><i>General family profile</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Wealthier families (C2) (D1) (D2) (E1)</li> <li>• Mostly well-educated (D1)</li> </ul> <p><i>Beneficiary family profile</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Their children already attend private school (C2)</li> <li>• Self-employed (D2)</li> <li>• Low-to-middle socioeconomic group (last two years) (E1)</li> </ul> <p><b>Application and placement process</b></p> <p><i>Process</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All parents are informed in advance (C2) (E1)</li> <li>• All first-year applicants received incentive (C1)</li> </ul> <p><i>Problems</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Parents should take more responsibility (C2) (D1) (D2)</li> <li>• September 1<sup>st</sup> is too late (C2) (D1)</li> <li>• Parents rely much on the incentive (D2) (E1)</li> <li>• Busy period in the last week (C2) (D2)</li> <li>• Everybody applies to incentive (E1)</li> </ul>	<p><b>Rationales for private school choice</b></p> <p><i>School facilities</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Social activities (C3) (E2)</li> <li>• Physical facilities (C3) (E2)</li> <li>• Online feedback system (E2)</li> </ul> <p><i>Education quality</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Well-established education system (E2) (G)</li> <li>• Participation in international programs (C3) (E2)</li> <li>• High academic/social achievement (C3)</li> <li>• Teacher quality (C3)</li> <li>• Foreign language education (E2)</li> <li>• Private tutoring for national exams (G)</li> <li>• Low class-size (G)</li> </ul> <p><i>Financial</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Low cost including extra tutoring (G)</li> </ul> <p><b>Family profile</b></p> <p><i>General family profile</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Wealthier families (C3) (E2)</li> <li>• Middle-income families (F) (G)</li> </ul> <p><i>Beneficiary family profile</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High-income families do not apply (C3) (G)</li> <li>• Low- and lower middle-income families (C3)</li> <li>• Low-to-middle socioeconomic group (G)</li> </ul> <p><b>Application and placement process</b></p> <p><i>Process</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All parents are informed in advance (C3) (G)</li> <li>• Parents make single school choice (F) (G)</li> <li>• All first-year applicants received incentive (C3)</li> </ul> <p><i>Problems</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 9<sup>th</sup> grade was, advantageous for first two years, now balanced (F) (G)</li> <li>• No problem in application process (C3) (E2)</li> <li>• Successful placement process (G)</li> <li>• Parents rely much on the incentive (G)</li> </ul>

Figure 13. Private school administrators' views on education incentive policy (continue next page)

<p><b>Pre-primary</b></p> <p><b>Eligibility criteria</b> <i>Distinctive</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Siblings attending school (B)</li> <li>• Parental marital and vital status (A) (B)</li> </ul> <p><b>Critics</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Income determination based on applicant statement (A)</li> </ul> <p><b>Impact on access to private education</b> <i>None</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No effect on decision to attend (A)</li> </ul> <p><b>Positive</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Facilitates to afford tuition fee (A) (B)</li> </ul> <p><b>Impact on education quality</b> <i>Quality increase</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• By competition (A)</li> <li>• By reducing public school class-size (B)</li> </ul> <p><b>Recommendations</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Quota should be increased (B)</li> </ul>	<p><b>Primary &amp; Lower Secondary</b></p> <p><b>Eligibility criteria</b> <i>Distinctive</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Household income (D1)</li> <li>• Siblings attending school (D2)</li> <li>• Parental marital and vital status (D2)</li> <li>• Academic achievement (in the last two years) (E1)</li> </ul> <p><b>Critics</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Disadvantage for scholarship students (C2)</li> <li>• Income determination based on applicant statement (C2) (D1) (D2)</li> </ul> <p><b>Impact on access to private education</b> <i>None</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No effect on decision to attend (D2)</li> <li>• Attracted attention but not much (C1)</li> </ul> <p><b>Positive</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Raised the enrollments slightly (C2)</li> <li>• Raised the enrollments significantly (D1)</li> <li>• Such a 20-25% extra discount (D2)</li> <li>• Facilitates to afford tuition fee (D2)</li> </ul> <p><b>Impact on education quality</b> <i>Quality increase</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• By reducing public school class-size (D1)</li> </ul> <p><b>Recommendations</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Household income determination method should be improved (D1) (D2)</li> </ul>	<p><b>Upper Secondary</b></p> <p><b>Eligibility criteria</b> <i>Distinctive</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Siblings attending school (F) (G)</li> <li>• Parental marital and vital status (F) (G)</li> </ul> <p><b>Critics</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Should be income-based (C3)</li> <li>• Should be income and achievement based (E2)</li> <li>• Disadvantage for scholarship students (C3)</li> <li>• Underestimated social achievement (C3)</li> </ul> <p><b>Impact on access to private education</b> <i>None</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No effect on decision to attend (F) (G)</li> <li>• Insufficient amount (C3)</li> <li>• Worthwhile but not enough amount (E2)</li> </ul> <p><b>Positive</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Raised the enrollments (C3) (G)</li> <li>• Few applicants gave up attending (C3)</li> </ul> <p><b>Impact on education quality</b> <i>Quality increase</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• By competition (C3) (E2)</li> <li>• By reducing public schools' class-size (C3) (G)</li> </ul> <p><b>Recommendations</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Criteria might be achievement-based (E2)</li> <li>• Quotas for vocational high school should be increased (F)</li> </ul>
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Figure 13. Private school administrators' views on education incentive policy

**Beneficiaries.** Private schools are the beneficiaries of the EIP. Rationales of parents to choose private schools and family profiles from the point of view of the school administrators were evaluated under this theme.

*Rationales for private school choice.* From the Figure 13, the private school administrators expressed a variety of rationales of the parents to choose their school. These rationales were grouped into four: school climate, school facilities, education quality, and finance. For school climate, family-school cooperation (A, B, D2) and intimate atmosphere (A, B, C1, D2) were stated in pre-primary and elementary levels. For example, one school administrator (CSA1) pointed out that as, “I believe we are in a good dialog with our parents in the visits and meetings. That means we work within school-family cooperation. We do not believe the success is not just because of us.”

Regarding school facilities, the school administrators in all educational levels emphasized the role of social activities in private schools (B, C1, C2, C3, E1, E2). Moreover, physical structure and environment of private schools enabling students to develop their social skills (C1, C3, E2) were cited as specific factors for private school choice. For instance, the administrators of School C pointed out that their schools’ “physical structure is like a campus” (CSA1). He added, “All the buildings were designed as school initially, that is, it was not transformed into school from a structure built for another reason”. Similarly, another school administrator commented on their school’s physical facilities as:

Our school is in the forest. I heard from our parents that they choose us due to our physical facilities. When children go out, they can get fresh air. There are many facilities. They can play in nature in the forest. There are the reasons of preference. (CSA2)

Several considerations associated with education quality of private schools were stated during interviews. The participants expressed the importance of better foreign language education (A, B, C1, C2, D1, E1, E2), low class-size (A, C2, E1, G), and teacher/education

quality (A, C1, C3, D2) of private schools as motivating factors for parents' school choice. For example, one of the school administrators (ASA) put emphasis on weekly hours of English lessons and asserted "students learn English well [in private schools]". She added, "Since parents think foreign language is a crucial factor for employment, they are headed to private schools if they have access to". Additionally, another school administrator in elementary level commented on the significance of low class-size in education quality for parental choice as follows:

Due to low class-size, more students could get on the stage and take the floor more in classroom. Students don't have such chance in a classroom with 56-60 students. When they raise their hands, think a class with 15-20 students and a class with 60 students. The class-size in our school corresponds to one fourth; thus, students can take the floor much more. Students can get much more attention from their teachers. (CSA2)

*Family profile.* When the participant school administrators were asked about family profile in their school, they reported both general and beneficiary family profiles. Concerning general family profile, the administrators said that wealthier families (C2, C3, D1, D2, E1, E2) and middle-income families (A, B, F, G) tend to send their children to private schools. Interestingly, one private school administrator's perspective on student admission process in private school provided an insight about their intended family profile as follows:

We act selectively. We don't admit under a certain point of achievement especially in high school level. We examine all the factors such as psychological health and achievement status based on interviews in counseling service with the family. First, you have to have a good financial situation or at least at a certain level because not everyone can apply. Not every student in public schools can attend private schools. Family atmosphere is important, family income level is important, and student achievement is important. These selective factors would prevent demand surplus in private schools. (ESA1)

On the other hand, some of the participant administrators described the beneficiary families in their school as low socioeconomic (A, B, G), low-to-moderate (C3), and self-employed (D2) families. In addition, some administrators emphasized the beneficiary families' children were already attending private school (C2, D1) while another administrator emphasized that all applicants in the first-year implementation received incentive in their school (C1).

For example, while one participant administrator (DSA1) stated for the beneficiary profile in their school as "These people would already send their children to private school even they didn't benefit from the incentive" and another administrator (DSA2) said: "The likely family for the incentive seems the one who is self-employed and not the one who is payroll employee". On the contrary, an administrator (ESA1) commented about the change in beneficiary profile in the last two-year period as, "this year [2016-2017] the situation is different. We saw that there are beneficiary children whose parents are divorced, who have siblings attending schools. I think the policy process has started to work literally since this year".

For the theme of beneficiaries, the school administrators stated the rationales that attract parents' attention to their school and family profile in the school. They emphasized the parents' rationales in three categories: school climate, school facilities, education quality, and finance. Family-school cooperation and intimate atmosphere for school climate, opportunities of social activities for school facilities, and better foreign language education and low class-size for education quality were the common rationales mentioned by the school administrators with respect to private school choice. Further, they described general family profile in their school as upper middle- and high-income families while defined the beneficiary family profile as the ones who were already sending their children to private school. However, some of them stated that the implementation was fair to select the parents who need the incentive. The next

section presented the analysis results for the experiences of parents receiving and not receiving incentive in Çanakkale.

***Policy implementation. Application and placement process.*** When the school administrators were asked about the application and placement process of the education incentive, they indicated their opinions related to the process and problems they faced in this process. For the application process, one school administrator stated that they informed all parents in advance regarding the application procedures and guided them in this process (B, C2, C3, E1, G).

Although several school administrators mentioned that they did not experience any significant problems in the application and placement process of the policy (A, C3, E2, G), they expressed several problems they faced such as very busy application period (C2, D2), due to the high number of applicants (A, B, E1), which indicated parents relied much on the incentive (A, B, D2, E1). For instance, one administrator (ESA1) described this situation as: “Regardless of their income level, all our parents who don’t need the incentive apply for it. They were really in expectation for the incentive. Though the amount is not much, it is still attractive”. Further, some of the administrators suggested that parents should have taken more responsibility in the application process (C2, D1, D2). In addition, one school administrator (FSA) pointed out the school choice process and said, “In fact, students had already been enrolled in the school. They usually make only one choice. Thus, it was enough for them to complete the application procedure”.

***Eligibility criteria.*** The eligibility criteria to benefit from education incentive were expressed by the private school administrators in two categories: distinctive criteria and critics on criteria. For distinctive criteria, the participant administrators mostly stated number of siblings attending school in the family (B, D2, F, G), applicant parents’ marital and vital status (A, B, D2, F, G), household income of applicant (D1), and academic achievement



especially in the last two-year implementation (E1). For example, one of the administrators (ASA) found the eligibility based on parental status positive and said, “This year [2016-2017] one child whose father is dead received the incentive. It is nice”. Further, another school administrator (DSA1) suggested the following: “points for sport and art activities can also be increased as well as having siblings attending school. I think, income should not be the dominant criterion”.

Concerning the critics on eligibility criteria to benefit from the incentive, considerable number of the school administrators pointed out that income determination based on applicants’ statement did not work well (A, C2, D1, D2). One school administrator (CSA2) explained the reason as, “Many self-employed people, to be realistic, showed themselves as a worker in their businesses with minimum wage and get the right to benefit” as well as “the salary amount on the payroll of a civil servant working in a public institution is unchangeable” (DSA2). On the other hand, one of the participant administrators (FSA) pointed out the situation in the last two years of the incentive implementation and said the following: “Household income level does not affect at present since most of the beneficiary families have an income around 5000 TL. Thus, other criteria gained importance to qualify for the education incentive”.

To be able to use the incentive, the applicants who were qualified for the incentive must not have a scholarship amount exceeding 51%. One school administrator expressed that high-achieving scholarship students were disadvantaged to benefit from the incentive (C3). One school administrator (ESA1) told how they managed this issue:

We asked our parents about what they wanted to do whether to continue with 90% scholarship or with the education incentive. This caused that the parents worried about losing their right of incentive use. Some of them withdrew their applications and continued with their scholarship. In addition, this situation affected our scholarship principles. Now, our 100% scholarship opportunity is followed by 35% scholarship. (CSA2)

Concerning the policy implementation theme, the school administrators mentioned their experiences for the application and placement process of the incentive policy and the critics on eligibility criteria for the applicants. Although the administrators complained about busy application period because of the late timing before the beginning of school year and high number of applicants, they told that there happened no significant problem in the process. Moreover, school administrators expressed that parental marital and vitality status, number of siblings attending school, and household income were distinctive criteria especially in the last two years. On the contrary, most of the administrators mentioned that the determination process of household income for the applicant families did not work well especially in the first two years. Some of the administrators stated the reason was that the determination process proceeded based on applicant's statement for the household income. Further, there were critics on that household income of the self-employed applicants did not reflect the reality. In the final theme, the results for policy outcomes were given based on the views of the school administrators in Çanakkale.

***Policy outcomes. Access to private education.*** One of the policy outcomes was the impact of the incentive on students' access to private education. The narratives of participant school administrators revealed two results: no impact or positive impact on access to private education. Several administrators reported that the incentive has no impact on the decision of parents to send their children to a private school (A, D2, F, G) since as one administrator (DSA2) said, "it is not just the tuition fee. There are expenses for transportation, school uniforms, foreign language education and other books, etc.". In addition, the administrators explained even for those reasons that the incentive amount was rather worthwhile, it was not sufficient to decide attending a private school (C1, C3, E2). One school administrator (CSA1) attracted attention to the government's support had a positive effect on private school enrollments and explained the reason as, "people started to research. They thought that it is a

different thing if the government supports it. I guess, they thought it would be better to send their children to private schools”.

On the other hand, some of the administrators expressed that the incentive amount facilitated parents’ payments to afford tuition fee and other expenditures (A, B, D2). Besides, several school administrators mentioned that their school enrollments increased relatively by means of the education incentive implementation (C2, C3, D1, G). For instance, an administrator (CSA3) pointed out the class-size change in their school after the incentive implementation as, “the class-size was 17-18 in the previous years; but it increased to 23-24 now. The education incentive affected it positively”. Another participant administrator emphasized low-tuition fee of the school as follows:

Education in our basic high schools has a reasonable price at the country level. Parents make payment and they send their children as if they send them to private tutoring courses. If they also had the incentive, then they can attend the school paying a small amount. (GSA)

*Quality.* Quality was another policy-relevant outcome of the education incentive. The school administrators stated the impact of education incentive as quality increase. Following the education incentive implementation, the school administrators expressed that education quality would increase by competition among schools (A, C3, E2) and by reducing the class-size in public schools (B, C3, D1, G). Regarding class-size based quality, one of the school administrators emphasized (DSA1) the following: “They are angry with the money distributed to private schools, but class-size [in public schools] would increase by 15 students if private schools didn’t exist”.

*Improvement.* For the improvement of the policy implementation process, the school administrators mentioned some recommendations. The school administrators (D1, D2) mentioned the required change in method for household income determination. A school administrator (DSA1) expressed this situation as, “the MoNE needs to have a more objective

and fair solution in order to select people to benefit from the incentive who deserve the most". In addition, some of the administrators mentioned the quotas that should be increased (B, F).

For this section of policy outcomes, access to private education and education quality were mentioned among the impacts of education incentive. First, the school administrators experienced positive effect of the incentive in school enrollments; however, they stated that the families mostly already decided to send their children to private school. They also emphasized that the incentive had facilitating effect for parents to access private education with respect to afford the student expenditures. Second, the administrators mentioned that education incentive policy would have impact on education quality by reducing class-size in public schools and increasing competition among schools.

**Practitioner experiences: parents in Çanakkale.** To explore the practitioner experiences, I also interviewed with parents in each private school in the central district of Çanakkale. Interviewees were asked about their experiences as to the education incentive policy implementation. Participants for this section were recruited from two sub-groups: parents (1) who received the incentive and (2) who did not. The findings from each group were given below in two parts.

*Parents receiving the incentive.* Beneficiary parents were asked about their experiences as to the education incentive and policy enactment. The main categories and codes are given in Figure 15 below by education level including pre-primary, primary, lower secondary, and upper secondary levels. The number of participants in each education level was written on the table. For example, the number of parents receiving the incentive in primary level was given as 3PY on the table below. The categories from data analysis for this part were formed under the themes as follows:

*Beneficiaries*

- Rationales for private school choice

*Policy implementation*

- Application and placement process
- Eligibility criteria

*Policy outcomes*

- Impact on access to private education



<p><b>Primary: 3 PY</b></p> <p><b>Rationales for private school choice</b></p> <p><i>School climate</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Family-school cooperation (C1) (E1)</li> <li>Supportive environment for student development (C1)</li> </ul> <p><i>School facilities</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Physical facilities (C1)</li> <li>Online support and monitoring system (E1)</li> </ul> <p><i>Education quality</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Foreign language education (C1) (E1)</li> <li>Full-day schooling (C1) (E1)</li> <li>Extra weekend courses (E1)</li> <li>Teacher quality (C1) (D1)</li> <li>Education quality (D1)</li> <li>Low class size (C1) (E1)</li> <li>Well-established education system (C1) (E1)</li> </ul> <p><b>Application and placement process</b></p> <p><i>Process</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>School help in process (D1)</li> <li>Informed by media (E1)</li> <li>Application via e-school (E1)</li> <li>Single school choice (D1) (E1)</li> </ul> <p><i>Problems</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No problem in process (E1)</li> <li>Affluent applicants cause injustice (D1)</li> </ul> <p><b>Eligibility criteria</b></p> <p><i>Distinctive</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Unemployed parent (D1)</li> <li>Middle-income family (E1)</li> </ul> <p><i>Critics</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Disadvantage for scholarship students (C3)</li> </ul> <p><b>Impact on access to private education</b></p> <p><i>Positive</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Difficult to pay without incentive (C1) (E1)</li> <li>Facilitate to afford (D1) (E1)</li> </ul>	<p><b>Lower Secondary: 3 PY</b></p> <p><b>Rationales for private school choice</b></p> <p><i>School climate</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Supportive environment for student development (D2) (D3) (E2)</li> <li>Intimate atmosphere (D2) (D3)</li> </ul> <p><i>School facilities</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Physical facilities (E2)</li> </ul> <p><i>Education quality</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Foreign language education (D2) (D3) (E2)</li> <li>High academic achievement (D2) (D3)</li> <li>Full-day schooling (E2)</li> <li>Low class-size (D3) (E2)</li> <li>Well-established education system (E2)</li> <li>Teacher quality (E2)</li> </ul> <p><b>Application and placement process</b></p> <p><i>Process</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>School help in process (D2) (D3) (E2)</li> <li>Informed by media (D2) (D3)</li> <li>Single school choice (D3) (E2)</li> </ul> <p><i>Problems</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>First year was chaotic (D2)</li> <li>Unclear information for school choice process (E2)</li> <li>Quotas are not enough (E2)</li> </ul> <p><b>Eligibility criteria</b></p> <p><i>Distinctive</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Unemployed parent (D2)</li> <li>Household income (D3)</li> </ul> <p><i>Critics</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Problematic income determination method (D2) (E2)</li> </ul> <p><b>Impact on access to private education</b></p> <p><i>None</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No effect on decision to attend (D3)</li> </ul> <p><i>Positive</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Facilitate to afford (D2) (D3)</li> <li>Difficult to pay without incentive (E2)</li> </ul>	<p><b>Upper Secondary: 5 PY</b></p> <p><b>Rationales for private school choice</b></p> <p><i>School climate</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Safety (E3) (F1) (G1)</li> <li>Supportive environment for student development (C3) (E3)</li> </ul> <p><i>School facilities</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Physical facilities (C2)</li> </ul> <p><i>Education quality</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Foreign language education (C2) (C3)</li> <li>Full-day schooling (E3) (G1)</li> <li>Private tutoring for national exams (E3) (G1)</li> <li>Special classes for high-achieved students (C2) (C3)</li> <li>Teacher quality (C2)</li> <li>Job-oriented education (F1)</li> <li>Education quality (G1)</li> </ul> <p><b>Application and placement process</b></p> <p><i>Process</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>School help in process (C2) (C3)</li> <li>Informed by media (C2)</li> </ul> <p><i>Problems</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Almost all first-year applicants received (E3) (G1)</li> <li>No problem in process (C3)</li> <li>Quotas are not enough (E3)</li> <li>Affluent applicants received incentive (G1)</li> </ul> <p><b>Eligibility criteria</b></p> <p><i>Distinctive</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Siblings attending school (C2)</li> <li>Parental status (G1)</li> <li>Household income (E3)</li> </ul> <p><i>Critics</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Advantage for first year's applicants (C2)</li> <li>Problematic income determination method (C3)</li> </ul> <p><b>Impact on access to private education</b></p> <p><i>None</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No effect on decision to attend (C2) (C3) (E3) (F1) (G1)</li> </ul> <p><i>Positive</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Facilitate to afford (C2) (C3)</li> </ul>
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Figure 14. Views of the parents who benefit from the education incentive

**Beneficiaries.** Parents/students are the beneficiaries of the EIP. Rationales of beneficiary parents to choose private schools for their children were evaluated under this theme.

*Rationales for school choice.* As shown in Figure 15 above, to explain the motivation behind choosing private education for their child(ren), beneficiary families emphasized a variety of rationales related to school climate, school facilities, and education quality. Regarding school climate, participants stated that enhanced family school cooperation (C1, E1), safety (E3, F1, G1), intimate atmosphere (D2, D3) had an important influence on choosing private education instead of public for their children. In addition, positive school environment supporting students' multidimensional development was underlined as an important character of private schools that motivates parents for private education (C1, D2, D3, E2, C3, E3). According to an upper-secondary level parent (CPY3), for example, "student development should be multifaceted, and all the education plans, curriculum, and teachers in the school should support students' diverse aspects". S/he continued: "Private schools are a few steps ahead from public schools. Public schools, unfortunately, cannot accomplish this due to several reasons; crowded school, insufficient social facilities and opportunities, and unsatisfactory teacher performance". A lower secondary participant, similarly, commented on the importance of positive and supportive school climate as:

There is really a democratic environment in the school for any subject. My child can speak about things he is uncomfortable in the class and he said he was not able to do it last year in his public school. In addition, teachers are patient and they listen to students to the end. There are competitions, project presentations, and social activities organized by the school continuously. Thus, there is always an encouragement to talk to people... Even just for the reason of student development factor, I can send my children to private school (EPY2).

Parents also mentioned the facilities in private schools while describing the rationale for their school choice. For example, the level of physical facilities was stated as a principal

factor to consider private school as a choice by participants from all levels (C1, E2, C2). Moreover, online systems aiming to monitor, and support student success underlined as a key factor of private institutions that affected participant decisions. A primary level parent, for example, commented on these online opportunities as:

They have a great feedback system that you can upload the application on your phone. You can follow easily what your child does that day, whether s/he does his/her homework. They also send materials that student missed in the exams; and you can follow whether they complete these materials. Students and parents follow the system separately; thus, you can take your precaution. (EPY1)

Education quality appeared as the last category in beneficiary parent rationales behind choosing private education. In this category, participant parents expressed several factors including foreign language education (C1, E1, D2, D3, E2, C2, C3), full-day schooling (C1, E1, E2, E3, G1), teacher/education quality (C1, D1, E2, C2, G1), low class size (C1, E1, D3, E2) and well-established institutional education system (C1, E1, E2) that attracted their attention in school choice process. Regarding foreign language education, for example, a participant (DPY3) said: “I wanted my child to learn English. Here at 6<sup>th</sup> grade, all students can speak English and know the rules. I am sure that all the students will graduate from this school by reading and speaking English well”. Low class-sizes in private schools was also commonly shared as a rationale for school choice. A parent (EPY2), whose child previously attended to a public school, told that they “were grateful for that public school for its location and teacher quality”. S/he then continued how they decided to change their choice towards a private institution by saying: “Since it [the public school] became popular and made a difference due to the seniority of teachers, it got crowded up to 40-student classrooms. Because of the class-size, I preferred this private school”. Pointing out the importance of the



quality of teachers, full-day schooling/private tutoring, and institutionalized school system in private schools, a parent shared her/his rationale as follows:

Since I heard about X [public] school: There were strange people around it and students with unpleasant habits like drug use, sometimes there was no teachers in classes, and teachers' performance was not satisfactory. My child will enter the university exam and 9<sup>th</sup> grade lessons are important. Why there would be no teacher in my child's class? Here that never happens. They use that time at least to do tests. They have study time from 3.30 pm to 6.30 pm. They can ask their question during this period. There are not such chances in public schools anymore. (GPY1)

For the theme of beneficiaries, the parents receiving incentive expressed a variety of rationales for their private school choice in terms of school climate, school facilities, and education quality. Family cooperation, safety, and intimate atmosphere were the factors for school climate aspect. In addition, the parents emphasized that private schools provided an environment for their children's multidimensional development. Further, the most common factors in education quality category stated by the parents were better foreign language education, full-day schooling, teacher/education quality, and low class-size. The next section provided the views of parents receiving incentive on the incentive policy implementation.

***Policy implementation. Application and placement process.*** Beneficiary parent experiences related to application and placement process were grouped under two categories. First, parents shared their experiences regarding how the process ensued. Several participants from all-levels stated that they were informed by the media in the process (E1, D2, D3, C2), and the school helped them in applying for the incentive (D1, D2, D3, E2, C2, C3). Parents said that they applied for the incentive online via e-school (E1) and made only one school choice (D1, E1, D3, E2). One of the participant parents who applied the incentive in the first implementation year commented on the application and placement process as follows:

We applied to the incentive in the second additional application period. First, we enrolled in public science high school. We completed a form there, which shows your request to attend a private school. The administration updated this information on the system. They also completed the necessary information on e-school system instead of us and we made our application. We just only submitted the income information and the document for siblings attending school. Even for this, it was enough to given ID number of his brother since they see him on the system as a student.

We followed the announcement of results. Private schools were also monitoring the results and school transfer requests. The private schools made the school transfer application and completed (CPY2).

As the second category in this section, participants commented on the problems that they experienced in the application and placement process. Several participants said that they did not face any problems in terms of proceeding the process (E1, C3). According to these parents, the application and placement system worked well in terms of being informed, proceeding the application and finalizing the process with results and placement. Some parents, on the other hand, shared some adversities they experienced. According to these participants “the first year of the implementation was chaotic” (D2), and “almost all the applicants in the first year received the incentive” (E3). Furthermore, some participants criticized the application and placement process especially about small number of quotas announced (E2, E3) and wealth level of some beneficiaries (D1, G1). According to these parents, some of the affluent families applied for -and received- the incentive while they did not need it. To explain, a primary level parent commented as follows:

The beneficiary families who are well off to send their children to private school steal the right of the people that really need incentive. Thus, incentive amount should be used in the places where heating problems exist or even there is no classroom. I mean, if only there is no private or public-school difference. All children should have music teacher or should take art classes. I

experienced that. When I sent my child to kindergarten as she was 6 years old, she said: 'Mom, there is nothing here.' Even 6-year old child understood the inequality. (DPY1)

*Eligibility criteria.* Participant parents shared their views on eligibility criteria especially in two subjects. First, they explained the distinctive criteria in their application and placement process: These distinctive criteria were: household income (E1, D3, E3), unemployed parent (D1, D2), parental marital and vital status (G1), and siblings attending school (C2). On the other hand, some parents commented critically on the eligibility criteria. According to their views, the income-determination method was problematic and "unfair" (C3) as it took advantages for self-employed families and the government lacked supervision of household income for these parents (E2, D2). Moreover, by referring the pre-requisite concerning that applicants who were qualified for the incentive must not have a scholarship amount exceeding 51%, one of the parents (CPY1) criticized the status of scholarship students in the program. He pointed out that successful students were punished with this application; on the contrary, he suggested that they should be supported more.

Regarding the policy implementation them, the parents receiving incentive expressed their views on the application and placement process and eligibility criteria to receive incentive. First, the parents mentioned that school administrations helped them in the application process and they did single school choice for the placement procedure. In addition, they pointed out that affluent families applied for and received the incentive, especially in the first year. Second, household income, siblings attending school, and parental marital and vitality status of the eligibility criteria were stated in the distinctive criteria to be able to receive incentive. Further, the parents criticized the way of household income determination and mentioned that self-employed parents' income statements did not reflect the real situation.

*Policy outcomes. Impact on access to private education.* Most of the beneficiary parents stated that the incentive had no noteworthy influence on deciding to send their

child(ren) to private schools; however, it facilitated affording tuition fees and other education expenses (D3, C2, C3, E1, E3, F1, G1). A participant (CPY2), for instance, said: “Indeed, the incentive has no effect for low income families. It only helps middle-income group to afford. We could still afford it without the incentive because of our son’s full scholarship and desire to attend that school”. Consistent with that opinion, another parent stated that they use the incentive for other educational expenses and it is not highly effective on school choice. S/he said:

It [the incentive] will contribute to the people who already send their children to private schools. However, it makes a huge contribution to middle-income families in Çanakkale. I can say that it influenced my decision since I would have afforded hardly if I did not benefit from the incentive. Of course, I would still send them to private school without the incentive. I can pay the amount of 3-4 thousand Liras. In addition, when I compare the extra expenses of attending public school, the private school tuition fee is reasonable. I pay the fee and do not think any more (EPY1).

Some of the beneficiary participants, on the other hand, emphasized that without the incentive, they would have difficulties in affording the costs of private education (C1, E1, E2). According to these participants, the incentive program had a significant effect on their decision in choosing private schools instead of public ones. A parent, whose children were at the same private school, explained her/his experience:

I considered sending my children to private school only if I received the incentive since it was costly without the incentive. In fact, it becomes reasonable for two kids and decreases to normal prices. I am not a fan of private education, but I am satisfied with the education and it makes sense when you have the opportunity. I considered that 15 thousand Liras plus the incentive amount, 7 thousand Liras; I would pay 22 thousand Liras in total for two kids. Then I asked whether I could provide my child such an education in the private school including weekend

courses, English language education for 10 thousand Liras per kid. In public school, they were getting education in a certain level, but I think it will be worth it due to those factors. (EPY2)

In this part, the parents stated their views on the impact of incentive in terms of access to private education. The parents mentioned that the incentive amount facilitated their expenditures to afford private education such as tuition fee, food, transportation, and social activities. In addition, some of the parents emphasized that they could have difficulty to afford although the incentive did not affect their decision to send their children to private school. The next part presented the analysis results of the views of parents who applied and were not deemed as eligible for the incentive.

***Parents not receiving the incentive.*** Parents who did not receive incentive but sent their children to private schools in central district of Çanakkale province were also asked about their experiences as to the education incentive and the policy implementation. The main categories and codes are given in Figure 16 below according to education level including pre-primary, primary, lower secondary, and upper secondary levels. The categories were gathered under the themes as follows:

*Beneficiaries*

- Rationales for private school choice

*Policy implementation*

- Application and placement process
- Eligibility criteria

*Policy outcomes*

- Impact on access to private education

Pre-primary, Primary & Lower Secondary : 4 PN	Upper Secondary : 6 PN
<p><b>Rationales for private school choice</b></p>	<p><b>Rationales for private school choice</b></p>
<p><i>School climate</i></p>	<p><i>School climate</i></p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Safety (B1) (C1)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Caring attitude in enrollment process (E2) (F2) (G2)</li> </ul>
<p><i>School facilities</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Safety (F1)</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Physical facilities (C1)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Discipline (E2)</li> </ul>
<p><i>Education quality</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Innovative institutional development environment (C2)</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Full-day schooling (B1) (C1) (D1) (E1)</li> <li>• Low class size (B1) (C1) (D1) (E1)</li> <li>• Quality education (B1) (D1) (E1)</li> <li>• Teacher quality (B1) (C1)</li> <li>• Recommendation upon reference (B1) (E1)</li> <li>• Foreign language education (C1)</li> <li>• Ideological closeness (D1)</li> <li>• Well-established education system (E1)</li> <li>• High academic achievement (E1)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Online student monitoring system (E2)</li> <li>• Physical facilities (C2)</li> </ul>
<p><i>Financial</i></p>	<p><i>Education quality</i></p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Convenient location (B1)</li> <li>• Public schools are also costly (B1) (E1)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Low class-size (C2) (E2) (G2)</li> <li>• Teacher quality (C2) (E2) (G1)</li> <li>• Job-oriented education (F1) (F2)</li> <li>• Education quality (G2) (E2)</li> <li>• Foreign language education (C2)</li> <li>• Private tutoring for national exams (G1)</li> </ul>
<p><i>Application and placement process</i></p>	<p><i>Financial</i></p>
<p><i>Process</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Convenient tuition fee (F1) (F2) (G2)</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• School help in process (B1) (C1)</li> <li>• Informed by media (E1)</li> <li>• Schools make incentive advertisement to attract attention (E1)</li> </ul>	<p><i>Application and placement process</i></p>
<p><i>Problems</i></p>	<p><i>Process</i></p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unorganized implementation in first year (C1)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No difficulty (C2) We will try again (C2) (E2) (F2) (G1)</li> </ul>
<p><i>Eligibility criteria</i></p>	<p><i>Eligibility criteria</i></p>
<p><i>Distinctive</i></p>	<p><i>Distinctive</i></p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Income status is disadvantageous (C1) (D1) (E1)</li> <li>• Two parents working families have disadvantage (B1) (D1)</li> <li>• No siblings is disadvantageous (D1)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No siblings is disadvantageous (C2)</li> <li>• Academic achievement (F2)</li> </ul>
<p><i>Critics</i></p>	<p><i>Critics</i></p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Quotas are not enough (B1) (D1) (E1)</li> <li>• Problematic income determination method (B1) (D1)</li> <li>• Affluent applicants received incentive (D1)</li> <li>• Criteria are not distinctive (B1)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Problematic income determination method (C2) (E2) (G1)</li> <li>• Special conditions and successes are not effective (E2)</li> </ul>
<p><i>Impact on access to private education</i></p>	<p><i>Effect of incentive on access to private school</i></p>
<p><i>None</i></p>	<p><i>None</i></p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No effect on decision to attend (B1) (C1) (D1) (E1)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No effect on decision to attend (C2) (E2)</li> </ul>
<p><i>Positive</i></p>	<p><i>Positive</i></p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Would facilitate to afford (B1)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Would facilitate to afford (C2) (G1)</li> </ul>

Figure 15. Views of the parents who do not benefit from the education incentive

There were four parents for pre-primary, primary and lower secondary levels from five private schools. Since most of these schools were united institutions, findings for these levels merged and presented as a group in the Figure 15. The other participant group consisted of six participants, whose child(ren) studied at the upper-secondary level in four private schools.

**Beneficiaries.** Parents/students are the beneficiaries of the EIP. Rationales of non-beneficiary applicant parents to choose private schools for their children were evaluated under this theme.

*Rationales for school choice.* Participant parents who applied for but could not receive the incentive reported several rationales for their private school choice. Like in beneficiary parent rationales, non-beneficiary family rationales were classified in four groups: school climate, school facilities, education quality, and finance. Considering school climate, discipline, safety, and intimate atmosphere (B1, C1, D1, F1) were cited by most of the parents as factors that influenced their school choice. A parent (DPY1), for example, stated that the private school s/he chose had a positive and supportive environment even compared to other private schools. S/he said: “There is an intimate atmosphere here, which I like very much. It is like a paid public school”. Moreover, the same parent also mentioned to the caring attitude of school administrators and staff during the enrollment process (E2, F2, G2). According to their experience, this type of positive attitude influenced their choice towards private institutions. In terms of school facilities, several participants addressed the advantages of physical environment and equipment in private schools (C1, C2). In addition, a participant told that the online systems to monitor student attendance and success attracted her/his attention for choosing private institutions (E1).

To explain their motivation for private education, non-beneficiary parents also mentioned several rationales related to education quality. One of the most common rationales among participants was low class-size in private schools (B1, C1, D1, E1, C2). A parent

(EPN1), for example, stated that the class-size was 40 in their public-school experience; however, it became 20 later in their current private school. S/he continued, “Thus, they [teachers] care about individual differences of children. For example, social intelligence of my son developed, and his academic achievement followed this. He goes to school voluntarily for the first time and even gets sad in vacation times”. Several parents also mentioned the quality of teachers and high academic achievement in private schools to describe their source of attention towards private education (B1, C1, C2, E1, E2, G1). Related to that, a parent (GPN1), who sent their children to a basic high school, said, “Since the level of education provided in public schools is not good enough, they open complementary courses, but same teachers give the same lessons in these courses, which was undesirable for us”. She continued as, “We rather had to send to basic high school due to the lack of attention by public school teachers. In addition, teachers in private schools pay one-to-one attention to students”. Furthermore, some parents also underlined several other rationales such as the level of foreign language education (C1, C2), well-established institutional system (E1), job-oriented education (F1, F2), ideological closeness (D1) and the recommendations/references regarding the quality of the school (B1, E1).

For the rationales, lastly, non-beneficiary families commented on several financial motivations regarding their private school choice. Interestingly, non-beneficiary participants compared to the parents receiving the incentive cited financial rationales more commonly. For example, the convenient amounts of tuition in private school were emphasized by some parents (F1, F2, G2). Moreover, several participants underlined that costs in public schools can also be high in some circumstances (B1, E1). For example, a primary-level parent (EPN1) stated that s/he had to send her/his child to private school since s/he works until 5 pm. S/he told that finding a person to take care of her/his child after school would cost some more money. S/he then, added: “Lunch was another issue as I was at work at that time. The



expenses were the same. I tried for two years in that way; but I preferred to spend the same amount of money for private education”. The same participant, finally, commented on the other expenses in public schools and her/his private school choice as:

In fact, it did not make much difference in terms of the amount of money I paid. At least, my child participates only in one place and is not interrupted. As in public school, I used to pay for lunch, transportation service fee two times (for lunchtime and transfer for private course). I paid a lot for private courses since teachers in public schools do not care about your children when you did not so. (EPN1)

In this section, the parents not receiving incentive stated their rationales for their private school choice. Discipline, safety, and intimate atmosphere were the factors mentioned by the parents with respect to school climate. The parents emphasized that they chose a private school to send their children due to the physical facilities they had. Concerning the education quality, the parents mentioned several considerations for their school choice such as low class-size, teacher quality, high-academic achievement, and better foreign language education.

***Policy implementation. Application and placement process.*** Participant non-beneficiary parent experiences were grouped under two categories: First, the process refers to the experiences regarding how the application and placement process proceeded in the schools. Second, problems describe the adversities faced by parents in the process. As for the process, parents stated that media information (E1) and institutional support provided by the schools (B1, C1) guided the application and placement process. A participant, on the other hand, commented on information channels and said that advertisements made by the schools on the incentive attracted her/his attention (E1). Furthermore, several participants reported that although they were not able to receive, they planned to apply for the incentive again in the upcoming years (C2, E2, F2, G1).

Considering the problems in the application and placement process, a participant stated that there were some organizational and informational problems for the first-year implementation (DPN1). S/he told that since her/his child was at kindergarten that year [2014-2015], s/he was misinformed about who were able to apply for the application. S/he added that although they were then informed that they could be applicant later, they had some troubles in the process. S/he commented on her/his experience and summarized the process as follows:

We were told that only pre-primary, 1<sup>st</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> grade students could apply. My child finished 1<sup>st</sup> grade and the other was in kindergarten at that time [2014-2015]. So, I did not apply for it. Many people thought the same way and there were not many applicants in the first application period. Later, they said we could apply but it was a little troublesome since your child had to leave school and enrolled in resident based public school. Then we could not receive the incentive and then we were transferred to the private school again (DPN1).

*Eligibility criteria.* Regarding the eligibility criteria, non-beneficiary parents commented on the distinctive elements in the process as well as aspects to be criticized. Parents stated that academic achievement had a considerable impact on eligibility (F2), and students with no siblings (D1, C2), two parents working both (B1, D1) and from high-income families (C1, D1, E1) had disadvantageous in being selected for the incentive. For the aspects to be criticized, on the other hand, parents tended to disapprove the income determination method (C1, D1, E1, C2, E2, G1) and criticized the distinctiveness level of the criteria (B1, F2) as well as the fact that affluent families were selected as eligible for the incentive (D1). One of the parents (FPN2), for example, criticized the balance between the evaluation criteria of income and academic achievement and stated that; “If this implementation is based on income, then it fails, since academic achievement is also effective. The government wants to get in turn for the scholarship. Thus, it should not be said as an income-relevant scholarship”.

As for the household income determination method, a parent, whose child started private school in 1<sup>st</sup> grade, commented as follows:

The evaluation is based on household income primarily, and it depends on to the people. If they report the real status of their income, then it works fairly. But if not, we cannot know anything about who won what. Maybe the ones who earn more money than I do obtained the right to benefit from the incentive (CPN2).

For the policy implementation theme, the participant parents expressed their views on application and placement process and the eligibility criteria. They mentioned schools helped them to complete the application procedure. Further, the parents indicated the reasons for not receiving the incentive that they have one child and their household income was high. However, they stated that private education is costly including school uniforms, transportation, and social activities. Thus, they told that they would apply for the incentive. On the other hand, some of them criticized the income determination method of the government and stated well off families applied and received incentive. The next section presented the views of the parents not receiving incentive on the impacts of education incentive policy.

***Policy outcomes.*** *Access to private education.* Participant non-beneficiary parents mostly stated that the education incentive did not have a considerable influence on their decision for choosing private education instead of public (B1, C1, D1, E1, C2, E2). A parent (BPN1), for instance, said that s/he and her/his partner both works in the family, and they still had difficulties in paying tuition fees. According to his view, however, the incentive did not affect their decision towards private education. S/he added that, in her/his view, "the incentive didn't affect the decision of upper-income families" since "they often prefer sending their children to private schools anyway".

Some participants, on the other hand, mentioned to the supportive influence of education incentive on their children's access to private education (B1, C2, G1). Contrary to

the other non-beneficiary parent, these participants underlined that the incentive would facilitate the costs private schools, and there could be families who were not able to afford private education without the incentive. As an example, a parent stated the following:

There are parents that consciously send their children to private schools for some reasons such as a better learning environment and low class-size. I know a lot of parents who force themselves to send their children for these reasons. For such families, the incentive is really supportive. It is not that low amount of money. It makes you feel good. (CPN2)

Overall, the results for the third question indicated an in-depth description of the experiences of the practitioners in Çanakkale with respect to the incentive policy implementation. The rationales of parents to choose a private school for their children provided insights to understand where the education incentive policy stands exactly for the goal of widening access to private education. All groups of participants stated the rationales for private school choice in three groups: school climate, school facilities, and education quality. All three groups of practitioners emphasized the importance of physical facilities and environment for social activities for children's social development besides academic achievement. School administrators and parents stated that low class-size as a principal factor for parent satisfaction with respect to the private schools.


The school administrators described general family profile in their school as upper middle- and high-income families while defined the beneficiary family profile as the ones who were already sending their children to private school. On the other hand, the parents stated that the incentive facilitated to afford private education expenditures although they already decided to send their children to private school without incentive. All the groups of participants pointed out that affluent families applied and were deemed as eligible for the incentive. At this point, the participants commented that the process concerning the determination of household income by the government did not work well. For instance, household income documents of some self-employed parents did not represent the reality.

For the impacts of the incentive policy, access to private education and quality arguments were stated. Although school administrators mentioned that the enrollments increased under the effect of education incentive; however, they all stated that parents, in general, already decided to send their children to private school. On the other hand, they also agreed that education incentive facilitated to afford private education expenditures.

### **How does the policy work?**

The fourth research question was related to the evaluation of the education incentive policy outcomes based on the question, “*How does the policy work?*” Based on the findings provided by the previous research questions, I evaluated the policy issue as an entire process in terms of the progress in four-year period.

**Evaluation of the policy.** To answer whether the policy works or not, it would be better to look at how the policy actors at the very beginning and during the implementation process expressed their goals and rationales with respect to the policy. The narratives of the governmental actors were evident that the government introduced the incentive as a mechanism for translating the policy driver, which is privatization in education, and the economic rationales into schools. The Figure 17 summarizes the education incentive case in Turkey.




*Figure 16.* An overview of Turkey's education incentive case.  
Source: Adapted from (Adamson & Astrand, 2016)

First, public-private partnerships served as the privatization for the policy driver in this case. Thus, the government shared the responsibility of providing education with privately operated organizations and legitimized private education development. Second, the main goals of the government for the policy indicated its economic rationales. The governmental discourse showed that the government aimed to widen access to private education using a targeted incentive implementation. In addition, they expected to increase education quality by reducing the class-size in public schools and competition among schools. Further, the government asserted that they spent less money having private schools providing education service with their own resources and facilities. Finally, the government chose to introduce the incentive as a mechanism to pursue the mentioned goals. Further, the education incentive led to a widened private school market for students/parents with respect to the increasing number of private schools and students attending these schools.


Within the framework of the explanation above, I evaluated Turkey's incentive case in terms of intended and unintended consequences of the policy with respect to access to private education, equity, quality, segregation, and accountability arguments.

**Intended consequences.** The policy goals of access to private education, equality of opportunity/equity, and education quality were evaluated in the context of the intended consequences of the EIP. First, the government intended to reach was to increase access to private education. To evaluate this, the share of private schools and students attending private schools in total are indicators to see the change in four-year period. First, I looked at the change in the share of private schools in the last six years (2012-2018) including the EIP implementation. As shown in Figure 18, the percentage of private schools in total increased from 9.6% to 17.8% in six-year period since 2012-2013 school year year (See the Appendix J for the numbers in detail). Considering education levels, there is a rapid increase at upper secondary (general) level between 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 school years. The reason for that was the transformation of PTIs to private schools (basic high schools). After the introduction of the EIP at the 2014-2015 school year, it seemed the increase was more visible in lower secondary and upper secondary level private schools.



*Figure 17* The percentage of private schools in total according to educational level. Source: National Education Statistics (MoNE, 2015b, 2016, 2017, 2018).

From the government perspective, the use of the stagnant capacity of private schools was one of the principal elements of the EIP. Therefore, increasing the number of students attending private schools gained importance at this point. The Figure 19 below indicates the percentage of students attending private schools in total in the last six years (2012-2018). From the Figure, we can see that the percentage of students attending private schools increased from 3.9% to 8.3% since 2012-2013 school year (See the Appendix J for the numbers in detail). The goal of the government was to reach 12% by the end of 2018-2019 school year. The increase was 2.3% after the introduction of the EIP between the 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 school years; thus, it might be difficult to pursue the goal by 2018-2019 with this rate of increasing. With respect to education levels, there was a steady increase in the numbers of students attending private schools in each school year except for the 2016-2017 at pre-primary and elementary levels. The reason for this decrease in 2016-2017 might be related to the closing down of some schools in the context of the coup attempt and its reflections on educational institutions. Similarly, the rapid increase was seen at upper secondary level schools in the 2015-2016 school year after the introduction of the EIP.



*Figure 18.* The percentage of students attending private schools in total.  
Source: National Education Statistics (MoNE, 2015b, 2016, 2017, 2018).



In terms of access to private education, in total the percentage of students enrolled in private schools showed that private schools benefited from the incentive and the number of students attending private schools has increased. Basic high schools, specifically, benefited in upper secondary level and in total enrollment. Their transformation process will be completed by 2018-2019 school year. The government had set the goal for the students ratio to reach 15% in private education by 2023 (Çaycı TV, 2018). For that reason, the government might expect such a slow increase between 2019-2013.

It is also interesting to see that the shares of private schools and students attending private schools in total did not increase with similar rates (Figures 17 and 18). This might be related to that either there is more boutique type small-size private schools or significant amount of stagnant capacity of private schools are still not used.

Second, within the context of widening access to private education, the government designed the eligibility criteria to reach socioeconomically disadvantaged families with the goal of increasing equity. Table 25 below compares the scoring points of the eligibility criteria and their percentage in total score in four years.

Table 25

*Distribution of the Eligibility Criteria in the Maximum Application Score*


Evaluation Criteria	Maximum Scores for the evaluation criterion*							
	2014-15	%	2015-16	%	2016-17	%	2017-18	%
Academic achievement at the previous school year	20	21.7	100	10.4	100	10.3	100	10.3
Social achievements	30	32.6	160	16.7	160	16.5	160	16.5
Household income	10	10.9	340	35.4	350	36.1	350	36.1
Siblings attending school	22	23.9	260	27.1	260	26.8	260	26.8
Parents' marital and vital status	10	10.9	100	10.4	100	10.3	100	10.3
<b>Maximum Total Score</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>960</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>970</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>970</b>	<b>100</b>

\*The maximum scores of each criteria group and percentages are not the exact values.

Source: Calculated by the researcher using the guides published by OOKGM for the application and placement process of the education incentive.

The criteria for special conditions were not included for the distribution analysis since they were not common for all school years. With the purpose of making a comparison for the distribution of eligibility criteria, I took the maximum points for each item in the criteria

except for special conditions. Due to this reason, the total scores were not complete scores. Later, I examined the percentages of each criteria group in total. Figure 20 below reveals the difference in years more clearly. The most striking change among eligibility criteria groups was between household income, academic and social achievements. The change happened between the school years 2014-2015 and 2015-2016. While the percentage of household income increased in the second-year, the percentages of academic and social achievements decreased. The distribution of the criteria was settled in the third year (2016-2017) since there was not any change in the eligibility criteria distribution and even as to the content.



*Figure 19.* The eligibility criteria distribution for the EIP (2014-2017).

Regarding the results in Figure 19, while academic and social achievements outweigh at the school year 2014-15, it shifted to household income criterion by the school year 2015-16. Academic and social achievements had made up 22 and 33 percent of the eligibility criteria (which equals to more than half) in the first year. While the criterion of total household income for a month represented only 11% initially, in the last three years, household income has the largest portion (around 35% in average). Further, siblings attending school follows it with 27%, then students' social achievements come (17%), and academic achievement and parents' marital and vitality status (10%) become the last two. Moreover, the

distribution of eligibility criteria in the first school year shows merit-based feature, while the distribution in the last two school years indicate need-based feature.

Comparing the two results regarding the beneficiary profile and the eligibility criteria of the incentive policy, in the last two school years, more disadvantaged families/students received the incentive. Household income and number of siblings attending school received the highest attention. Therefore, it can be said that the eligibility criteria were successful to select the applicants for targeted families in these school years.

Third, another goal was to increase education quality by reducing class-size in public schools. Table 26 demonstrates the class-size in public schools between 2012-2017.

Table 26

*The Number of Students per Classroom in Public Schools (2012-2017)*

School Year	Pre-primary*	Primary	Lower Secondary	Upper Secondary (General)	Total (Formal Education) **
2012-2013	25	24	44	30	31
2013-2014	25	24	42	33	30
2014-2015	25	24	35	29	28
2015-2016	24	23	31	26	26
2016-2017	67	21	32	26	27
2017-2018	67	22	31	25	26

The 2012-13 school year is the initiation of '4+4+4' policy, which divided the basic education period into three equal parts.

\* Number of pre-primary schools does not include the nursery classes in the private education institutions.

\*\* Open education statistics are not included.

Source: National Education Statistics (MoNE, 2015b, 2016, 2017, 2018).

As it is seen from the table above, the number of students per classroom in public schools had a tendency to decrease slightly until the 2016-2017 school year. There is an extremely increase in the number of students per class at pre-primary level in the 2016-2017 and continued in the next year. This increase might be related to the policy initiated for the expansion of compulsory education as including the pre-primary level in pilot provinces in the country. Further, while the number of students per classroom decreased, it is important to discuss other variables in this decrease. Although EIP might have played a role in this development, it is hard to attribute the whole change to the policy.

One of the benefits of the government was to provide education service for students with less money than public spending. In terms of efficiency aspect, Table 27 shows the incentive amounts and expenditures per pupil according to education levels.

Table 27

*Incentive Amount and Expenditure per Pupil According to Education Levels (2014-2017)*

School Year	Pre-Primary		Primary		Lower Sec.		Upper Sec. Total		Basic High Sc.	
	IA	EPP	IA	EPP	IA	EPP	IA	EPP	IA	EPP
<b>2014-2015</b>	2,500	4,672	3,000	4,777	3,500	4,090	3,500	4,392	3,000	4,777
<b>2015-2016</b>	2,680	5,924	3,220	5,282	3,750	4,741	3,750	5,025	3,220	5,282
<b>2016-2017</b>	2,860	5,806	3,440	6,349	4,000	5,026	4,000	6,567	3,440	6,349
<b>2017-2018</b>	3,060	-	3,680	-	4,280	-	4,280	-	3,680	-

\*IA refers to Incentive Amount and EPP refers to Expenditure per Pupil.  
Source: OOKGM (2014, 2015, 2016, 2017), TUIK Statistics (TUIK, 2017).

As we compare the education expenditures per pupil (EPP) and incentive amounts in the table above, the government spent less money for the incentive policy implementation than public spending per pupil. The ratio of incentive amount for public spending per pupil changed between 0.5 and 0.8 in various school years. For example, the government spent half of EPP per pre-primary level students receiving incentive and attending private schools while spent 0.8 times less for lower secondary in three school years. In addition, the government formulated the policy as it can increase the incentive amount up to 1.5 times of EPP. Therefore, the government spent less money for the students attending private schools in four-year period. On the other hand, when the increasing rate of students attending private education starts to decrease, the government might raise the amount of incentive to reach the policy goals.

According to the interview results, on the other hand, the school administrators and parents emphasized that the incentive had no effect on parents' decisions to send their children to private schools. Because the incentive amounts are far below private school tuition fees even the Ministry advocates that tuition fee for most of the private schools in Turkey are not costly (around 60% of private schools have tuition fees under 15 thousand TL) (Çaycı TV,

2018). It makes sense for pre-primary private schools and basic high schools. However, the parents also pointed out that the private spendings were high in private schools; hence, they found that the incentive amount was still worthwhile since it facilitated to afford their expenditures for private education.

It is also important to look at the application and placement procedures and transparency of the process. Applicant private school administrations and parents have responsibility to present accurate information in the application process. According to the policy legalizations, their statements can be inspected and if they submit inaccurate statements, they are sentenced. For example, the schools might be banned from the incentive system if they make the same mistake twice (OOKGM, 2014, 2015). Concerning to the incentive placement process, the governmental actors stated that there were several strategies they follow to increase the transparency of the process. They were stated below as:

- The use of formulations for determining the provincial and school quotas,
- The placement process based on the applicants' scores by software,
- Two placement methods (internal and external) to prevent school interventions on the process
- Announcement of the results on e-school system including two placement scores: the lowest score for the public-school students and the lowest score for the students enrolled at private schools.

Another issue was related to the increase in private school tuition fees. It was stated that although some parents assume that the payments could be deposited directly to beneficiary families, the government avoid this way due to some potential problems in the allocation process (e.g. wrong account numbers, closed accounts of parents) and prefers allocating resources to schools. The settlement then should be between institutions and parents.

*Unintended consequences.* Private education institutions started to gain legitimacy in society with the public funds allocated. This encouraged the demand for private education; thus, the numbers of private schools and students attending private education increase. In addition, it provides more alternatives for parental choice.

According to the interviews with school administrators, they selectively admit students to private schools based on academic achievement. Due to the competition among private schools, they would like to attract high-achieving students using merit-based scholarships. Selective admissions in private schools might cause separation among schools according to the priorities of school to choose students. Further, the school administrations also emphasized their school facilities, which are there are standard conditions that private schools must complete during the establishment process. These factors also attract parents' attention if they can afford private education in these schools. Moreover, school administrators described their general family profile as upper- and high-income level and educated families. Therefore, socioeconomic segregation between public schools and private schools seems quite possible.

The fourth research question gave a holistic evaluation of the education incentive case in Turkey. The government used several economic rationales to legitimize private education expansion, which are efficient use of resources, equity, and quality. The EIP introduced as an education mechanism aimed at increasing the share of private education in total, widening access to private education using targeted incentive for students attending private schools, and increasing education quality by reducing class-size and competition. The government, in four-year period of the EIP, expanded the share of private education by increasing the number of private schools and students enrolled in these schools. In addition, the MoNE developed and improved the eligibility criteria to reach targeted low socioeconomic group of families. The beneficiary profile, in four-year period, showed that more disadvantaged group of families in terms of household income and parental vitality and marital status were able to enter the

system. Therefore, the disadvantaged groups were provided opportunities for quality education. Moreover, the government spent less money than public spending per pupil at all education levels. This can be shown for the efficient use of public resources as a result of public-private partnership in education between the government and private sector.

In summary, in the Chapter 4, education incentive case in Turkey described, explored and evaluated with an intensive portrait of it. The EIP has a long historical background before its introduction into education. The chapter provided insights to understand the drivers of the policy using a wide variety of data sources including policy documents, interviews with the governmental actors in the MoNE and the practitioners in Çanakkale. The eligibility criteria and the beneficiary profile of the policy implementation indicated that the incentive targeted low socioeconomic group of families, especially in the last two years. In addition, it has merit-based finance aid feature since academic and social achievements of applicant students provide advantage to receive incentive.

However, the school administrators and the parents who received and was not deemed eligible to receive incentive stated that well off families applied and were qualified for the education incentive to send their children to private schools. Further, the practitioners also pointed out that some of the self-employed parents' household income information did not reflect the reality. They also commented that the beneficiary profile composed of the parents who already decided to participate in a private school. The parents, on the other hand, found the incentive amount worthwhile to receive since private education expenses are costly. Therefore, all the related stakeholders had their own benefits and they attributed different values on the incentive.

## Chapter V: Discussion, Conclusion and Recommendations

In this chapter, the findings of the study were discussed considering the relevant literature. First, I argued about the evaluation of Turkey's education incentive case. Later, I discussed the research findings according to the main arguments related to the policy issue. Lastly, conclusion for the study was presented and recommendations for policy makers and policy analysts/researchers were stated.

### Discussion

**Evaluation of the EIP.** The present study results indicated that scarce resources and quality appeared as the basis for the economics rationales of the government. Other expected outcomes from the policy were increasing the share of private schools in education and the number of students in private schools as well as increasing the quality of education by decreasing the class-size in public schools. For these goals, the government introduced the incentive to use the stagnant capacity of private schools and supported to transformation process of private tutoring institutions.

In the Turkish case, it appears that the government's support for private schools provides a legitimate base for the development of private education. Rizvi and Lingard (2010) argue that policy process comes with the authoritative decision of allocating values, and governments most frequently design education policies to guide institutions and professionals in a certain way and direct actions and behaviors. Therefore, although the incentive policy is likely to be a material policy, there happens a shift in the perception towards private schools related to the opportunity for better education. It might go to the understanding that one would better attend a private school for high quality education. As TEDMEM explained in its Monitoring Report for 2017-2018 school year, the EIP seems to strengthen the perception that private schools are more successful than public schools (TEDMEM, 2018).



The education incentive policy represents the characteristics of both need-based and merit-based financial aids. In some respects, it is a need-based aid since the eligible applicants are expected to be children of low-to-moderate income families. In addition, the beneficiaries continue to benefit from the incentive along their current educational level and sustainability for a certain achievement level is not required to continue the beneficiary status of students.

However, the eligibility criteria include student achievement for a significant percent of the total application score (20-25%). Further, the beneficiary students who have high grade point averages and social achievements appears as advantageous to receive the incentive especially in the last two years, since the lowest income level was expanded and almost all the eligible applicants was from this interval. Some grades, on the other hand, are exceptional for merit-based feature. These are pre-primary and the first three grades in primary level since there is no grading system for them. That means, the other eligibility criteria are more distinctive to be deemed eligible. Namely, need-based characteristics appeared at these grade levels.

Some of the participants also mentioned the types of financial aid for the students attending private school especially for not having more than 51% scholarship discount to benefit from the incentive. They criticized this rule since the scholarship given by private schools was merit-based, which students' national test scores were taken into account. Further, the participant school administrators told that they offered the parents to prefer one of them if their children achieved a scholarship discount at least 51% and deserved the incentive at the same time.

The EIP introduced in Turkey can also be called as a targeted voucher-like scheme, which aimed to increase the share of low-income families who have access to private education (MEB, 2017). There are several types of targeted school voucher programs in the world limited to different variables such as low-achievement, disability, and low-income. The

programs targeting low-income students are usually seen in developing countries to attend low-tuition private schools (Shakeel et al., 2016). Concerning the beneficiary profile, particularly in the last two years of EIP, the policy has the feature of targeted since household income and being a member of disadvantaged families had the largest proportion of eligibility criteria. In other words, the government applied a distributive policy with the aim of redistributing public funding for disadvantaged families in terms of income level.

At this point, the interview results showed that governmental support on private education contributed to develop awareness towards private schools and private education. Thus, it can be thought that the stakeholders explored the notion of education as a consumable service. The substantial number of applicants also supported this finding and narratives of the participant parents showed that governmental support to private education helped to overcome their biases towards private schools. One can note that education incentive has an influence on the relationship between private schools as education service supplier and students as consumers of private education service. Namely, the incentive policy transforms the characteristics of education service and demanding stakeholders. Therefore the Turkish case of EIP can be understood as an example of the connection between personal returns and education, as Saltman (2014) asserts that the relationship between education and individual returns, especially raised income, frames the education as a private consumable good, which is followed by privatizing education service and encouraging people to purchase the best quality education.

**Access to private education.** In the four-year period of the incentive implementation, the number of private schools and students attending these schools increased significantly. However, this raises the question of whose access to private education has increased; targeted low-to-moderate or well-off families? The findings in this study indicated that, the amount of education incentive is insufficient to pay the tuition and fees to attend a private school.

Furthermore, considering the extra costs in affording private education such as books, transportation, and school uniforms, the education incentive appears inadequate also in its influencing capacity regarding decisions to participate in a private school.

On the other hand, some participant parents tended to send their children to a private school due to the high expenditures encountered also in public education. That means, in some circumstances, the incentive functions as a discount or facilitating factor for well-off families. Further, in recent years, one can witness the increase in the household private expenditures at all education levels. In 2016, for example, household private expenditures composed of 18,5% of total expenditures (TUIK, 2017). This ratio was 35% for general upper secondary level including tutoring expenses for university exam preparation. In addition, the incentive amount and the number of beneficiaries was the highest at upper secondary level; however, basic high schools held more than half of this portion. Therefore, it can be claimed that although the amount of incentive can be insufficient in its influencing role on school choice, it may have a considerable positive impact on the affordability of expenses in private education.

Similar to the other low tuition private school examples in developing countries, basic high schools in Turkey might be considered as low-tuition private schools increasing the access to education (ERG, 2017; Patrinos et al., 2009). On the other hand, the MoNE 2015-2016 statistics show that more than half of the students coming from other schools enrolled at 12<sup>th</sup> grade in basic high schools (ERG, 2017). In the four-year period of the EIP implementation, 12<sup>th</sup> grade in basic high schools kept its high recipient cap ratio to benefit from the incentive. Similarly, the interviewed parents emphasized the importance of low tuition fee and tutoring for national exams among their rationales to choose basic high schools. Although the government has spent a significant amount of money to their

transformation into private schools, it should be considered that basic high schools have a temporary private school position in the context of the projection of private education.

On the other hand, the government aims to increase the share of private education to 12% by the 2018-2019 school year and to 15% by 2023 (Çaycı TV, 2018; MoNE, 2015a). To achieve this, the MoNE has planned to end the transformation process of PTIs by the end of 2018-2019 school year. In addition, the MoNE has applied a variety of rearrangements in the policy-relevant regulation, which are; change in grade quota distribution, exchange in province quotas, and increase in school recipient quota. These arrangements in the regulation of EIP related to maximum usage of the recipient caps can be attributed to the use of the available budget effectively to reach its goals.

Rationales of parents for choosing a private school can provide insight for the considerations related to access to private education. The findings indicated that, in their school choice, parents take private education into account mostly for better foreign language education, physical facilities, social activities as well as academic achievement opportunities, low class-size and full-day schooling. Similarly, Mayer, Peterson, Myers, Tuttle, & Howell (2002) found that parents' rationales for school choice include a variety of factors such as academic quality, school discipline, religious instruction, teacher quality, and safety. Therefore, it can be understood that school climate and facilities, and education quality take a vital role in parents' decision to send their children to private schools. Conversely, why public schools do not have these quality features should also be considered in the context of policy reforms.

Privatization in education can also be related to educational assessment systems in countries. Assessment system in a country might favor private schools over public schools due to some advantageous of private schools such as resources, facilities, teacher quality, etc. (OECD, 2011). The school choice rationales can also affect parent satisfaction towards private

education. Participant parents in the current study emphasized that they could not find these elements in public school, which led them to seek alternatives. In addition, to establish a private school in Turkey, the entrepreneurs must meet several standards to sustain their educational service such as class size, physical facilities, and full-day schooling (MEB, 2012). The justifications of the parents, as a result, demonstrate that families can have a rational decision-making process since they consider the cost-benefits of sending their children to a private school including individual and social benefits of private education.

**Equity.** The interviews with governmental actors showed that, at the governmental level, private schools are perceived as public resources to provide education service. In the context of the basic principles of National Education Law (TBMM, 1973), private schools provide functional role for equity-based actions. OECD (2017) suggests redefining the concepts of public and private good and emphasizes that the understanding of greater enrollment in private schools should not be interpreted as departure from the notion of education as public good. The reason for this suggestion is that many private schools operate as government-dependent; thus, they can be seen as “legally private, functionally public” (OECD, 2017). This perspective accounts for an alternative way of thinking about private schools. On the contrary, some educational think-tanks reported their concerns for equitable usage of public resources and suggested that the amount spent for EIP can be used primarily for the improvement of education quality in public schools (ERG, 2015a; TEDMEM, 2014).

The current study results related to the nationwide beneficiary profile showed that families receiving the incentive had one or two child(ren) in general. For the parents interviewed in the study, the ones having two expressed their willingness to send their both children to private school. Therefore, they might assume that they do not provide them equality of opportunity. At this point, the incentive supports parents to make that decision. Further, some of the private school administrators stated their parents’ profile composed of

upper middle socioeconomic group. As Currid-Halkett (2017) states, well-off people have tendency to invest in education and human-capital investments significantly more than the middle-income groups, since education is the only way for them to move upwards in socioeconomic status. In addition, opponents of voucher programs assert that economically well-off families use vouchers rather than those who need them the most (Arenas, 2004; Gauri & Vawda, 2003).

Regarding to the eligibility criteria, extra scores were provided for disadvantaged groups including children of martyr, veteran, or disabled parents. In addition, the parents in the study stated the criteria of income level, siblings attending school, and parental marital and vitality status were the distinctive eligibility criteria to receive the incentive. All these criteria can be related to low-income families; thus, one can claim that the incentive policy aimed at qualifying these families for the incentive. On the other hand, in the limitation of the central district case of Çanakkale, it appears that high-income families might have restrained the opportunity for low-to-moderate families to benefit from the incentive and to be able to send their children to private school due to the problems in household income determination system, which was discussed in the efficiency part in this section.

**Quality.** Education quality was one of the important rationales of the participant parents for sending their child(ren) to private schools. This result demonstrates that private schools are considered as an option for higher quality education, enabling parents to avoid failing in their school choice for their children. In addition, the increase in the number of private schools and students attending private schools strengthens the school market in Turkish education system. As an explanation for this increase, proponents of neoliberal reforms often claim that providing alternatives to parents for school choice promotes competition among schools and it results in overall achievement in education (Adamson & Astrand, 2016). The governmental actors of the EIP use the relationship between competition

and quality; however, it is difficult to say that all the private schools participated in education system in the four-year period have the high-quality education. For instance, basic high schools are counted as temporary private schools; however, the parents in the study emphasized their priority to prepare their children for national tests. Considering K-12 level within compulsory education, the government should consider increasing education quality in public and private schools together.

Governments interfere in the balance between supply and demand of private education. Rizvi & Lingard (2010) assert that policies are directly associated to allocation of values and drive the policy actors' behaviors and actions in a desired way. In Turkey's case, the incentive policy serves as an interface between supply (private schools) and demand sides (parents). The parents' rationales for private school choice showed that they were not satisfied with the facilities and education quality in public schools. Moreover, some of the parents stated that they have forced themselves to afford private school tuition and other educational expenditures. These findings might bring the argument that parents have a tendency to prefer sending their children to private school as an option to get high quality education if they have enough financial source. On the other hand, private schools are the policy actors who supply private education and demand to benefit from the education incentive as well as use it for high quality education service. Regarding the EIP, for example, some of the school administrators in the study used the incentive to attract parents' attention and persuade them to enroll in their school.

Low class-size appeared as another important consideration for the parents of the study to choose a private school. They stated that teachers had more time to take care of students in low-size classrooms in terms of providing effective learning environments. In their study on Hong-Kong Pre-Primary Voucher-Scheme, Fung & Lam (2011) found that small-size classroom, school-parent cooperation in terms of accountability, and cultural values and

beliefs were possible reasons for higher level of motivation for students, which led to learning and behavioral improvements. In addition, the participant school administrators of the pre-primary level private schools emphasized family-school cooperation at their school for parental choice. The reason might be that family involvement is a principal factor to improve education quality at pre-primary education level (Gulec & Genc, 2010).

In Turkey, private schools are operated under the supervision of the MoNE. The dependency includes terms and conditions determined by the MoNE for opening a private school, curriculum to follow in schools, and the national standardized tests that will be taken by the students. Yet, private schools try to make a difference with various educational methods they applied as to foreign language education, sport and art activities, and various learning methods, especially at pre-primary level. The proponents of the neoliberal mechanisms emphasize that whether there is a positive impact of such programs in private education and what causes the positive effects are important for public schools to learn from these experiences (Witte, 2009). For instance, as it was mentioned by the parents in the study, private schools conduct internationally certified teaching and learning programs in their school, which improve the education quality in their school and provide advantage towards them among other schools. At this point, the MoNE should take an active role to gather information about these types of helpful and applicable applications and develop projects to transfer them to public schools.

**Accountability and efficiency.** According to findings, the government has spent less amount of money for the beneficiary students attending private schools compared to the expenditure per pupil amounts. The governmental actors mentioned that the MoNE could invest in education quality since they would spend less without investing for new school establishment and equipments. However, in the four-year period, the efficiency was assessed with quantitative indicators, i.e. increase in the share of private schools and students in total.



On the other hand, considering beneficiary family profile, the beneficiaries were grateful about their status since they could use it for the expenses such as transportation, books, school uniforms, social activities organized by schools and tuition fee. The parents whose financial situation was well enough to attend a private school spent their subsidy for their children's development. Further, the incentive serves more as a facilitator to afford the tuition fee for the parents who already decided to send their children to a private school but had difficulty to make their payments. Think tanks in Turkey (ERG, 2017; TEDMEM, 2018) also criticizes that public resources allocated to private schools for the beneficiary students might be fair to supply the basic requirements of public schools and disadvantaged group of students. Thus, this might cause corruption in terms of using public resources for wealthy families (ERG, 2015b).

As the interview results showed, in the first two years of the policy implementation, a significant amount of beneficiary parents were the ones who were already able to afford the expenditures of private schools. On the other hand, all the beneficiary students' household income was in the lowest income interval, which is 5 thousand Liras, in the last two years. In the U.S., a school choice program selected their beneficiaries from applicant pool enrolled in public schools since there were sufficient demand (Wolf et al., 2010). Therefore, the change of the obligation for being enrolled in public schools in the first implementation year showed that there were not enough applications from public schools.

There is not such a system that parents can get information on and compare between the beneficiary schools in the context of student achievement in national exams, school graduation, and parent satisfaction. In Çanakkale case parents mostly made only one choice, which can be also considered as a risk of lowering their chance to receive the incentive.

Although the incentive policy has a targeted program view, the question of who do use the incentive is required to answer. The interviews with parents in the study pointed out that

the method of household income determination did not work well especially in the first two years. Some of the occupational groups such as self-employed business workers or owners do not have any standard income interval. Thus, the interview results and public discourse at this point indicated that some misuse of the incentive may have occurred. In addition, TEDMEM 2017 Educational Monitoring Report states the problems related to the application process specifically concerning household income statement and determination method (TEDMEM, 2018). Although it is impossible to know about the existence or the number of such examples; it refers to an accountability issue since the incentive policy is a publicly funded policy.

Private schools must fulfill the required data entry such as tuition fee amounts to the follow-up e-system since the school year 2015-2016. In addition, concerning whether the rate of increase in tuition fees for private schools is determined according to annual inflation, the MoNE has started to monitor it by an electronic follow-up system since April 2017. The system is used to monitor the tuition amount raises. The Head Office monitors the tuition fees of private schools via this e-system, audits by the Ministry inspectors, and parents' complaints. Furthermore, the Ministry also passed the item providing that parents must make their payments to the bank accounts of private school to prevent injustice treatments. On the contrary, these arrangements were initiated in the third year of the EIP; that may imply that the items were not well-established in the policy formulation process.

**Segregation.** The differentiation of parent profile in private and public school appears as another controversial issue in the context of social class segregation. In the current study, the school administrators described their family profile as high- and upper middle-income families, middle level of education, and occupations groups of civil servants and self-employed. The study of Parry (1996 cited in Witte, 2009) supports the finding that children of families with high socio-economic level usually attend private schools. PISA 2009 results show that students having higher socio-economic status attend private schools in most of the

countries (OECD, 2011). In addition, interview results pointed out that middle-income families were encouraged to send their children to private schools, if children had some partial scholarship as well. Further, in terms of beneficiary profile, there were some critics by the participants related to the families who could already afford private education received the incentive. Similarly, the data for Chilean case shows that high socioeconomic group of families attend private or private subsidized schools (Adamson et al., 2016). Opponents of voucher programs assert that it cause social class segregation since economically well-off use vouchers (Arenas, 2004; Gauri & Vawda, 2003; Patrinos et al., 2009). Similarly, PISA 2015 results reveal that the more low-achieving and low socioeconomic group of students gather in the same school the less they succeed in the exams (OECD, 2016). Therefore, average socioeconomic level of schools has a decisive role on student performance on test scores. The EIP, at this point, might function as a factor that unwittingly increases the social class segregation between private and public school students (TEDMEM, 2015).

The statistical findings of the study regarding the beneficiary profile, revealed that, especially in the last two years, lower middle-income students also had the opportunity to attend private schools. However, if similar socio-economic level families choose schools with similar features, this might cause social segregation, which leads to social inequality (Aydagül, 2013). Mayer et al. (2002), however, point out that voucher-like schemes can have impact on reducing socioeconomic segregation by diminishing household income gap between families and obligation residential location-based school choice.

Parry (1996 cited in Witte, 2009) argued that private schools were much likely to use criteria of national exam scores or average grade points for student admissions, while public schools include more disadvantaged groups of children. The EIP case in Turkey advocates that the government supported high-achieved private school students to stay in private education or encouraged high-achieved students public school students to attend in private

schools. Opponents of voucher programs also support this argument that private schools' selective admissions might cause school stratification and academic segregation (Arenas, 2004). PISA 2015 results, however, showed that after accounting for students' socio-economic status, on average across OECD countries, students enrolled in public schools scored higher than students in private schools (OECD, 2017). The report also revealed that the students in public schools were interpreted as a large group of disadvantaged students. In terms of the concerns related to social segregation between public and private schools, this finding is a contrary in the context of students' learning outcomes.



## Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to describe, explore, and evaluate the education incentive policy (EIP) introduced by the MoNE in Turkey by the 2014-2015 school year to widen the share of private education in total. The government used several economic rationales to legitimize private education expansion, which were efficient use of resources, equity, and quality. Following a decade having political debates on the policy, the government passed the EIP as an education mechanism aimed at increasing the share of private education in total, widening access to private education using targeted incentive for students attending private schools, and increasing education quality by reducing class-size and competition.

Private schools and students who would like to benefit from the incentive have to apply for the education incentive. The application process proceeds in three phases: (1) application by private schools and students through online systems, (2) school choice by the selected applicants, and (3) placements. Beneficiary students also must complete the enrollment and school transfer processes to be deemed eligible. Further, the eligibility criteria for applicant pool compose of; household income, academic and social achievements, siblings attending school, parental vitality and marital status, and special conditions such as being children of martyr, veteran, and disabled parents. Based on the eligibility criteria, it is possible to claim that the incentive policy primarily targets low-income students based on disadvantaged family background, particularly, children of low-to-moderate income families.

Regarding the countrywide beneficiary student profile in four years, the results for the majority as follows:

- More than half of them are high-achieving,
- Children of low-to-moderate income families (especially in the last two years),
- The percentage of the beneficiaries having maximum 2 siblings attending are 95% (in the first-two years) and 85% (in the last two years),

- For the criteria of parental vitality status, the percentage of ‘alive and together’ status is 90% in the first two years, around 65% in the last two years.
- For special conditions, the beneficiary students being children of martyr, veteran and disabled are extremely limited, but increase in years.

The statistical data for the general beneficiary profile at the country level and the interviews with the policy practitioners in Çanakkale showed that the beneficiary families, particularly in the first two years of policy implementation (2014-2015 and 2015-2016), included well-off families who applied for the incentive and were already able to afford private education expenditures for their children. On the other hand, in the last-two years (2016-2017 and 2017-2018), the eligibility criteria were improved in the direction of selecting children of lower socioeconomic groups including being child of martyr, veteran, and disabled parents. For instance, all the beneficiary students were coming from the lowest household income interval (i.e. below 5 thousand Turkish Liras), which was expanded in the 2016-2017 school year.

The transformation process of basic high schools takes a significant place in the implementation of EIP. The reason is that, the recipient cap and the number of beneficiaries at these schools held most of the upper secondary level, particularly in the last two years. Therefore, the government spends a significant amount of money for the transformation process of basic high schools. In addition, the beneficiary basic high schools contribute significantly to the goal of the government to increase the share of private schools and students in private education. However, the interview findings and national think-tank reports point out that the function of these schools is still mostly based on preparing students for national high-stake tests.

The parents’ views in the study revealed that their rationales to send their children to private school based on school facilities, school climate, education quality, and finance. The

most frequently mentioned rationales in the interviews with the parents in Çanakkale are: Family school cooperation and safety for school climate, physical facilities of and social activities in schools, better foreign language education, low class-size, academic achievement, and full-day schooling facilities. On the other hand, all the practitioners emphasized that the incentive did not affect their decision to send their children to private schools; however, they found the incentive amount worthwhile, since the expenses are costly in private education.

It is evident that the EIP implementation in Turkey attracted attention to private schools in providing education service. A perception of that education is a consumable service, has risen after the introduction of the education incentive implementation. The government and the practitioners had their own benefits and they attributed different values on the incentive. Financial facilitating for parents, recruitment and societal legitimacy for private schools, and equity, and quality for the government were the dominant values for the policy actors. Further, low- and lower-middle income families' access to private education had also contributed to this perception shift since private education started to become normalized in the eyes of society.

## **Recommendations**

*For policy makers,*

- Household income determination method should be revised so as to prevent unfair statements for the household income given by the applicants.
- Following the completion of transformation process of basic high schools into private schools, the MoNE can allocate the EIP budget for a fewer number of disadvantaged student groups by allocating the full-tuition amount for their education.
- The MoNE might develop a portal for the detailed information related to the beneficiary private schools. Through this portal, important data for school choice (e.g. recipient cap, number of beneficiary students at grade levels in the previous

year) can be shared with the public. Thus, parents can make healthier decisions for the school choice before their visits to the schools.

- To monitor and improve the beneficiary satisfaction, parent and student surveys can be used to gather data related to their satisfaction level and reasons for their satisfaction.
- Beneficiary parents should be monitored, particularly continued along the educational level period to examine the impacts of the EIP on indicators such as standardized test scores, repetition rate, and years of schooling.
- Methods and innovative strategies for foreign language learning and acquisition applied in beneficiary private schools might be examined and shared for and with public schools.

*For policy analysts and researchers,*

- Performance and satisfaction of the beneficiary students particularly transferred from public schools to private schools can be examined in detail.
- To examine the rationales for the dropouts of the education incentive system, qualitative studies can be conducted with the students who left private schools.
- Studies regarding to the preferences of the beneficiary students and families for the school choice can be conducted in different contexts or with larger groups.



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<http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.1739.pdf>
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## Appendices


### Appendix A. Approval for the use of the data obtained from OOKGM


 T.C.  
 ÇANAKKALE ONSEKİZ MART ÜNİVERSİTESİ REKTÖRLÜĞÜ  
 ÖĞRENCİ İŞLERİ DAİRE BAŞKANLIĞI

Sayı : 93130991-044-E.51165 25.04.2017  
 Konu : Halime ÖZTÜRK

**EĞİTİM BİLİMLERİ ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRLÜĞÜNE**

Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Özel Öğretim Kurumları Genel Müdürlüğü'nün 18.04.2017 tarihli ve 36077160-405.99-E.5282070 sayılı yazısı ekte gönderilmektedir.  
 Gereğini bilgilerinize arz ederim.

 e-imzalıdır  
**Sami YILMAZ**  
 Genel Sekreter

Ek :  
 1 - Yazı (1 sayfa)  
 2 - CD

Not: 5070 sayılı elektronik imza kanunu gereği bu belge elektronik imza ile imzalanmıştır.

Terzioğlu Yerleşkesi Rektörlük Binası B Blok Zemin Kat  
 2862180018 Bilgi için:Ebru PEKÇETİN  
 Memur





T.C.  
 ÇANAKKALE ONSEKİZ MART ÜNİVERSİTESİ  
 ÖĞRENCİ İŞLERİ DAİRE BAŞKANLIĞI

Sayı : 93130991/044-2817 16597

21 Aralık 2015

Konu : Anket Çalışması (Halime ÖZTÜRK)

**EĞİTİM BİLİMLERİ ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRLÜĞÜNE**

**İLGİ** : 18.11.2015 tarih ve 33813216.044-1639 sayılı yazınız.

Enstitünüz Eğitim Bilimleri Anabilim Dalı Eğitim Yönetimi ve Denetimi Bilim Dalı Doktora öğrencisi Halime ÖZTÜRK'ün, "**Eğitim Politikalarının Analizi İçin Bir Çerçeve Geliştirilmesi ve Uygulama Örneği**" başlıklı tez çalışması ile ilgili Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Özel Öğretim Kurumları Genel Müdürlüğünün 07.12.2015 tarih ve 93778809-405.99-E.12587572 sayılı yazısı yazımız ekinde gönderilmektedir.

Gereğini bilgilerinize arz ederim.

**Samir YILMAZ**  
 Genel Sekreter

**EK :**  
 -Yazı (1 sayfa)



**T.C.**  
**MİLLÎ EĞİTİM BAKANLIĞI**  
**Özel Öğretim Kurumları Genel Müdürlüğü**

Sayı : 36077160-405.99-E.5282070  
Konu : Anket Çalışması (Halime ÖZTÜRK)

18.04.2017

**ÇANAKKALE ONSEKİZ MART ÜNİVERSİTESİNE**  
**(Öğrenci İşleri Daire Başkanlığı)**

İlgi : 31/03/2017 tarihli ve 93130991-044-E.40753 sayılı yazımız.

Üniversiteniz Eğitim Bilimleri Enstitüsü Eğitim Bilimleri Anabilim Dalı Eğitim Yönetimi ve Denetimi Bilim Dalı Doktora öğrencisi Halime ÖZTÜRK'ün, "Eğitim Politikalarının Analizi İçin Bir Çerçeve Geliştirilmesi ve Uygulama Örneği" başlıklı tez çalışması kapsamında özel okullara destek amacıyla başlatılan eğitim ve öğretim desteği uygulamasının bir politika olarak analiz edileceği ve etki-fayda maliyet analizlerinin yapılabilmesi için; başvuran, destek alan okul ve öğrencilere ilişkin 2016-2017 öğretim yılına ait istatistiksel verilerin talebine ilişkin ilgi yazı ve ekleri incelenmiştir.

Söz konusu tez çalışmasının yapılması için talep edilen, 2016-2017 öğretim yılında Eğitim ve Öğretim desteğine başvuran ve destekten faydalanan öğrencilere ait istatistiksel veriler CD ortamında hazırlanarak ekte gönderilmiştir.

Bilgilerinizi ve gereğini arz ederim.

Mehmet BARAN  
Bakan a.  
Daire Başkanı

Ek: 1 adet CD.

Güvenli Elektronik İmza  
Aslı ile Aynıdır.  
*B. 104.12012*

MEB Beşevler Kampüsü E Blok Beşevler/ANKARA  
Elektronik Ağ: <http://oogkm.meb.gov.tr>

Ayrıntılı bilgi için: E. ÇEVİK Şef  
Tel: (0 312) 4132504  
Faks: (0 312) 2239926



T.C.  
MILLÎ EĞİTİM BAKANLIĞI  
Özel Öğretim Kurumları Genel Müdürlüğü

Sayı : 93778809-405.99-E.12587572  
Konu: Anket Çalışması (Halime ÖZTÜRK)

07.12.2015

ÇANAKKALE ONSEKİZ MART ÜNİVERSİTESİNE  
(Öğrenci İşleri Daire Başkanlığı)

- İlgi :** a) Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart Üniversitesi Öğrenci İşleri Daire Başkanlığının 23/11/2015 tarihli ve 93130991/044-2675/15217 sayılı yazısı,  
b) MEB Strateji Geliştirme Başkanlığının 30/11/2015 tarihli ve 12301703 sayılı yazısı.

Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart Üniversitesi Eğitim Bilimleri Enstitüsü Eğitim Bilimleri Anabilim Dalı Eğitim Yönetimi ve Denetimi Bilim Dalı Doktora öğrencisi Halime ÖZTÜRK'ün, "Eğitim Politikalarının Analizi İçin Bir Çerçeve Geliştirilmesi ve Uygulama Örneği" başlıklı tez çalışması kapsamında özel okullara destek amacıyla başlatılan eğitim ve öğretim desteği uygulamasının bir politika olarak analiz edileceği ve etki-fayda maliyet analizlerinin yapılabilmesi için; başvuran, destek alan okul ve öğrencilere ilişkin 2014-2015 ve 2015-2016 öğretim yıllarına ait istatistiksel verilerin talebine ilişkin ilgi (a) ve (b) yazı ve ekleri incelenmiştir.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası, Millî Eğitim Temel Kanunu ile Türk Millî Eğitiminin genel amaçlarına uygun olarak, ilgili yasal düzenlemelerde belirtilen ilke, esas ve amaçlara aykırılık teşkil etmeyecek şekilde, söz konusu tez çalışmasının yapılması Genel Müdürlüğümüzce uygun görülmüştür.

Bilgilerinizi ve gereğini rica ederim.

Ömer Faruk YELKENCİ  
Bakan a.  
Genel Müdür V.


Bilgi:  
MEB Strateji Geliştirme Başkanlığı

Güvenli Elektronik İmza  
Aslı ile Aynıdır.  
08.12.2015

MEB Beşevler Kampüsü E Blok Beşevler/ANKARA  
Elektronik Ağ: <http://ookgm.meb.gov.tr>

Ayrıntılı bilgi için: ElifÇEVİK Şef  
Tel: (0 312) 4132504  
Faks: (0 312) 2239926

## Appendix B. Approval for the Interviews in Çanakkale by the Provincial Directorate



**T.C.  
ÇANAKKALE VALİLİĞİ  
İl Millî Eğitim Müdürlüğü**

Sayı : 60305806-44-E.5172331  
Konu: Halime ÖZTÜRK

14.04.2017

**MİLLÎ EĞİTİM MÜDÜRLÜĞÜNE  
ÇANAKKALE**

İlgi : Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart Üniversitesi Öğrenci İşleri Daire Başkanlığının 10/04/2017 tarihli ve 45084 sayılı yazısı.

Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart Üniversitesi Eğitim Bilimleri Enstitüsü Eğitim Bilimleri Anabilim Dalı Eğitim Yönetimi ve Denetimi Bilim Dalı doktora öğrencisi Halime ÖZTÜRK tarafından "Eğitim Politikalarının Analizi İçin Bir Çerçeve Geliştirilmesi ve Uygulama Örneği" başlıklı tez çalışması için Merkez ilçedeki özel anaokulu, özel ilkokul, özel ortaokul, özel liselerde görev yapan yöneticiler ve öğrenim gören öğrencilerin velilerine yönelik görüşme yapılması isteği ilgi yazı ile teklif edilmektedir.

Söz konusu tez çalışması Müdürlüğümüz Anket-Araştırma İnceleme Komisyonunca incelenerek uygun görülmüştür.

Makamlarınızca da uygun görülmesi halinde olurlarınıza arz ederim.

Erdal DOĞANCI  
Müdür Yardımcısı

OLUR  
14.04.2017

Murat BÜYÜK  
Millî Eğitim Müdürü V.

Gözetim Kurulu İmza  
14.04.2017  
Leyla GÜLEÇ  
Şef

Çanakkale İl Millî Eğitim Müdürlüğü Valilik Binası 3. Kat  
Strateji Geliştirme Bölümü Merkez/ÇANAKKALE  
e-posta: istatistik17@meb.gov.tr

Ayrıntılı bilgi için: Özlem Emine AYDIN V.H.K.İ.  
Tel: (0 286) 217 11 35- 117  
Fax: (0 286) 217 29 72

Bu evrak güvenli elektronik imza ile imzalanmıştır. <http://evraksorgu.meb.gov.tr> adresinden 5462-d24a-3783-9132-b719 kodu ile teyit edilebilir.

20 Nisan 2017 = 14267



T.C.  
ÇANAKKALE VALİLİĞİ  
İl Millî Eğitim Müdürlüğü

17.04.2017

Sayı : 60305806-44-E.5218679  
Konu: Halime ÖZTÜRK

ÇANAKKALE ONSEKİZ MART ÜNİVERSİTESİ REKTÖRLÜĞÜNE  
(Öğrenci İşleri Daire Başkanlığı)

İlgi : a) 10/04/2017 tarihli ve 45084 sayılı yazınız.  
b) 14/04/2017 tarihli ve 5172331 sayılı Makam Onayı.

Üniversiteniz tarafından Müdürlüğümüz okullarında uygulanmak üzere ilgi (a) yazı ile gönderilen tez çalışmasına istinaden alınan ilgi (b) Makam Onayı ekte gönderilmiştir.  
Bilgilerinize arz ederim.

Murat BÜYÜK  
Millî Eğitim Müdürü V.

Ek:

- 1-Makam Onayı (01 Adet)
- 2-Komisyon Raporu (01 Adet)
- 3-Mühürlü Çalışma Formları (01 Adet 05 Sayfa)

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Folu H  
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Çanakkale İl Millî Eğitim Müdürlüğü Valilik Binası 3. Kat  
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## Appendix C. Interview Consent Form

### Katılım Onay Formu

Eğitim Politikalarının Analizi için Bir Çerçeve Geliştirilmesi ve Uygulama Örneği

*Araştırmacı:* Arş. Gör. Halime ÖZTÜRK

*Danışman:* Doç. Dr. Osman ÇEKİÇ

Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart Üniversitesi

Eğitim Fakültesi, Eğitim Yönetimi ve Denetimi Anabilim Dalı

**Görüşmenin Amacı:** Bu görüşme, Eğitim Yönetimi ve Denetimi doktora programı kapsamında yürüttüğüm “*Eğitim Politikalarının Analizi için Bir Çerçeve Geliştirilmesi ve Uygulama Örneği*” başlıklı doktora tezimde kullanılacak verilerin toplanması amacıyla yapılmaktadır. Elde edilen bulgular ve araştırma sonuçlarının, Türkiye’de uygulanan “*eğitim-öğretime destek*” politika uygulamasının analiz edilmesi ve eğitim politikalarının analizi konusunda bir çerçeve geliştirilmesine katkı sağlaması hedeflenmektedir.

**Prosedür:** Görüşmeci olmayı kabul ettiğiniz takdirde sizinle yukarıda belirtilen araştırma konusu ile sınırlı kalmak koşuluyla, belirleyeceğimiz bir yer ve zamanda yaklaşık 45-50 dakika sürecek bir mülakat yapılacaktır. Mülakat esnasında veri kayıplarını önlemek için sizin de onayınızla kaydı ses kaydı yapılacak olup kayıtlar yalnızca görüşmenin deşifresi amacıyla kullanılacaktır. Görüşmenin kayıt edilmesini istemezseniz bunu mülakata başlamadan ya da mülakatın herhangi bir anında belirtebilirsiniz. Bu durumda araştırmacı görüşmeye yazılı not tutarak devam edebilir. Eğer mülakata devam etmek istemezseniz bunu istediğiniz zaman belirtip, görüşmeyi yarıda bırakabilirsiniz.

Araştırma için sizinle yalnızca bir görüşme yapılması planlanmıştır. Ancak takip eden aşamalarda konuyla ilgili olarak tarafınızla tekrar görüşme ihtiyacı ortaya çıkabilir. Bu durumda araştırmacı sizinle telefon ya da e-posta yoluyla irtibat kurarak randevu talep edebilecek ya da yazılı olarak tekrar görüşlerinize başvurabilecektir.

**Araştırmanın Sizin için Yararları:** Araştırmaya katılmanın size doğrudan kazandıracağı maddi bir getiri olmayacaktır. Bununla birlikte eğitim politikası oluşturma sürecinin bir paydaşı olarak katılımınız, ülkemiz eğitim politikalarının oluşturulması, analizi ve değerlendirilmesinde kullanılacak bilimsel çalışmaların yetkinliği açısından önemlidir.

**Araştırmanın Sizin İçin Riskleri:** Araştırmanın günlük yaşamınız ve çalışma alanınız açısından getireceği bir risk bulunmamaktadır. Eğer araştırma sorularından bazıları ya da tamamına cevap vermek istemezseniz o soruyu atlayabilir ya da görüşmeyi istediğiniz anda yarıda bırakabilirsiniz. Görüşlerinizin gizliliği ile ilgili tedbirler araştırmacı tarafından alınmış olup aşağıdaki başlıkta detaylı şekilde açıklanmıştır.

**Gizlilik:** Görüşmeler katılımcının onayı alınarak kayıt altına alınacaktır. Görüşme kayıtları yazılı hale getirilene kadar kayıt cihazında veya elektronik formatta bilgisayarda sadece araştırmacının erişebileceği bir dosyada saklı tutulacaktır. Her görüşme numaralandırılacak ve görüşme yapılan katılımcıya kod isim verilecektir. Katılımcıların kişisel bilgilerini deşifre edebilecek bilgiler kesinlikle araştırma sonuçlarında kullanılmayacaktır. Araştırma verilerinin analizi sonrasında elde edilen sonuçlar, bu kod isimler kullanılarak akademik yayınlarda paylaşılacaktır.

**Katılım Maliyeti:** Araştırmaya katılımınızın görüşmeye ayıracağınız yaklaşık 45 dakikalık zaman dilimi dışında size bir maliyeti olmayacaktır.

**Tazmin:** Bu araştırmaya katılımınızdan dolayı size herhangi bir ücret ödenmeyecektir.

**Gönüllü Katılım:** Araştırmaya katılım tamamen gönüllülük esasına dayanmaktadır. Araştırmaya katılmayı kabul etmiş olsanız bile, istediğiniz zaman herhangi bir yaptırım olmaksızın çalışmadan çekilebilirsiniz.

**İletişim Bilgileri:** Konu ve araştırma ile ilgili herhangi bir sorunuz olursa veya daha fazla bilgi almak isterseniz aşağıdaki iletişim bilgilerinden yararlanabilirsiniz:

Arş. Gör. Halime Öztürk  
Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart Üniversitesi  
Eğitim Fakültesi, Eğitim Bilimleri Bölümü  
Anafartalar Yerleşkesi E Blok E4-436, 17100 Çanakkale, Türkiye  
Tel : +90 (286) 217 1303/ 3557  
E-mail : ozturkhalime@gmail.com

#### **Katılım Onay Formu**

Bu onay belgesini okudum ve araştırma ile ilgili bilgi aldım. Araştırma ile ilgili sormak istediklerimi sordum ve araştırmacı tarafından sorularıma cevap aldım. Bahsi geçen araştırmaya gönüllü olarak katıldığımı bildiririm. Bu bilgilendirme belgesini imzaladıktan sonra bir kopyasını teslim aldım.

Katılımcı Adı Soyadı - İmza  
Tarih

Araştırmacı İmza  
Tarih

## Appendix D. Interview Protocol for Governmental Actors

**Görüşme Konusu:** Eğitim Öğretime Destek Politika Uygulamasının İşleyiş Sürecinin Analizi

**Görüşme Tarih ve Saati:**

**Yer:**

**Görüşmeyi yapan kişi:**

**Görüşme yapılan kişi:**

**Görüşme yapılan kişinin konumu:**

**Araştırmanın kısaca tanıtımı:** Bu çalışma, eğitim-öğretime destek politika uygulamasının işleyiş sürecini analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır.

**Görüşme soruları:**

1. Kendinizi tanıtır mısınız?  
(Cinsiyet, yaş, kıdem, eğitim durumu, görev ve görev süresi, vb.)
2. *Eğitim-öğretime destek* politika uygulamasının ortaya çıkış neden(ler)i nelerdir?
3. Politikanın oluşturulma sürecinde kim(ler), hangi kuruluşlar rol oynamıştır?
  - *Eğitim-öğretime destek* politika uygulamasının gündeme alınmasında ve hazırlık sürecinde etkili olan kişi ve kuruluşlar hangileridir?
  - Bu uygulamanın oluşturulmasında kimlerden yardım alınmıştır?
  - Politikanın oluşturulma süreci ile ilgili yapılan toplantılarla ilgili ulaşılabilir dokümanlar (rapor, tutanak, vs.) var mıdır?
4. *Eğitim-öğretime destek* politika uygulamasının hazırlık sürecinde örnek alınan uluslararası uygulamalar var mıdır? Varsa nelerdir?
5. Başvuru sürecinde izlenecek yol nasıl belirlenmiştir?
  - Teşvik verilecek okul ve öğrencilerin belirlenmesindeki değerlendirme kriterleri nasıl oluşturulmuştur?
6. Herhangi bir pilot uygulama yapıldı mı?
7. Denetleme ve izleme nasıl gerçekleştirilmektedir?
  - Başvuru sürecindeki kriterlere uygunluk nasıl denetlenmektedir?
  - Teşvik alanların izleme süreçleri nasıl yapılmaktadır?
  - Karşılaşılan sorunlar nelerdir?
8. Geri besleme mekanizması nasıl işlemektedir?
  - Uygulama sürecine ilişkin şikayet ve/veya geri bildirimler nasıl alınıyor? Nasıl değerlendiriliyor ve yararlanılıyor?
  - Kriterlerdeki değişiklikler neye göre yapılmıştır?



9. *Eđitim-öđretime destek* politika uygulamasının sonuçları ve etkileri nelerdir?
10. Uygulamada yaşadığınız zorluklar neler?
11. Özel öđretim kurumlarına ilişkin yaşadığınız sorunlar nelerdir?
- Başvuru süreci ile ilgili yaşanan sorunlar nelerdir?
  - Tercih süreci ile ilgili yaşanan sorunlar nelerdir?
  - Kayıt süreci ile ilgili yaşanan sorunlar nelerdir?
  - Nakil işlemleri ile ilgili yaşanan sorunlar nelerdir?
12. *Eđitim-öđretime destek* politika uygulamasının nasıl devam etmesi öngörülmektedir?



## Appendix E. Interview Protocol for Private School Administrators

**Görüşme Konusu:** *Eğitim ve Öğretim Desteği Politikasının İşleyiş Süreci*

**Görüşme Tarih ve Saati:**

**Araştırmanın konusu:** Bu çalışma, özel okullara verilen eğitim-öğretime destek uygulaması kapsamında bu uygulamanın işleyiş sürecin incelemeyi ve uygulamada karşılaşılan sorunları ve öneriler belirlemeyi amaçlamaktadır.

1. Kendinizi tanıtır mısınız?
2. Eğitim-öğretim desteği sizce özel okula giden öğrenci sayısını nasıl etkiledi?
  - a. Yıllara göre kaç başvuru yapıldı?
  - b. Yıllara göre kaç kişi yararlandı?
3. Okulunuz hakkında genel bir bilgi verebilir misiniz? (Kademeler, öğrenci-öğretmen sayıları, İmkanlar (fiziksel, sosyal), hedefler)
4. Velilerinizin okulunuzu tercih etme nedenleri nelerdir?
  - a. Destekten yararlanan aile profili ile ilgili bilgi verebilir misiniz? (Gelir, eğitim, sosyal durum, vb.)
5. Eğitim öğretime destekte öğrencilerin belirlenmesindeki değerlendirme kriterleri hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?
6. Eğitim-öğretime destek ile verilen miktar öğrencilerin harcamalarını ne ölçüde karşılıyor?
  - a. Okulunuzun yıllık ücreti nedir?
  - b. Velilerin öğrenciler için yapmaları gereken ekstra harcamalar var mıdır? Varsa nelerdir?
7. Eğitim-öğretim desteği uygulamasının işleyiş sürecini nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?
  - a. Yaşadığınız sorunlar var mı? Varsa nelerdir?
8. Destek sürecindeki, başvuru, tercih, kayıt, nakil işlemleri ile ilgili süreci nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?
  - a. Yaşadığınız sorunlar var mı? Varsa nelerdir?
9. Eğitim-öğretim desteği uygulamasının uzun vadeli etkilerini düşündüğünüzde, özel okullar sizce nasıl etkilenir?
  - a. Çanakale için durumu nasıl öngörüyorsunuz?

## Appendix F. Interview Protocol for Parents

**Görüşme Konusu:** *Eğitim ve Öğretim Desteği Politikasının İşleyiş Süreci*

**Görüşme Tarih ve Saati:**

**Görüşme Soruları:**

Kendinizi tanıtır mısınız? (Yaş, eğitim durumu, meslek, çocuk sayısı, vb.)

1. Destekten yararlanıyor musunuz?
  - a. Destek alan/ Destek için başvurduğunuz çocuğunuz hangi kademedede / kaçınıcı sınıfta eğitim alıyor?
  - b. Eğitim-öğretim desteği uygulamasından nasıl haberiniz oldu?
  - c. Başvuru süreciniz nasıl gerçekleşti?
2. Çocuğunuzu özel okula göndermeyi tercih etme nedenleriniz nelerdir?
  - a. Eğitim-öğretim desteği okul tercih sürecinde nelere dikkat ettiniz?
  - b. Tercih sürecinde yaşadığınız olumlu/olumsuz deneyimler nelerdir?
3. Eğitim-öğretim desteği ile ilgili memnuniyet durumunuz nedir?
  - a. Eğitim-öğretime destek ile verilen miktar öğrencilerin harcamalarını sizce ne ölçüde karşılıyor?
  - b. Çocuğunuzun özel okuldaki eğitimi için harcadığınız aylık ve yıllık masrafınız hangi aralıkta değişmektedir?
  - c. Aylık ve yıllık ekstra harcama kalemleriniz nelerdir?
 

Aylık Harcanan Miktar için

a) 0-500 TL      b) 501-1250 TL      c) 1251-1750 TL      d) 1751-2500 TL

e) 2501 TL ve üzeri

Yıllık Harcanan Miktar için

a) 0-5000 TL      b) 5001-10,000 TL      c) 10,001-15,000 TL

d) 15,001-20,000 TL e) 20,001 TL ve üzeri
4. Çocuğunuz daha önce devlet okulunda öğrenim gördü ise, özel okula başladığında yaptığınız harcamalar nasıl değişti?
5. Eğitim-öğretim desteğinde uygulanan değerlendirme ölçütleri hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?
  - a. Kriterler hakkında bilginiz var mı?
  - b. Bu kriterler sizce ne kadar belirleyici? Yeterli mi?
  - c. Sizce başka hangi kriterler eklenebilir ya da hangileri çıkarılabilir/değiştirilebilir?

## Appendix G. Related Parts of Private Education Institutions Law No. 5580

### MALİ HÜKÜMLER

MADDE 12 – Kurumlar, faaliyetlerini sadece kazanç sağlamak için düzenleyemezler. Ancak, Türk Millî Eğitiminin amaçları doğrultusunda eğitimin kalitesini yükseltmek, gelişmelerine fırsat ve imkân verecek yatırımlar ve hizmetler yapmak üzere gelir sağlayabilirler.

Okulların su, doğal gaz ve elektrik ücretlendirilmesi, resmî okullara uygulanan tarife üzerinden uygulanır.

**(Ek fıkra: 4/7/2012-6353/42 md.)** Bu Kanun kapsamında organize sanayi bölgelerinde açılan mesleki ve teknik eğitim okullarında öğrenim gören her bir öğrenci için, 2012-2013 eğitim ve öğretim yılından başlamak üzere, resmî okullarda öğrenim gören bir öğrencinin okul türüne göre Devlete maliyetinin bir buçuk katını geçmemek üzere, her eğitim öğretim yılı itibarıyla Maliye Bakanlığı ile Bakanlık tarafından müştereken belirlenen tutarda, Bakanlık bütçesine bu amaçla konulan ödenekten eğitim ve öğretim desteği yapılabilir.

**(Ek fıkra: 4/7/2012-6353/42 md.)** Cumhurbaşkanı kararıyla, bu Kanun kapsamında organize sanayi bölgeleri dışında açılan mesleki ve teknik eğitim okullarında öğrenim gören öğrenciler için de altıncı fıkradaki usul ve esaslar çerçevesinde eğitim ve öğretim desteği yapılabilir.<sup>(1)</sup>

### EK MADDE 1 – (Ek: 1/3/2014-6528/12 md.)

(İptal birinci fıkra: Anayasa Mahkemesinin 13/7/2015 tarihli ve E.: 2014/88, K.: 2015/68 sayılı Kararı ile.)

Bu Kanun kapsamında örgün eğitim yapan özel ilkokul, özel ortaokul ve özel liselerde öğrenim gören Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşı öğrenciler için, resmî okullarda öğrenim gören bir öğrencinin okul türüne göre her kademedeki okulun öğrenim süresini aşmamak üzere, eğitim ve öğretim desteği verilebilir. Bu fıkra kapsamındaki eğitim ve öğretim desteğinden özel okul öncesi eğitim kurumlarından eğitim alanlar da, 48-66 ay arasında olmak şartıyla en fazla bir eğitim-öğretim yılı süresince yararlandırılabilir.

Eğitim ve öğretim desteği, Bakanlıkça eğitim kademelerine göre her bir derslik için belirlenen asgari öğrenci sayısının üzerinde ve her hâlükârda derslik başına belirlenen azami öğrenci sayısını geçmemek üzere verilebilir. Eğitim ve öğretim desteği verilecek toplam öğrenci sayısı her yıl Maliye Bakanlığı ve Bakanlıkça müştereken belirlenir.

Eğitim ve öğretim desteği; yörenin kalkınmada öncelik derecesi ve gelişmişlik durumu, öğrencinin ailesinin gelir düzeyi, eğitim bölgesinin öğrenci sayısı, desteklenen öğrenci ve öğrencinin gideceği okulun başarı seviyeleri ile öncelikli öğrenciler gibi ölçütler ayrı ayrı veya birlikte dikkate alınarak verilebilir.

Söz konusu eğitim öğretim hizmetini sunan veya yararlananların, gerçek dışı beyanda bulunmak suretiyle fazladan ödemeye sebebiyet vermeleri durumunda bu tutarların, ödemenin yapıldığı tarihten itibaren 6183 sayılı Kanunun 51 inci maddesine göre hesaplanacak gecikme zammı ile birlikte bir ay içinde ödenmesi, yapılacak tebligatla sebebiyet verenlerden istenir. Bu süre içinde ödenmemesi hâlinde bu tutarlar, anılan Kanun hükümlerine göre Maliye Bakanlığına bağlı vergi daireleri tarafından takip ve tahsil edilir. Bu fiillerin tekrarı hâlinde, ayrıca kurum açma izinleri iptal edilir.

Dönüşüm programı kapsamındaki kurumları, aynı amaç ve niteliklerinin korunması şartıyla devralanlar, bu madde hükümlerinden Bakanlığın izni ile yararlandırılabilir.

Dönüşüm sürecinin bitiminde dönüşme talebinde buldukları örgün eğitim kurumunun haiz olması gereken şartları karşılayamayanların kurum açma izinleri iptal edilerek faaliyetlerine son verilir. Bu durumdaki kurumlardan, teşvik uygulamaları kapsamında yararlandıkları eğitim ve öğretim desteği, istisna, muafiyet ve haklar ile diğer teşviklerin parasal tutarının, ilgili teşvikten yararlandırılma tarihinden itibaren 6183 sayılı Kanunun 51 inci maddesine göre hesaplanacak gecikme zammı ile birlikte bir ay içinde ödenmesi yapılacak tebligatla ilgililerden istenir. Bu süre içinde ödenmemesi hâlinde bu tutarlar anılan Kanun hükümlerine göre Maliye Bakanlığına bağlı vergi daireleri tarafından takip ve tahsil edilir.

Bu madde kapsamında Bakanlıkta istihdam edileceklerde aranacak şartlar, eğitim ve öğretim desteğinin verilmesine ilişkin ölçütler, desteğin verileceği eğitim kurumu türleri, eğitim kademeleri ve kurumlar itibarıyla verilecek destek tutarları, eğitim ve öğretim desteğinin kontrol ve denetimi ile bu maddenin uygulanmasına ilişkin diğer usul ve esaslar Maliye Bakanlığı ve Bakanlıkça müştereken hazırlanan yönetmelikle belirlenir.

## Appendix F. Official Statement for the EIP (2014-2015)

7  
Ağustos 2014 PERŞEMBE

Resmî Gazete

Sayı : 29081

### TEBLİĞ

MALİYE Bakanlığı ve Milli Eğitim Bakanlıđından:

2014-2015 EĐİTİM VE ÖĐRETİM YILINDA ÖZEL OKULLARDA ÖĐRENİM

GÖREN ÖĐRENCİLER İÇİN EĐİTİM VE ÖĐRETİM DESTEĐİ

VERİLMESİNE İLİŞKİN TEBLİĐ

Bilindiđi üzere, 8/2/2007 tarihli ve 5580 sayılı Özel Öđretim Kurumları Kanununun Ek 1 inci maddesinin ikinci,üçüncü, dördüncü, beşinci ve sekizinci fıkralarında;

“Bu Kanun kapsamında örgün eğitim yapan özel ilkokul, özel ortaokul ve özel liselerde öğrenim gören Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşı öğrenciler için, resmî okullarda öğrenim gören bir öğrencinin okul türüne göre her kademedede okulun öğrenim süresini aşmamak üzere, eğitim ve öğretim desteđi verilebilir. Bu fıkra kapsamındaki eğitim ve öğretim desteđinden özel okul öncesi eğitim kurumlarından eğitim alanlar da, 48-66 ay arasında olmak şartıyla en fazla bir eğitim-öđretim yılı süresince yararlandırılabilir.

Eđitim ve öğretim desteđi, Bakanlıkça eğitim kademelerine göre her bir derslik için belirlenen asgari öğrenci sayısının üzerinde ve her hâlıkârda derslik başına belirlenen azami öğrenci sayısını geçmemek üzere verilebilir. Eğitim ve öğretim desteđi verilecek toplam öğrenci sayısı her yıl Maliye Bakanlığı ve Bakanlıkça müştereken belirlenir.

Eđitim ve öğretim desteđi; yörenin kalkınmada öncelik derecesi ve gelişmişlik durumu, öğrencinin ailesinin gelir düzeyi, eğitim bölgesinin öğrenci sayısı, desteklenen öğrenci ve öğrencinin gideceđi okulun başarı seviyeleri ile öncelikli öğrenciler gibi ölçütler ayrı ayrı veya birlikte dikkate alınarak verilebilir.

Söz konusu eğitim öğretim hizmetini sunan veya yararlananların, gerçek dışı beyanda bulunmak suretiyle fazladan ödemeye sebebiyet vermeleri durumunda bu tutarların, ödemenin yapıldığı tarihten itibaren 6183 sayılı Kanunun 51 inci maddesine göre hesaplanacak gecikme zammı ile birlikte bir ay içinde ödenmesi, yapılacak tebligatla sebebiyet verenlerden istenir. Bu süre içinde ödenmemesi hâlinde bu tutarlar, anılan Kanun hükümlerine göre Maliye Bakanlığına bađlı vergi daireleri tarafından takip ve tahsil edilir. Bu fiillerin tekrarı hâlinde, ayrıca kurum açma izinleri iptal edilir.

Bu madde kapsamında Bakanlıkta istihdam edileceklerde aranacak şartlar, eğitim ve öğretim desteđinin verilmesine ilişkin ölçütler, desteđin verileceđi eğitim kurumu türleri, eğitim kademeleri ve kurumlar itibarıyla verilecek destek tutarları, eğitim ve öğretim desteđinin kontrol ve denetimi ile bu maddenin uygulanmasına ilişkin diđer usul ve esaslar Maliye Bakanlığı ve Bakanlıkça müştereken hazırlanan yönetmelikle belirlenir.”

hükümleri yer almaktadır.

Diđer taraftan 5580 sayılı Kanun hükümleri doğrultusunda; 23/10/2012 tarihli ve 28450 sayılı Resmî Gazete’de yayımlanan Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Özel Öđretim Kurumları Yönetmeliđinin Ek 2 nci maddesinin birinci fıkrasında“Kanunun Ek-1 inci maddesine göre her yıl Temmuz ayında Maliye Bakanlıđı ile müştereken hazırlanacak olan tebliđe illere göre belirlenen sayıdaki öğrenciler için Ek-10’da yer alan okul türleri ve gruplarına göre eğitim ve öğretim desteđi verilebilir. Tebliđe; her bir öğrenci için verilebilecek eğitim öğretim desteđi tutarı resmi okullarda öğrenim gören bir öğrencinin okul öncesi, ilkokul, ortaokul ve liselerde Devlete maliyetinin bir buçuk katını geçmemek üzere, bir önceki yılın verileri esas alınarak belirlenir.” hükmüne yer verilmiştir.

Bu kapsamda, eğitim ve öğretim desteği verilecek okul kademe ve türleri, destek tutarları, öğrenci sayısı ve bunlara ilişkin diğer hususlar aşağıda belirtilmiştir.

1 – 5580 sayılı Kanun kapsamında açılan özel okul öncesi, ilkokul, ortaokul ve ortaöğretim okul türlerinde öğrenim gören her bir öğrenciye verilecek eğitim ve öğretim desteği tutarları aşağıdaki Tablo-1’de yer almaktadır.

**Tablo-1: Eğitim Öğretim Desteği Verilen Okul Türleri, Destek Tutarları ve Öğrenci Sayıları**

.No	Okul Türü	Destek Tutarı (TL)	Destek Verilecek Öğrenci Sayısı
	Okul Öncesi Eğitim Kurumu	2.500	50.000
	İlkokul	3.000	50.000
	Ortaokul	3.500	75.000
	Lise	3.500	75.000
	Temel Lise	3.000	
<b>Toplam</b>			<b>250.000</b>

2 – 2014-2015 eğitim ve öğretim yılında yukarıdaki Tablo-1’de sayılan okul kademe ve türleri için toplam 250 bin öğrenciye eğitim ve öğretim desteği verilecektir.

3 – İllere göre eğitim ve öğretim desteği verilecek okul kademe ve türleri, öğrenci sayısı, öğrenci ve okul seçilmesine ilişkin ölçütler ile diğer ilgili hususlar Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı tarafından yayımlanacak kılavuzda belirtilecektir.

4 – Sosyo-ekonomik gelişmişlik seviyelerine göre eğitim ve öğretim desteği verilecek öğrencilerin illere dağıtımında aşağıdaki tabloda yer alan katsayılar kullanılacaktır.

**Tablo-2: Sosyo-Ekonomik Gelişmişlik Seviyeleri Katsayıları**

Sosyo-Ekonomik Gelişmişlik Seviyesi	Katsayı
1. Bölge	0,95
2. Bölge	0,95
3. Bölge	1,00
4. Bölge	1,00
5. Bölge	1,20
6. Bölge	1,30

5 – Okul öncesi eğitime devam eden öğrencilerden 48-66 ay yaş grubunda olanlar eğitim öğretim desteğinden yararlanabilir.

6 – İllere okul türlerine göre ayrılan öğrenci kontenjanından az talep gelmesi durumunda Millî Eğitim Bakanlığının boş kalan kontenjanları aynı okul türünden talebin fazla olduğu illerde kullanabilir.

7 – Eğitim öğretim desteği, Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı bütçesine bu amaçla konulan ödenekten karşılanır. Ödemeye ilişkin usulleri belirlemeye Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı yetkilidir.

8 – Bu Tebliğde yer almayan hususlarda düzenleme yapmaya ve uygulamada ortaya çıkabilecek tereddütleri gidermeye [MALİYE](#) Bakanlığı ve Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı yetkilidir.

9 – Maliye Bakanlığı ve Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı tarafından müştereken hazırlanan bu Tebliğ, 2014-2015 eğitim ve öğretim yılı için geçerli olmak üzere yayımı tarihinde yürürlüğe girer.

10 – Bu Tebliğ hükümleri Maliye Bakanı ve Millî Eğitim Bakanı tarafından yürütülür.

## Appendix H. Guide for the EIP application and placement process (2017-2018)

<b>İLETİŞİM</b> <b>Başvuru ve Yerleştirme İşlemleri İle İlgili</b>	
MEB ÖZEL ÖĞRETİM KURUMLARI GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ Öğrenci İşleri ve Sosyal Etkinlikler Daire Başkanlığı	
Telefon	: 0(312) 413 25 09- 413 34 22 - 413 25 04 - 413 25 10 - 413 34 38 - 413 34 51 Alo 147
Faks	: 0 (312) 223 99 26
İnternet Adresi	: <a href="http://ookgm.meb.gov.tr">http://ookgm.meb.gov.tr</a>
e- Posta	: <a href="mailto:ookgm@meb.gov.tr">ookgm@meb.gov.tr</a>

<b>2017-2018 ÖĞRETİM YILI EĞİTİM VE ÖĞRETİM DESTEĞİ BAŞVURU VE YERLEŞTİRME TAKVİMİ</b>	
<b>TARİH</b>	<b>YAPILACAK İŞLEM</b>
10 Ağustos 2017 - 06 Eylül 2017	Destekten Yararlanmak İsteyen Özel Okulların MEBBİS Üzerinden Başvuruları
10 Ağustos 2017 -06 Eylül 2017	Destekten Yararlanmak İsteyen Öğrencilerin e-Okul Üzerinden Başvuruları
07 Eylül 2017	Tercih İşlemi Yapabilecek Öğrencilerin İlanı
07 -14 Eylül 2017	Öğrencilerin Tercih İşlemleri
15 Eylül 2017	Yerleştirme Sonuçlarının İlanı
15-22 Eylül 2017	Nakil ve Kesin Kayıt İşlemleri
25 Eylül 2017	Ek Yerleştirme Sonuçlarının İlanı
25-29 Eylül 2017	Ek Yerleştirme Kayıt İşlemleri



## 1. GENEL AÇIKLAMALAR

- a) Bu e-Kılavuz 5580 sayılı Özel Öğretim Kurumları Kanununun Ek 1'inci maddesi ve Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı Özel Öğretim Kurumları Yönetmeliğinin Ek 2'nci maddesi hükümlerine göre hazırlanmıştır.
- b) 5580 sayılı Kanun kapsamında açılan özel okullara, 04/08/2017 tarih ve 30144 sayılı Resmî Gazete'de yayımlanan 2017-2018 Eğitim ve Öğretim Yılında Özel Okullarda Öğrenim Görecek Öğrenciler İçin Eğitim ve Öğretim Desteği Verilmesine İlişkin Tebliğ'de yer alan okul türlerine göre toplam 75.000 öğrenciye 2017-2018 eğitim öğretim yılında geçerli olmak üzere eğitim ve öğretim desteği verilecektir.
- c) Yönetmelik eki Eğitim ve Öğretim Desteği Verilecek Okul Türleri (Ek-10) aşağıdaki tabloda yer almaktadır.

### Eğitim ve Öğretim Desteği Verilecek Okul Türleri

Kurum Türü Adı
Özel Anadolu Güzel Sanatlar Lisesi
Özel Anadolu Lisesi
Özel Ermeni İlkokulu
Özel Ermeni Okul Öncesi Kurumu
Özel Ermeni Ortaokulu
Özel Ermeni Ortaöğretim Okulu
Özel Fen Lisesi
Özel Hazırlık Sınıfı Bulunan Anadolu Lisesi
Özel Hazırlık Sınıfı Bulunan Fen Lisesi
Özel Mesleki ve Teknik Anadolu Lisesi
Özel Musevi İlkokulu
Özel Musevi Okul Öncesi Kurumu
Özel Musevi Ortaokulu
Özel Musevi Ortaöğretim Kurumu
Özel Rum İlkokulu
Özel Rum Ortaokulu
Özel Rum Ortaöğretim Kurumu
Özel Süryani Okul Öncesi Kurumu
Özel Sosyal Bilimler Lisesi
Özel Spor Lisesi
Özel Temel Lise
Özel Türk İlkokulu
Özel Türk Okul Öncesi Kurumu
Özel Türk Ortaokulu
Özel Laboratuvar Lisesi
Özel Fen ve Teknoloji Lisesi

- ç) 5580 sayılı Kanun kapsamında açılan okul öncesi, ilkokul, ortaokul ve ortaöğretim okul türlerinde 2017-2018 eğitim öğretim yılında öğrenim görecek her bir öğrenciye verilecek eğitim ve öğretim desteği tutarları aşağıdaki tabloda yer almaktadır.

**Eđitim ve Öğretim Desteđi Verilecek Okul Türleri, Destek Tutarları ve Destek Verilecek Öğrenci Sayıları**

Sıra No	Kurum Türü Adı	Destek Tutarları	Destek Verilecek Öğrenci Sayıları
1	Okul Öncesi	3.060,00 TL	6.000
2	İlkokul	3.680,00 TL	15.000
3	Ortaokul	4.280,00 TL	15.000
4	Ortaöđretim	4.280,00 TL	15.000
5	Temel Lise	3.680,00 TL	24.000
<b>Toplam</b>			<b>75.000</b>

- d) Okul öncesi eğitim kurumlarında (anaokulu ve ana sınıfı) öğrenim görecek, yaşları 48-66 ay arasında olan öğrencilerin velileri/vasileri eğitim ve öğretim desteđi için kayıtlı buldukları resmi/özel okullardan e-Okuldaki Özel Kurumlar Eğitim ve Öğretim Desteđi Menüsü üzerinden başvuru yapabilecektir.
- e) Eğitim ve öğretim desteđinden yararlanmak isteyen ve herhangi bir okulda kaydı görünmeyen okul öncesi öğrencilerinin velileri/vasileri okul öncesi eğitim yapılan resmi/özel okullara kayıtlarını yaptırarak eğitim ve öğretim desteđi için e-Okuldaki Özel Kurumlar Eğitim ve Öğretim Desteđi Menüsü üzerinden başvuru yapabilecektir.
- f) İlkokul, ortaokul ve ortaöđretim okullarında öğrenim gören öğrencilerin velileri/vasileri, eğitim ve öğretim desteđi için e-Okul üzerinden, belirlenen tarihlerde öğrencinin kayıtlı bulunduğu resmi/özel okul müdürlüklerine başvurabilecektir.
- g) 8. sınıf öğrencileri, Temel Eğitimden Ortaöđretime Geçiş Sistemine göre yerleřtirme sonuçlarının ilanından önce kayıtlı buldukları okul müdürlüklerinden eğitim ve öğretim desteđi için başvurabilecektir. Bu öğrencilerden başvuru işlemini gerçekleřtirmeyenler, yerleřtirme sonuçlarının ilanından sonra kaydoldukları okul müdürlüğü üzerinden başvurularını yapabilecektir.
- ğ) İlkokul, ortaokul ve ortaöđretim okul türlerinde öğrenim gören öğrencilerden eğitim ve öğretim desteđi almaya hak kazananlar, okulun öğrenim süresi sonuna kadar bu destekten yararlanacaktır. Ancak bu öğrencilerden uzun süreli tedavi gördüğünü sağlık raporuyla belgelendirenler hariç olmak üzere, buldukları sınıfta sınıf tekrarı yapanlar eğitim ve öğretim desteđinden yararlanma hakkını kaybedecektir.
- h) Eğitim ve öğretim desteđi almaya hak kazanan öğrencilerin eğitim ve öğretim destek bedeli %35'i Kasım, %35'i Şubat ve %30'u Haziran aylarında olmak üzere öğrenim gördükleri okullarına ödenecektir.
- ı) Veliler/vasiler, okulla anlařtıkları yıllık öğretim ücretinin Bakanlıkça karşılanacak eğitim ve öğretim desteđinin dışında kalan bedelini ayrıca okula ödeyecektir. Bu nedenle veliler/vasiler, kayıt yaptıracakları okulların ücretleri ve diđer şartları hakkında bilgi edinip tercihlerini belirleyecektir.
- i) Eğitim ve öğretim desteđi almaya hak kazanan öğrencilerin Bakanlıkça eğitim ve öğretim desteđi verilen ve destek verilme şartlarını taşıyan farklı bir okula nakil olmaları halinde, öğrenciye nakil olduđu okulun türüne göre eğitim ve öğretim desteđi

ödemesine devam edilir. Bu durumdaki öğrenciler için yapılacak ödemeler, ödeme tarihlerinde e-Okulda oluşturulan liste üzerinden kayıtlı olduğu okuluna yapılır.

- j) Eğitim ve öğretim desteği almaya hak kazanan öğrencilerin velileri/vasileri kayıtlarını yaptırırken, Yönetmelik eki Eğitim ve Öğretim Desteği Verilebilecek Öğrencilerin Tespit Formu'nun (Ek-12) doldurulması esnasında sunulan belgelerin asıllarını özel okul müdürlüğüne teslim edecektir. Özel okul müdürlükleri bu belgeleri Devlet Arşiv Hizmetleri Hakkında Yönetmelik hükümlerine göre muhafaza edecektir.
- k) Başvuru alacak, resmi/özel okul müdürlüklerinin işlemleri usulüne uygun ve zamanında yapabilmeleri için il/ilçe millî eğitim müdürlükleri gerekli desteği sağlayacaktır. Eğitim öğretim hizmetini sunan ve eğitim ve öğretim desteğinden ilk defa yararlananlara ilişkin bilgi ve belgeler ocak ayına kadar il/ilçe millî eğitim müdürlüğüne görevlendirilen maarif müfettişi/şube müdürü veya uygun görülen başka personel tarafından incelenecektir. Gerçeğe aykırı bilgi ve belge sunanlar hakkında yasal işlem yapılacaktır.
- l) 2016-2017 öğretim yılında eğitim ve öğretim desteği devam eden ara sınıf öğrencileri 2017-2018 eğitim öğretim yılı için destek başvurusu yapmayacaktır.
- m) Eğitim ve öğretim desteği verilecek öğrencilerin tespitinde Eğitim ve Öğretim Desteği Verilebilecek Öğrencilerin Tespit Formu'nda (Ek-12) belirlenen toplam puanda eşitlik olması durumunda, öncelikle bir önceki yılın yılsonu başarı puanı yüksek olan, eşitliğin bozulmaması durumunda özürsüz devamsızlığı az olan öğrenci tercih edilecektir. Eşitliğin yine bozulmaması halinde ise yaşı küçük olan öğrenci tercih edilecektir.
- n) Eğitim ve öğretim desteğinden yararlanacak öğrenciler, e-Okulda oluşturulan Modül üzerinden tercihlerine uygun okula yerleştirilir. Eğitim ve öğretim desteği kapsamında destekten faydalanan öğrenciler, eylül ayı içerisinde başka bir okula nakil olmaları hâlinde eğitim ve öğretim desteği hakkını kaybederler.
- o) Eğitim ve öğretim desteği alan öğrencinin, resmi okula veya destek kapsamı dışında ya da destek kontenjanı dolmuş bir özel okula nakil gitmesi halinde desteği kesilecektir.
- ö) Öğrenci hangi sınıf seviyesinden eğitim ve öğretim desteği almaya hak kazanmış ise o sınıf seviyesine destek kapsamında kaydolabilecektir. İlkokul birinci sınıftan destek almaya hak kazanan öğrenci okul öncesine; okul öncesinden destek almaya hak kazanmış bir öğrenci ilkokul birinci sınıfa eğitim ve öğretim desteği kapsamında kayıt olamayacaktır.
- p) Okul öncesi veya ilkokul birinci sınıf öğrencilerinin eğitim ve öğretim desteğine başvuruları kayıtlı oldukları sınıf seviyesi üzerinden yapılabilecektir.
- r) Okullara eğitim ve öğretim desteği almaya hak kazanan öğrencilerin yerleştirme işlemlerinde, yerleştirme puanları her sınıf seviyesinde ayrı ayrı değerlendirmeye alınacaktır.
- s) Eğitim ve öğretim desteği tercihi yapmaya hak kazanmış öğrencinin velisi/vasisi, Başvuru ve Yerleştirme Takviminde belirtilen tarihlerde tercih işlemlerini yapıp, destek kapsamında kazanmış olduğu okula yine belirtilen tarihlerde kesin kayıt işlemini yaptıracaktır. Kesin kayıt işlemlerinde nakil onay işleminin

tamamlanmasından okul idaresi sorumlu olacaktır. Kesin kayıt döneminde işlemi yapılmayan öğrenci, hakkını kaybedecektir.

- ş) Veliler/vasiler nakil süreçlerini e-Okul Veli Bilgilendirme sistemi üzerinden takip edebilecek olup naklin tamamlanmasından sorumlu olacaktır.
- t) Ücretsiz veya kurumun ilan ettiği yıllık ücretin % 51'i ve fazlası oranında burslu okutulan öğrenciler için eğitim ve öğretim desteği verilmeyecektir.
- u) Kurumların ilan ettiği ücretler üzerinden yapılan indirimlerde indirim oranına bakılmaksızın öğrenci eğitim ve öğretim desteğinden yararlanabilir. İndirim sonucunda oluşan öğrenim ücreti eğitim ve öğretim desteğinden az olamaz.
- ü) Yönetmelik eki Eğitim ve Öğretim Desteği Verilebilecek Öğrencilerin Tespit Formu'yla (Ek-12) ilgili değişiklik talepleri, son başvuru tarihine kadar öğrencinin kayıtlı olduğu okul idareleri tarafından yapılabilecektir. Son başvuru tarihinden sonra değişiklik talepleri kabul edilmeyecektir.

## 2. YERLEŞTİRME İŞLEMLERİ

- a) Eğitim ve öğretim desteği almaya hak kazanan öğrencilerin yerleştirme işlemlerinde, yerleştirme puanları her sınıf seviyesinde ayrı ayrı değerlendirmeye alınacaktır.
- b) Sınıf seviyelerinin her birine okulun destek kontenjanının yüzde 25'i kadar öğrenci yerleştirilir. Her sınıf seviyesine bina kontenjanının yüzde 25'inden fazla öğrenci yerleşemeyecektir.
- c) Temel liselerde 9, 10 ve 11'inci sınıf seviyesinin her birine, okulun eğitim ve öğretim desteği kontenjanının yüzde 20'si kadar; 12'nci sınıf seviyesine ise okulun destek kontenjanının yüzde 40'ı kadar öğrenci yerleştirilecektir.
- ç) Bina kontenjanlarının boş kalan bölümlerine, özel okulu dışarıdan tercih eden öğrenciler ve özel okula kayıtlı olan öğrencilerden en yüksek puana göre öğrenciler yerleştirilecek olup, okulun bina kontenjanının dolması halinde ilgili özel okula kayıtlı öğrencilerden puan üstünlüğüne göre yerleştirme işlemi yapılacaktır.
- d) Öğrencilerin tercihleri sonucunda ilgili özel okul için iki yerleştirme puanı ilan edilecektir. Yerleştirmede oluşan en düşük puanlar; kurum dışından yerleşen öğrenci ile okulun kayıtlı öğrencisinin en düşük puanları olacaktır.
- e) Okulların eğitim ve öğretim destekli kontenjanlarının üzerinde destek kapsamında yerleştirme işlemi yapılmayacaktır.
- f) Ek Yerleştirme işlemi için ayrıca tercih alınmayacak olup ilk tercihlere göre okulların boş kalan kontenjanlarına yukarıdaki esaslar doğrultusunda yerleştirme yapılacaktır.

## 3. BAŞVURU ŞARTLARI

- a) T.C. vatandaşı olmak,
- b) Okul öncesi eğitimde 18 Mart 2012 ile 18 Eylül 2013 tarihlerinde veya arasında

doğmuş olmak,

- c) İlkokul birinci sınıflarda 30 Eylül 2017 tarihi itibariyle kayıt şartlarına sahip olmak,
- ç) Beşinci sınıfa devam edeceklerde 18 Eylül 2017 tarihi itibariyle ortaokul veya imam-hatip ortaokulu kayıt şartlarına sahip olmak,
- d) Ortaöğretime devam edeceklerde ortaöğretim kurumlarının kayıt şartlarına sahip olmak,
- e) Eğitim ve öğretim desteği alırken 2016-2017 eğitim öğretim yılı sonunda sınıf tekrarı yapmamış olmak,
- f) Resmi/özel ilkokul, ortaokul ve ortaöğretim okullarının ara sınıflarında kayıtlı olmak,
- g) Eğitim ve öğretim desteği almak istediği okul türünün kayıt ve nakil şartlarına haiz olmak,

#### 4. OKULLARIN YAPACAKLARI İŞLEMLER

##### 4.1. Eğitim ve Öğretim Desteğinden Yararlanmak İsteyen Özel Okulların Yapacakları İşlemler

- a) 2017-2018 öğretim yılı eğitim ve öğretim desteği başvuru ve yerleştirme takviminde belirtilen tarihlerde özel okul yöneticileri ( Önceki yıllarda eğitim ve öğretim desteği kapsamında olan özel okullar dâhil), MEBBİS'te yer alan Özel Öğretim Kurumları Modülü üzerinden eğitim ve öğretim desteği kapsamına alınacak öğrencilerden nakil ve kayıt almak istedikleri sınıf kademelerini sisteme ekleyeceklerdir.
- b) Okullar, eğitim ve öğretim desteği kapsamında öğrenci almak istemedikleri sınıf seviyesine giriş yapmayacaktır.
- c) Özel ilkokul, ortaokul ve ortaöğretim okulları, güncel bina kontenjanının % 75'ine kadar, okul öncesi kurumlarda ise güncel bina kontenjanının % 70'ine kadar eğitim ve öğretim desteği kapsamındaki öğrencileri nakil ve kayıt alabilecektir.

##### 4.2. Öğrenci Başvurularını Alacak Resmi/Özel Okulların Yapacakları İşlemler

- a) Okul yöneticileri varsa Yönetmelik eki Eğitim ve Öğretim Desteği Verilebilecek Öğrencilerin Tespit Formu'nun (Ek-12) 1'inci maddesinin (b), (c), (d) fıkralarında yer alan (her madde için bir adet belge) 2015-2016 ve 2016-2017 eğitim öğretim yıllarına ait bilgilerini Modüle girecektir. Belgeler; il millî eğitim müdürlükleri, gençlik hizmetleri ve spor il müdürlükleri ve ilgili federasyonlar tarafından düzenlenerek onaylanmış olmalıdır.
- b) Okul yöneticileri, Yönetmelik eki Eğitim ve Öğretim Desteği Verilebilecek Öğrencilerin Tespit Formu'nun (Ek-12) 2'nci maddesinde belirtilen; ailede çalışan anne ve baba, anne ve babanın ayrı olması durumunda öğrencinin veli/vasi gelirlerinin (kira geliri, nafaka, bilirkişi ücreti, görev tazminatı, döner sermaye, ek ders ücreti gibi ek ödemeler ve diğer gelirler dâhil) aylık toplamına göre bilgileri Modüle girecektir. Anne, baba veya veli/vasiden beyan ettikleri gelirlerin dışında başka herhangi bir gelirinin olmadığına ve ödeme almadıklarına dair Gelir Beyan Taahhütnamesi (e-Kılavuz Eki) doldurularak teslim alınacaktır.

- c) Okul yöneticileri Yönetmelik eki Eğitim ve Öğretim Desteği Verilebilecek Öğrencilerin Tespit Formu'nun (Ek-12) 3'üncü maddesinde belirtilen; Ailede Öğrenim Gören Diğer Çocuklar bölümünde üniversitede okuyan veya 2017-2018 eğitim öğretim yılında üniversitede okumaya hak kazanan öğrenci bilgileri ile e-Okul sistemi dışında yer alan kardeş öğrencilerin öğrenim belgelerini kontrol ederek bilgilerini Modüle girecektir.
- ç) Okul yöneticileri, Yönetmelik eki Eğitim ve Öğretim Desteği Verilebilecek Öğrencilerin Tespit Formu'nun (Ek-12) 4'üncü maddesinin 4'üncü ve 5'inci satırlarında yer alan durumlara ilişkin onaylı belgesini kontrol ederek bilgilerini Modüle girecektir.
- d) Okul yöneticileri, Yönetmelik eki Eğitim ve Öğretim Desteği Verilebilecek Öğrencilerin Tespit Formu'nun (Ek-12) 6'nıncı maddesinde belirtilen; 5580 sayılı Kanununun 13'üncü maddesinde belirtilen çocukların bilgilerini Modüle girecektir.
- e) Okul yöneticileri, Yönetmelik eki Eğitim ve Öğretim Desteği Verilebilecek Öğrencilerin Tespit Formu'nda (Ek-12) yer alan bilgi ve belgeleri kontrol ederek Modüle girecektir. Başvuru çıktısının onaylı bir örneği veliye/vasiye verilecek bir örneği de okul müdürlüklerinde muhafaza edilecektir. Gerçeğe aykırı bilgi ve belge girişinde bulunan okul yöneticileri hakkında yasal işlem yapılacaktır.
- f) Başvuru esnasında okul yönetimlerince (a), (b), (c), (ç) ve (d) maddelerinde belirtilen belgelerin aslı görülerek birer örneği, Gelir Beyan Taahhütnamesinin ise aslı teslim alınacaktır.

##### **5. DESTEKTEN YARARLANMAK İSTEYEN ÖĞRENCİ VELİLERİNİN/ VASİLERİNİN YAPACAKLARI İŞLEMLER**

- a) Veliler/vasiler, öğrencinin kayıtlı bulunduğu resmi/özel okul müdürlüklerinde, e-Okuldaki Özel Kurumlar Eğitim ve Öğretim Desteği Menüsü üzerinden başvurularını yapacaktır.
- b) Veliler/vasiler, Yönetmelik eki Eğitim ve Öğretim Desteği Verilebilecek Öğrencilerin Tespit Formu'nda (Ek-12) yer alan bilgilerin doğruluğundan sorumlu olacaktır. Yanlış bilgi ve belge sunanların başvuruları ve eğitim ve öğretim desteği hakları geçersiz sayılacak olup haklarında yasal işlem yapılacaktır.
- c) Veliler/vasiler, uluslararası federasyonlarca yapılmış olan ve öğrencinin katılmış olduğu olimpiyatlar ve resmi makamlarca ulusal ve il düzeyinde yapılan yarışmalarda alınan derecelere (birinci, ikinci, üçüncü) ait belgelerin aslını ibraz ederek bir örneğini başvuru esnasında okul müdürlüğüne teslim edecektir.
- ç) Veliler/vasiler, eğitim ve öğretim desteği alacak öğrencinin birlikte yaşadığı aile bireylerine ait (anne ve baba veya veli/vasi) 2017 yılı Mayıs-Haziran-Temmuz aylarından herhangi birinin toplam gelir durumunu gösteren vergi dairesi, muhasebe birimleri veya ilgili kişi, kurum ve kuruluşlardan alınacak belge ve bu e-Kılavuz ekinde yer alan Gelir Beyan Taahhütnamesini başvuru esnasında okul müdürlüğüne teslim edecektir. Belirtilen aylara ait bordrosu alınamayan kişiler için 2017 yılına ait son alınan bordroya göre işlem yapılacaktır. Herhangi bir gelir beyan etmeyen anne, baba veya veli/vasi ise; Mal Müdürlükleri, Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumlarından 2017 yılında gelir getirici herhangi bir işi olmadığına dair resmi belgeyi alarak okul



müdürlüğüne teslim edecektir.

- d) Veliler/vasiler, üniversitede öğrenim gören diğer kardeşlerin öğrenim durumunu veya üniversitede okumaya hak kazandığını gösteren belgeleri ile e-Okul sistemi dışındaki kardeş öğrencilerin öğrenim belgelerini başvuru esnasında okul müdürlüklerine teslim edecektir.
- e) Eğitim ve öğretim desteği tercihi yapmaya hak kazanan öğrencilerin velileri/vasileri Başvuru ve Yerleştirme Takviminde belirtilen tarihlerde e-Okul üzerinden en fazla 15 okul tercihi yapabilecektir.

## 6. BAKANLIKÇA YAPILACAK İŞLEMLER

- a) Eğitim ve öğretim desteği il kontenjanları Özel Öğretim Kurumları Genel Müdürlüğü'nün internet sayfasında (<http://ookgm.meb.gov.tr>) ilan edilecektir.
- b) MEBBİS'te yer alan Özel Öğretim Kurumları Modülü üzerinden başvurularını yapan özel okulların değerlendirilmesi sonucunda eğitim ve öğretim desteğinden yararlanmaya hak kazanan özel okullar haftalık olarak Özel Öğretim Kurumları Genel Müdürlüğü'nün internet sayfasında ilan edilecektir.
- c) Yönetmelik eki Eğitim ve Öğretim Desteği Verilebilecek Öğrencilerin Tespit Formu (Ek-12) incelenerek değerlendirme sonucunda eğitim ve öğretim desteği tercihi yapmaya hak kazanan öğrenciler Özel Öğretim Kurumları Genel Müdürlüğü'nün internet sayfasında ilan edilecektir.
- ç) Yerleştirme sonucunda bir özel okula kaydolmaya hak kazanan öğrenciler Özel Öğretim Kurumları Genel Müdürlüğü'nün internet sayfasında ilan edilecektir.
- d) Eğitim ve öğretim desteği Ek Yerleştirme Sonuçları Özel Öğretim Kurumları Genel Müdürlüğü'nün internet sayfasında ilan edilecektir.

## 7. KAYIT ALACAK ÖZEL OKULLARIN YAPACAKLARI İŞLEMLER

- a) Eğitim ve öğretim desteğinden yararlanacak öğrencinin kaydolacağı özel okul tarafından; Yönetmelik eki Eğitim ve Öğretim Desteği Verilebilecek Öğrencilerin Tespit Formu'nun (Ek-12) 1'inci maddesinin (b), (c), (d) fıkralarında belirtilen; 2015-2016 ve 2016-2017 eğitim öğretim yıllarında uluslararası federasyonlarca yapılmış olan olimpiyatlara katıldığına ilişkin veya resmi makamlarca ulusal veya il düzeyinde yapılan yarışmalarda alınan derecelere (birinci, ikinci, üçüncü) ait belgelerin onaylı örneği teslim alınacaktır.
- b) Eğitim ve öğretim desteğinden yararlanacak öğrencinin kaydolacağı özel okul tarafından; Yönetmelik eki Eğitim ve Öğretim Desteği Verilebilecek Öğrencilerin Tespit Formu'nun (Ek-12) 2'nci maddesinde belirtilen eğitim ve öğretim desteği alacak öğrencinin anne, babaya veya veli/vasiye ait 2017 yılı Mayıs-Haziran-Temmuz aylarından herhangi birinin toplam gelir durumunu gösteren vergi dairesi, muhasebe birimleri veya ilgili kişi, kurum ve kuruluşlardan alınacak belge, bu e-Kılavuz ekinde yer alan Gelir Beyan Taahhütnamesi kayıt esnasında teslim alınacaktır. Belirtilen aylara ait bordrosu olmayan kişiler için 2017'ye ait son alınan bordroya göre işlem yapılacaktır. Herhangi bir gelir beyan etmeyen anne, baba veya veli/vasiden ise; Mal Müdürlükleri, Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumlarından temin edilen 2017 yılında gelir getirici

herhangi bir işi olmadığına dair resmi belge teslim alınacaktır.

- c) Eğitim ve öğretim desteğinden yararlanacak öğrencinin kaydolacağı özel okul tarafından; Yönetmelik eki Eğitim ve Öğretim Desteği Verilebilecek Öğrencilerin Tespit Formu'nun (Ek-12) 3'üncü maddesinde belirtilen; Ailede Öğrenim Gören Diğer Çocuklar bölümünde üniversitede okuyan veya 2017-2018 eğitim öğretim yılında üniversitede okumaya hak kazanan öğrencilerin belgeleri ile e-Okul sistemi dışında öğrenim gören kardeş öğrencilerin öğrenim belgeleri kayıt esnasında teslim alınacaktır.
- ç) Eğitim ve öğretim desteğinden yararlanacak öğrencinin kaydolacağı özel okul tarafından; Yönetmelik eki Eğitim ve Öğretim Desteği Verilebilecek Öğrencilerin Tespit Formu'nun (Ek-12) 6'ncı maddesinde belirtilen; harp veya vazife malulü sayılanların ilk ve orta öğrenim çağındaki çocuklarıyla haklarında koruma bakım veya barınma kararı verilen çocukların belgeleri kayıt esnasında teslim alınacaktır.

**DİKKAT:**5580 sayılı Kanun Kapsamındaki Özel Okullarda Öğrenim Görecek Öğrenciler İçin Verilecek Eğitim ve Öğretim Desteği Uygulama e-Kılavuzunda yer alan esaslar, kılavuzun yayımlandığı tarihten itibaren yürürlüğe girer. Bu esaslar yasama, yürütme ve yargı organları ile Bakanlığın gerekli görmesi halinde değiştirilebilir. Bu gibi durumlarda izlenecek yol Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı tarafından belirlenir ve Özel Öğretim Kurumları Genel Müdürlüğü'nün internet sayfasında (<http://ookgm.meb.gov.tr>) kamuoyuna duyurulur.



EK

**GELİR BEYAN TAAHHÜTNAMESİ**

..... okulunda kayıtlı bulunan  
öğrenci..... velisi/vasisiyim.

Başvuru işlemlerinde öğrenci değerlendirme kriterlerinde değerlendirilmek üzere ailemizin (anne, baba veya veli/vasi) gelirleri aşağıda yer almaktadır.

1. Bordroya dayalı aylık gelir: ..... TL.'dir.
2. Gayri menkul aylık kira geliri: .....TL.'dir.
3. Diğer gelirlerin toplamı (aylık olarak belirlenecektir.) : .....TL.'dir

Yukarıda beyan ettiğim gelirlerim dışında herhangi bir gelirim bulunmamaktadır.

Yukarıda beyan ettiğim gelirlerim dışında beyan etmediğim herhangi bir gelirin tespiti halinde, 5580 sayılı Kanununun EK 1'inci maddesi hükümleri ile diğer genel hükümler doğrultusunda hakkımda yasal işlem yapılacağını bildiğimi beyan ederim.

Öğrenci Velisinin /Vasisinin

Adı Soyadı :

İmzası :

## Appendix I. Evaluation Form for Applicant Students of the EIP (2015-2016)

EK-12

### EĞİTİM VE ÖĞRETİM DESTEĞİ VERİLEBİLECEK ÖĞRENCİLERİN TESPİT FORMU

ÖĞRENCİ DEĞERLENDİRME KRİTERLERİ	PUAN DEĞERİ	PUAN
<b>1-Öğrencilerin Başarısı</b>		
a) Bir önceki yıldaki başarı durumu		
b) Ülkemizi uluslararası olimpiyatlarda temsil etmesi (İlgili federasyonlarca)	70	
c) Ulusal düzeyde yapılan yarışmalarda aldığı başarı (Birincilik, ikincilik, üçüncülük)	50	
d) İl genelinde yapılan yarışmalarda aldığı başarı (Birincilik, ikincilik, üçüncülük)	40	
<b>2- Ailenin Aylık Toplam Geliri</b>		
1.000 TL den daha az ise	340	
1.000 TL veya 1.500 TL arası ise	330	
1.501 TL veya 2.500 TL arası ise	320	
2.501 TL veya 3.500 TL arası ise	310	
3.501 TL veya 4.500 TL arası ise	280	
4.501 TL veya 6.000 TL arası ise	250	
6.001 TL veya 7.500 TL arası ise	200	
7.501 TL veya 9.000 TL arası ise	100	
9.001 TL veya 10.500 TL arası ise	80	
10.501 TL ve daha fazla	40	
<b>3-Ailede Öğrenim Gören Diğer Çocuklar</b>		
Yok	0	
Her bir okul öncesi eğitim ve ilköğretim öğrencisi için (En Fazla Üç Kardeş-her biri için 20 puan )	60	
Her bir ortaöğretim okulu öğrencisi için (En Fazla Üç Kardeş-her biri için 20 puan )	60	
Açık öğretim veya askeri okul öğrencisi (En Fazla Üç Kardeş-her biri için 20 puan )	60	
Her bir üniversite öğrencisi için (En Fazla İki Kardeş-her biri için 40 puan )	80	
<b>4- Anne ve Babanın Durumu</b>		
Anne ve baba ölü	100	
Anne veya baba ölü	80	
Anne ve baba ayrı	40	
Anne ya da baba MEB Personeli	70	
<b>5- Aldığı disiplin cezaları (Uyarma Cezaları Hariç)</b>	-100	
<b>6- Kanununun 13 üncü maddesinde belirtilen harp veya vazife malulü sayılanların ilk ve orta öğrenim çağındaki çocukları ile haklarında koruma, bakım veya barınma kararı verilen çocuklar</b>	100	
<b>TOPLAM PUAN</b>		

(\*) Ailenin aylık toplam gelir tutarları her yıl bir önceki yıla ilişkin olarak Vergi Usul Kanunu hükümlerine göre belirlenen yeniden değerlendirme oranında artırılmak suretiyle yeniden belirlenir.

Appendix J. The Educational Indicators of Public and Private Schools (2012-2017)

School Type and School Year	Number of Schools		Number of Teachers		Number of Students		Number of Classrooms		Number of Students Per Classroom			Number of Students Per Teacher			
	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private	Total	Public	Private	Total	
<b>Pre-primary*</b>															
2012-2013	2,005	3,013	13,134	12,895	953,209	1,472,724	37,900	11,472	25	11	22	73	10	41	
2013-2014	2,196	3,234	13,127	12,731	923,590	1,35,905	37,387	13,079	25	10	21	70	11	41	
2014-2015	2,380	3,555	15,705	16,719	985,013	1,71,648	39,070	13,718	25	13	22	63	10	36	
2015-2016	3,074	3,714	17,493	18,083	1,017,436	1,91,670	41,566	16,699	24	11	21	58	11	34	
2016-2017	4,089	4,630	22,453	16,510	1,124,727	201,396	16,727	22,550	67	9	34	50	12	34	
2017-2018	4,855	5,218	25,688	19,447	1,264,733	236,355	18,851	25,736	67	9	34	49	12	33	
<b>Primary</b>															
2012-2013	28,177	992	261,497	20,546	5,426,529	167,381	222,265	12,655	24	13	24	21	8	20	
2013-2014	27,461	1,071	267,171	21,273	5,390,591	184,325	227,679	15,626	24	12	23	20	9	19	
2014-2015	26,339	1,205	273,058	22,194	5,230,878	203,272	219,937	17,823	24	11	23	19	9	18	
2015-2016	25,133	1,389	277,053	25,908	5,128,664	232,039	223,071	23,019	23	10	22	19	9	18	
2016-2017	24,155	1,324	269,770	23,108	4,759,317	213,113	225,945	22,325	21	10	20	18	9	17	
2017-2018	23,349	1,618	268,210	28,966	4,870,859	233,740	226,114	26,159	22	9	20	18	8	17	
<b>Lower Secondary</b>															
2012-2013	16,082	904	250,833	18,926	5,035,415	164,294	114,691	9,893	44	17	42	20	9	19	
2013-2014	16,046	972	259,345	21,459	4,998,232	182,019	118,146	10,405	42	17	40	19	8	18	
2014-2015	15,857	1,111	273,049	23,016	4,754,540	208,424	137,351	10,342	35	20	34	17	9	17	
2015-2016	15,787	1,555	291,392	31,288	4,595,342	278,089	147,626	17,317	31	16	30	16	9	15	
2016-2017	16,397	1,481	295,575	28,775	5,066,780	288,766	159,464	17,672	32	16	30	17	10	17	
2017-2018	16,875	1,869	302,257	37,593	5,077,153	321,779	162,565	23,107	31	14	29	17	9	16	
<b>Upper Secondary (General)</b>															
2012-2013	3,306	907	99,196	20,197	1,817,421	138,811	60,077	10,030	30	14	28	18	7	16	
2013-2014	2,736	1,007	95,785	21,568	1,753,332	140,610	53,303	11,196	33	13	29	18	7	16	
2014-2015	2,780	1,174	99,707	23,453	1,601,563	164,281	54,356	13,470	29	12	26	16	7	14	
2015-2016	2,806	2,504	101,560	49,898	1,461,117	373,394	56,405	34,401	26	11	20	14	7	12	
2016-2017	2,978	2,246	102,254	44,798	1,537,036	402,760	58,371	30,560	26	13	22	15	9	13	
2017-2018	3,110	2,606	105,001	54,578	1,533,087	450,725	61,132	35,320	25	13	21	15	8	12	
<b>Upper Secondary (Vocational)</b>															
2012-2013	6,078	126	133,321	2,181	2,007,128	17,854	58,356	1,103	34	16	34	15	8	15	
2013-2014	5,931	426	124,260	7,472	1,689,093	56,053	54,365	4,851	31	12	29	14	8	13	
2014-2015	3,660	429	131,714	7,660	1,832,460	75,890	57,252	5,875	32	13	30	14	10	14	
2015-2016	3,671	419	136,537	8,604	1,781,910	99,217	60,617	7,326	29	14	28	13	12	13	
2016-2017	4,027	372	137,326	7,771	1,737,000	111,720	63,695	6,922	27	16	26	13	14	13	
2017-2018	4,077	383	136,638	8,873	1,686,075	109,113	67,178	7,833	25	14	24	12	12	12	
<b>Upper Secondary (Religious)</b>															
2012-2013	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2013-2014	854	-	29,556	-	474,096	-	16,845	-	28	-	-	16	-	-	
2014-2015	1,017	-	35,844	-	546,443	-	20,708	-	26	-	-	15	-	-	
2015-2016	1,149	-	39,091	-	555,870	-	23,781	-	23	-	-	14	-	-	
2016-2017	1,452	-	40,891	-	506,516	-	30,203	-	17	-	-	12	-	-	
2017-2018	1,604	-	42,879	-	514,806	-	32,805	-	16	-	-	12	-	-	
<b>Total (Formal Education)**</b>															
2012-2013	55,648	5,942	757,981	74,745	15,239,702	613,064	493,289	45,153	31	14	29	20	8	19	
2013-2014	55,224	6,710	789,244	84,503	15,228,934	698,912	507,725	55,157	30	13	28	19	8	18	
2014-2015	52,033	7,474	829,077	93,042	14,950,897	823,515	528,674	61,228	28	13	27	18	9	17	
2015-2016	51,620	9,581	863,126	133,781	14,540,339	1,174,409	553,066	98,762	26	12	24	17	10	16	
2016-2017	53,098	10,053	868,269	120,962	14,731,376	1,217,755	554,405	100,029	27	12	24	17	10	16	
2017-2018	53,870	11,694	880,673	149,457	14,946,713	1,351,712	568,645	118,155	26	11	24	17	9	16	

Source: MoNE Statistics (2015b, 2016, 2017, 2018).

The school year 2012-13 is the initiation of 4+4+4 policy which divided the basic education period into three equal parts.

\* Number of pre-primary schools do NOT include the nursery classes in the private schools. It also affects the numbers of teachers and students.

\*\* Open education statistics are NOT included.